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ABSTRACT 
 
The activism of ethnic interest groups reflects the development of a pluralist American 
foreign-policy process in the post-Cold War era.  Since U.S. political power is divided and 
shared between the Presidency and Congress, there are two separate and interdependent 
decision-making arenas for interest groups to seek political access.  A topic left relatively 
under examined is the impact of partisanship in executive-legislative relations on the 
strategies groups use to influence foreign-policy decisions.  This thesis contributes to the 
study of the domestic politics of foreign policymaking by examining the role of ethnic 
interest groups in the Clinton administration’s decision to enlarge the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).  Party control of American political institutions, public opinion, and 
mass electoral pressure are posited as variables to guide the theory development of group 
strategies in foreign-policy lobbying.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On 30 April 1998, the United States Senate ratified the Protocols of Accession to the NATO 
Treaty by the vote of 80 to 19.  This signified the successful outcome of a major U.S. 
foreign-policy decision of the post-Cold War era:  the expansion of NATO into Central and 
Eastern Europe.  Policy entrepreneurs in the Clinton administration and in Congress were 
instrumental in guiding NATO enlargement along the policy process (Goldgeier, 1998; 1999; 
Carter & Scott, 2009, pp. 160-1).  A non-governmental organization that played an important 
part in the NATO enlargement debate was the coalition of ethnic groups representing 
Americans of Central and Eastern European ancestry.  Back in December 1993 when the 
Clinton administration put the brakes on enlargement by prioritizing the Partnership for 
Peace over bringing Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia into NATO, leaders 
of 18 ethnic organizations met at the Washington D.C. office of the Polish American 
Congress to establish the Central and East Europe Coalition (CEEC).  The primary mission 
of the CEEC then and now is the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into U.S.-led 
security institutions.  NATO is the key institution that anchors America’s security interests in 
the region. 
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 Even before the first round of NATO enlargement of the post-Cold War era was 
completed, the CEEC lobbied the Clinton White House to maintain an “open door policy.”  
The admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in 1999 marked the beginning of 
the CEEC’s campaign to bring all democratic Central and Eastern European states under the 
NATO security umbrella.  The CEEC continued to support the further expansion of NATO, 
including the admission of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia in 2004, and Albania and Croatia in 2009.  The CEEC issued a statement in April 
2009 reiterating “its support for the Alliance’s continued open door policy to include 
countries which are ready, able and willing to join the Alliance and which are democratic and 
respect the rule of law, including human and minority rights” (CEEC, 2009).  Recently in 
April 2012, the CEEC lobbied the Obama administration before the NATO Summit in 
Chicago to offer Macedonia an invitation to join the Alliance (Hungarian American 
Coalition). 
 The CEEC’s continued advocacy for enlarging NATO relates to the past and present 
regarding the influence of ethnic interest groups in U.S. foreign policy.  As McCormick 
(2012, p. 319) observed, “Ethnic groups . . . are not only the oldest foreign policy lobby but, 
in many ways, often turn out to be the most influential.”  The CEEC resembles the Assembly 
of Captive European Nations, a coalition of ethnic groups founded in 1954 to oppose Soviet 
domination of their ancestral homelands (Garrett, 1978, p. 305).  International events have 
triggered the establishment of ethnic lobbies.  For example, the Polish American Congress 
was established in Buffalo, New York in 1944 after the failure by the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
administration to restore Poland’s borders backed to its pre-World War II configurations.  
The demise of the Soviet Union inspired calls by the Polish American Congress and other 
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ethnic groups that comprise the CEEC for NATO memberships for their ancestral 
homelands.  The decision to lobby together for a common cause was motivated in part by the 
ethnic leaders’ outrage over the perceived acquiescence by the Clinton administration to 
Russian opposition by promoting the Partnership for Peace in lieu of “fast track” enlargement 
at the 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels.  The ethnic leaders regarded the administration’s 
decision as tantamount to a “second Yalta,” a reference to the post-World War II division of 
Europe.  As Tony Smith, author of Foreign Attachments, observed, “demands related to 
security are the most critical ones made by ethnic lobbies, for they involve the possibility of 
armed confrontation for the sake of survival of a foreign state” (2000, p. 119). 
 What is significant about the role of ethnic groups in U.S. foreign policymaking is 
their involvement on international security issues.  While all ethnic groups champion a 
“special relationship” between the U.S. and their ancestral homelands, the CEEC is probably 
the only group that actively lobbies for the U.S. government to enter into a treaty-bounded 
security commitment with their ancestral states.  These policies may fall below the level of 
decisions of peace and war, but the U.S. decision to enlarge NATO may entail the possibility 
of the U.S. engaging in armed conflict in defense of its NATO allies.  NATO enlargement is 
not considered a crisis-type issue where decision-making is pursued in small-group settings 
(Haney, 1997).  The policy process is not insulated from public pressure, as a matter of fact, 
it is completely exposed.  The U.S. politics of NATO enlargement provides a picture of a 
pluralist policymaking environment.  While the post-Cold War foreign-policy agenda has 
seen the rise in “intermestic” issues, it is safe to assume that NATO enlargement remains in 
most part a foreign-policy issue in its truest form.  The role of the U.S. Senate in the 
ratification process implies that NATO enlargement is a policy issue that requires 
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interactions between the executive and legislative branches.  Congressional involvement and 
the administration’s need for public support to secure ratification also implied that societal 
interests would be activated as well. 
 The policymaking system has become more pluralist since the end of the Cold War, 
and in turn, it has become more partisan.  The inclusion of NATO enlargement in the 
Republicans’ Contract with America and the GOP takeover of Congress after the 1994 
election intensified partisanship in the NATO enlargement debate.  It may be true that 
congressional assertiveness has come at the expense of executive dominance in foreign 
policymaking (Scott, 2002; Peterson, 1994).  The common occurrence of divided government 
has undercut executive-legislative cooperation in foreign policymaking.  As Tierney (1994, 
p. 102) observed, “In an era dominated by persistently divided government . . . partisanship 
has become the driving force in congressional differences with the executive over foreign 
and defense policy.”  The lack of bipartisan consensus over the role of the U.S. in world 
affairs is contributing to an executive-legislative “tug-of-war” over foreign policymaking 
(Rosner, 1995).  Interest groups have to consider the political dynamics of the policymaking 
environment when planning their lobbying strategies. 
 The post-Cold War foreign-policy system has been subjected to increased pluralism 
and partisanship.  The rise in the number of societal actors—most of which are ethnic interest 
groups—speaks to the development of a pluralist policymaking process.  Contention between 
the executive and legislative branches has increased the potential for gridlock in foreign 
policymaking (Peake, 2002).  A topic that remains relatively under examined is the impact of 
partisanship in executive-legislative relations on the strategic choices of interest groups.  If 
ethnic groups continue to have influence over policies concerning U.S. relations with their 
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ancestral homelands, and considering the diversity and number of ethnic groups active today, 
their influence over U.S. foreign policy could be substantial and wide-ranging.  In order to 
better understand the sources of influence for ethnic groups and how they operate in a 
partisan era, it is important to ask the right questions.  This begins by asking how the 
executive-legislative context shapes the lobbying strategies of interest groups.   
Research Question 
This thesis examines the impact of the executive-legislative context on interest-group 
strategies in foreign-policy lobbying.  Party control of the executive and legislative branches 
is a factor determining the level of concurrence or contention in the policymaking 
environment (Conley, 2002).  Of particular interest in this study is the role of divided 
government, which has been institutionalized in the contemporary American political 
landscape (Fiorina, 1992).  In a political system where power is divided and shared between 
the branches, interest groups have two separate yet interdependent decision-making arenas to 
consider.  If party control is significant in shaping the dynamics of executive-legislative 
relations, it is likely that a change from unified to divided government or vice versa would 
influence the strategies interest groups use to access the political process.  Thus, the 
relationship between the shift in party control of government and group lobbying strategies is 
the focus of this thesis.  It seeks to contribute to the understanding of how the policymaking 
context impacts the lobbying behavior of interest groups.  This study attempts to offer 
insights into how interest groups adjust their lobbying strategies in response to partisanship 
in relations between Congress and the Presidency. 
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 The composition of ethnic groups suggests that they are part of a larger constellation 
of citizen groups active in the Washington lobbying scene (Berry, 1999).  The focus on 
ethnic groups in this thesis allows for the examination of the strategies citizen groups use to 
influence foreign policymaking.  The engagement of these groups suggests the potential for 
increased democratic participation in the foreign-policy process.  Thus, if pluralism in U.S. 
foreign policy is shaped by the activism of groups reliant on “citizen lobbyists” as a source of 
power, there needs to be expanded knowledge in how groups with grassroots mobilization 
potential exert influence over the political process. 
 The focus on grassroots groups must consider the strategies used to mobilize mass 
political action.  Instances where group leaders mobilize their members to pressure 
policymakers are known as outside lobbying (Gais & Walker, 1991; Kollman, 1998).  This 
strategy may be effective in demonstrating mass political pressure, but coordinating 
grassroots action could be quite labor intensive.  First, the challenge for groups reliant on 
grassroots mobilization is overcoming the dilemma of collective action (Olson, 1965).  
Outside lobbying is effective only if large numbers of members are willing to pursue political 
action.  Second, policymakers have to be convinced that outside pressure directed at them is 
credible.  There is the possibility that grassroots pressure may appear contrived, or what is 
known as “astroturf” building (Smith H. , 1988, pp. 245-51).  Outside lobbying is not only 
aimed at lawmakers, but it is also directed internally—more specifically—mobilizing its 
members to pursue grassroots actions.  Ethnic groups are effective in demonstrating mass 
political pressure because of the connection members have regarding issues concerning their 
ancestral homelands.  Shaping public awareness of an issue not only facilitates the 
mobilization of its members to undertake political action, it also signals to policymakers the 
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intensity of group preference on that issue.  The variable that mediates between the use of 
outside lobbying to mobilize grassroots action and its effectiveness in pressuring 
policymakers is issue salience.  In order to develop a better understanding of how grassroots 
action could be converted into political influence, it is important to recognize the message 
group leaders convey to their members and policymakers.  Thus, issue salience is posited as a 
variable that examines the assumptions of the role interest groups play in shaping public 
opinion in foreign policymaking. 
 Outside lobbying is proven to be a multipurpose strategy for grassroots groups.  
Another element to outside lobbying is the ability for grassroots activities to simulate 
electoral mobilization (Wright, 2003, p. 90).  The logic here is that if group members are 
willing to engage in grassroots activities on behalf of a cause, it is most likely that they 
would take their preferences on that issue into the voting booth come election day.  
Especially for groups dependent on their membership bases for political influence, 
demonstrating the electoral clout of their members is an effective strategy to achieve political 
access since legislators desire to be re-elected (Mayhew, 1974).  There are ethnic groups with 
populations concentrated in key swing states that would make elected officials responsive to 
their concerns.  While mobilizing mass electoral pressure may be more effective toward 
Congress, there are opportunities where electoral politics could influence presidential 
decision-making.  The importance of the “battleground states” in recent presidential races 
could explain why presidents may become responsive to constituent pressure, even on 
foreign-policy matters.  Examining the strategies grassroots groups use to access the political 
process must consider group decisions to mobilize mass electoral pressure.  Thus, electoral 
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pressure is posited as a variable that examines the strategies group leaders use to “activate” 
foreign-policy issues of concern in an election campaign. 
Plan of Organization 
Chapter Two reviews the literature animating the topic of this thesis.  This chapter is divided 
into five sections, each focusing on a particular body of literature.  The first section reviews 
the studies concerning the role of interest groups, with particular attention to ethnic groups, 
in U.S. foreign policymaking and the strategies use to achieve political access.  This is 
followed by a review of the literature concerning the impact of party control on policymaking 
between the executive and legislative branches.  The third and fourth sections examine 
studies on interest-group relations with the Presidency and Congress, respectively.  The fifth 
section focuses on studies related to the electoral connection in U.S. foreign policy. 
 Chapter Three develops the theoretical framework for this thesis.  This chapter 
proposes a theory on the impact of the executive-legislative context on group selection of 
lobbying strategies, and in particular, the decisions by groups to target the executive and/or 
legislative decision-making arenas.  The aim is to develop a better understanding of how the 
policymaking context shapes the lobbying strategies of interest groups.  Three variables are 
posited in constructing this theoretical framework:  party control of government; issue 
salience; electoral pressure.  At least one testable hypothesis is offered for each variable to 
guide the theory testing in the empirical case-study chapters. 
 Chapter Four proposes the research design for this study.  The goal of this chapter is 
to connect the theoretical framework with empirical research.  The case-study method is used 
to achieve this goal.  The discussion is divided into three parts.  Part One discusses the 
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opportunities and challenges in the use of case-study methods in social science research.  Part 
Two focuses on case selection; and Part Three discusses the use of primary and secondary 
sources that comprise the data collection. 
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven constitute the empirical portion of the thesis, based on 
the case study entitled, “Clinton, Interest Groups, and the U.S. Politics of NATO 
Enlargement.”  The focus is on the role of the coalition of ethnic groups representing 
Americans of Central and Eastern European origins in the U.S. decision to enlarge NATO.  
Due to the duration of the NATO enlargement case (1993 to 1998), it is divided into three 
chapters, each focusing on a particular stage of development.  Chapter Five focuses on the 
events from September 1993 to November 1994, beginning with the Clinton administration’s 
internal deliberations over the pros and cons of enlarging NATO and ending with the 1994 
midterm election that resulted in the Republicans winning control of both houses of 
Congress.  Chapter Six begins with the start of the 105th Congress in January 1995 and the 
House Republicans’ plans to legislate on the Contract with America, including NATO 
enlargement, and ends with the 1996 presidential election where significant attention was 
devoted to the NATO enlargement issue in the battleground states of the Midwestern and 
Northeastern U.S.  Chapter Seven focuses on the administration’s campaign to secure the 
“advice and consent” of the U.S. Senate.  It begins in March 1997 with the establishment of 
the administration’s NATO Enlargement Ratification Office and ends with the final Senate 
vote on 30 April 1998. 
Chapter Eight provides the conclusion for this study.  It is divided into three parts.  
Part One presents the findings of this study.  Part Two draws upon the implications of this 
study and discusses how this study might contribute to our understanding of societal 
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influences in U.S. foreign policymaking.  Part Three offers suggestions for further research 
related to the role of societal groups in the politics of NATO enlargement in U.S. and non-
U.S. political settings.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
INTEREST GROUPS AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF FOREIGN POLICY:  
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
This chapter reviews the literature animating the topic of this thesis.  It is divided into five 
sections, each examining a particular body of literature.  The first section focuses on the role 
of interest groups in U.S. foreign policymaking, with attention to ethnic groups and the 
strategies interest groups use to achieve political influence.  The second section focuses on 
the literature related to the impact of party control of the executive and legislative branches 
on the policymaking process.  The third and fourth sections focus on the literature related to 
interest-group relations with the White House and Congress.  The fifth section assesses the 
literature on the electoral impact of foreign policy.  Thus, it is important to discuss the 
contributions made by these five sets of literature and how they could be further developed to 
address the topic of this thesis. 
Interest Groups and U.S. Foreign Policymaking 
While interest groups may not be as prolific in foreign policy compared to their counterparts 
in domestic policy, interest-group activism in foreign policymaking is substantial 
nonetheless.  The constellation of groups is quite diverse.  Tierney (1993; 1994, pp. 116-23) 
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identified various types of groups involved in foreign policymaking, ranging from economic 
interests, ethnic groups, advocacy and cause groups, and foreign governments.  Groups listed 
here are involved on a wide range of issues, but just how influential are they?  Jacobs and 
Page (2005), in their study on the influence of domestic actors in U.S. foreign policy, found 
that business groups, followed by labor unions, “exercise strong, consistent, and perhaps 
lopsided influence on the makers of U.S. foreign policy” (p. 120).  The number of interest 
groups in the U.S. foreign-policy system speaks not only to their diversity but the varying 
degrees of influence they exert over policymakers. 
 Of particular interest in this study is the role of grassroots groups.  Ethnic and 
advocacy and cause groups constitute organizations with grassroots bases.  International 
security issues have inspired calls for group activism.  Knopf (1998) examines the impact of 
protest movements on U.S. arms control policy of the Cold War era.  However, significant 
attention is paid to the role of ethnic groups in U.S. foreign policy.  The edited volumes by 
Said (1981) and Ahrari (1987) and the study by Watanabe (1984) represent major works on 
the topic of the Cold War era.  The post-Cold War era has witnessed a resurgence in the 
literature on ethnic-group activism in U.S. foreign policy.  Ambrosio (2002, p. 8) wrote:  “the 
end of the Cold War created unprecedented opportunities for interest groups in general, and 
ethnic identity groups, in particular, to influence the formulation and implementation of U.S. 
foreign policy.”  The significant works that have emerged after the Cold War and within the 
past decade include:  Haney and Vanderbush (1999); Tony Smith (2000); Ambrosio (2002); 
Mearsheimer and Walt (2007); Paul and Paul (2009).  The central focus of these studies 
concerns ethnic-group activism on behalf of U.S. relations with their ancestral homelands.  
While some studies discuss the role of ethnic groups more generally, others focus indepth on 
19 
 
the activism of particular groups, for example, the role of the Greek-American lobby on the 
Turkish arms embargo (Watanabe, 1984), the Cuban-American lobby on U.S. Cuba policy 
(Haney & Vanderbush, 1999), and the Israel lobby on U.S. Middle East policy (Mearsheimer 
& Walt, 2007).  The literature in this area underscores the rising influence of ethnic groups in 
U.S. foreign policy, especially after the Cold War. 
 There is consensus in the literature that the rise in ethnic-group activism has less to do 
wth America as a nation of immigrants and more on the nature of the American political 
system.  Tony Smith (2000, p. 101) wrote:  “to understand the impact ethnic groups can have 
on American foreign policy is to understand the character of the democratic system in which 
they operate.”  The source of ethnic-group influence does not rest only on the group’s 
identity, but more importantly, on how the group operates in a political system where power 
is divided and shared between the executive and legislative branches.  Group access was 
aided in part by changes in the structure of Congress in the 1970s (Tierney, 1994).  The 
increase in the number of congressional committees and assertiveness in foreign policy 
created more access points for groups to exert influence over the policy process.  The 
literature has largely identified this development as the reason for the rise in ethnic-group 
influence in foreign policymaking.  Haney (2010, pp. 1678-9) wrote:  “A more open 
governmental system, especially a more powerful and yet more porous Congress, and the 
breakdown of the Cold War consensus about the proper course for the ship of state, gave real 
incentives for interest group activism in foreign policy—a large portion of which was driven 
by ethnic groups.” 
 A basis for ethnic groups establishing influence is the development of “mutually 
supportive relationships” with policymakers (Haney, 2010, p. 1682).  Watanabe (1984, p. 53) 
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pointed out that “the existence of a mutually compatible relationship between important 
segments of the policymaking structure and organized ethnic groups . . . is the surest basis for 
an effective ethnic group voice.”  The likelihood of group cooperation with policymakers 
hinges on what Rubenzer (2008) termed the “strategic convergence criterion.”  He wrote:  
“ethnic identity groups enjoy success to the degree that their proposals conform to existing 
U.S. strategic priorities” (p. 171).  Haney and Vanderbush (1999, p. 345) made a similar 
point:  “The proposition is that ethnic interest groups will be more successful if they promote 
policies that the government already favors.”  Paul and Paul (2009, p. 131) observed that “the 
degree to which an ethnic lobby is defending the status quo may have a profound effect on 
the lobby’s influence.”  Developing a degree of compatibility in policy preferences with 
policymakers is an important step for ethnic groups to establish political influence. 
 Another issue to consider is the decision-making arena(s) targeted by interest groups 
(Bard, 1991).  Since policymaking is divided and shared between the executive and 
legislative branches, groups have two separate yet interdependent decision-making arenas to 
target.  Schlozman and Tierney (1986, p. 390) observed:  “The existence of multiple 
institutional arenas implies that there are numerous points at which influence might be 
exerted.”  Interest groups are likely to find the path of least resistance to enter the policy 
process.  Haney and Vanderbush (1999, p. 345) pointed out that “ethnic interest groups are 
more likely to be successful when the policy in question requires a congressional role since it 
is more porous than the executive.”  However, the literature on interest groups place greater 
emphasis on the branch of government that may not be the most important in foreign 
policymaking.  Unlike Congress with its multiple access points, gaining access to the 
executive branch may be difficult since it is more insulated from public pressure.  Paul and 
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Paul (2009, p. 205) observed:  “While ethnic groups may find they are pushing on an open 
door on Capitol Hill, many are pushing against a closed door at the White House.  Access is 
the key to influence in a pluralistic society, and most ethnic groups don’t have access to the 
White House.” 
 One of the shortcomings of the literature on the role of interest groups in foreign 
policymaking is its emphasis on group relations with Congress but not with the branch of 
government central to foreign-policy formulation.  The study of interest groups in foreign 
policy could be strengthened by examining ways groups develop access to the White House, 
a step taken in this study.   The literature has yet to examine the factors that would lead 
interest groups to target Congress but not the executive, executive branch but not Congress, 
both branches with equal emphasis, or both branches albeit with varying degrees of 
emphasis.  Taking the research on interest groups in this direction would provide a 
substantive contribution to the literature.  However, developing this line of inquiry begins 
with a review of the literature on the strategies interest groups use to develop political access. 
Strategies of Interest Groups 
The choice of strategies is important in determining how interest groups develop political 
access.  As Tierney (1993, p. 99) observed, “the influence of interest groups hinges on what 
they do—what sorts of political activities they pursue and how they marshal and allocate 
their resources to advance their policy preferences.”  There is consensus in the research that 
the strategic choices of interest groups are tied to their organizational characteristics.  
Schlozman and Tierney (1986, p. 161) pointed out:  “Perhaps the most important factor 
affecting an organization’s strategic choice of lobbying techniques is its resources.”  The 
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study by Gais and Walker (1991) found that “the choice of political strategies is ultimately 
connected to the group’s prospects for organizational maintenance” (p. 106). 
 The focus on grassroots groups in foreign policymaking must consider the use of 
outside strategies.  For groups with large membership bases, the ability to mobilize at the 
grassroots level is a major source of political influence.  Gais and Walker (1991) found that 
citizen action groups are more likely to pursue outside strategies.  In their words, “groups 
engaged in conflict that are organized around a cause or idea and depend heavily upon small 
financial contributions from large numbers of members scattered across the country are most 
likely to adopt an outside strategy based upon various forms of mass political persuasion” (p. 
120).  Outside strategies are intended to bring mass pressure onto policymakers.  Kollman 
(1998, p. 3) defined outside lobbying as “attempts by interest group leaders to mobilize 
citizens outside the policymaking community to contact or pressure public officials inside the 
policymaking community.”  In essence, “outside lobbying forces policymakers to pay 
attention” (p. 76).  Baumgartner et al. (2009, p. 125) raised a similar point that “grassroots 
activities communicate to policymakers the salience of an issue as well as whether there are 
likely to be electoral implications associated with activity on the issue.”  The point that 
grassroots lobbying simulates electoral mobilization is important here (Wright, 2003, p. 90). 
 Groups dependent on grassroots mobilization as a source of political influence are 
sensitive to organization of their membership bases due to the challenge of coordinating 
collective action (Olson, 1965).  Outside lobbying is effective only when group leaders are 
able to mobilize their members to engage in mass political action.  As Furlong (2005, p. 292) 
observed, “a large and diverse membership has certain advantages when groups lobby the 
legislative branch, and these types of groups are more likely to use grassroots efforts in their 
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lobbying techniques because of their ability to influence legislators who are responsive to 
electoral pressures.”  Size matters in grassroots campaigns.  The ability to convert group 
resources into political influence also rests on the concentration or dispersion of a group’s 
membership base.  Schlozman and Tierney (1986, p. 161) wrote:  “The size and geographical 
distribution of an organization’s membership may also dictate its choice of lobbying 
strategies; if there are many members spread throughout most congressional districts, and if 
the organization has the means to mobilize them, a campaign of grass roots pressure may be 
an option.”  Paul and Paul (2009, pp. 102-3) made a similar point:  “the degree of 
geographical concentration of an ethnic group may influence the group’s ability to gain 
access to members of Congress,” while “a dispersed population allows an ethnic community 
to target many members of Congress through a grassroots campaign since . . . members of 
Congress desired to be reelected.” 
 Much of the focus so far has been on the literature examining the impact of internal 
organization of groups on their choice of lobbying strategies.  The next set of literature 
examines the impact of the governmental context on the strategic choice of groups.  The 
study by Victor (2007) found that “legislative context indeed affects groups’ decisions about 
the conditions under which they should choose to lobby using direct [inside] and indirect 
[outside] tactics” (p. 841).  The detection of political opposition or gridlock in the legislative 
environment seems to be an indicator as to when groups resort to outside strategies.  
Baumgartner et al. (2009) also found that groups lobbying “uphill” are more likely to outside 
lobby than groups defending the status quo.  Thus, “Challengers make more direct contacts 
with policy makers, and they engage in more conflict-expanding strategies designed to draw 
attention to the issues they cared about” (p. 164).  These studies support a time-honored 
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tradition in U.S. politics that groups on the losing side of a policy battle are more likely to 
use conflict-expansion strategies (Schattschneider, 1960). 
 McQuide (2010) examines the impact of party control of American political 
institutions on group lobbying behavior.  His study found that “interest groups do take into 
consideration partisanship as they consider which institutions to lobby as they seek to 
maximize their resources” (p. 16).  Unlike studies that focus on group strategies in a 
legislative context (Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998; 1999), McQuide takes into account the 
executive-legislative context.  His finding that interest groups are more likely to target the 
White House during divided government under a Democratic administration provides support 
for the observation that interest groups have become more partisan in response to the 
changing political landscape.  Partisanship is a major factor shaping not just the dynamics of 
the policymaking environment but the orientation of interest groups as well.  McQuide 
confirmed the significance of partisanship on group strategic choices.  However, his study 
does not fully consider shift in party control of government, that is, the change from unified 
to divided government or vice versa.  Interest groups sometimes have to shift their strategies 
in response to the executive-legislative context.  His study opens a new line of research in 
this area but more work needs to be done.  For example, why would groups target a 
Democratic White House during divided government?  What is significant about divided 
government that would propel groups to target the executive branch?  These questions 
provide the starting point to further our understanding on the behavior of interest groups in 
an executive-legislative context. 
 Further research is needed in this genre of study.  The starting point for the inquiry is 
the significance of party control of government on group adaptation of lobbying strategies.  
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In other words, why would interest groups change lobbying strategies when there is a shift 
from unified to divided government or vice versa?  The studies mentioned thus far have yet 
to pinpoint the variables that explain the cause and effect.  It is important to understand the 
policymaking dynamics of executive-legislative relations that could influence the strategic 
choices of interest groups.  The next set of literature takes a step in this direction. 
Parties and Policymaking 
The publication of Mayhew’s (1991) Divided We Govern inspired much of the debate 
regarding the impact of party control on policymaking.  Studies have challenged Mayhew’s 
findings that party control of government has minimal impact on legislative productivity.  
These studies found that party control matters, and its effect on policymaking is quite 
significant.  The potential for policy gridlock is higher when party control of the executive 
and legislative branches are split.  Binder (1999, p. 527) found that “divided government are 
prone to higher levels of gridlock.”  And as Sinclair (2000, p. 153) noted:  “When control of 
the presidency and the Congress is divided, higher partisanship tends toward gridlock.”  The 
study by Edwards, Barrett and Peake (1997) found that “divided government inhibits the 
passage of important legislation” (p. 562; emphasis in original).  The focus of research is on 
the impact of party control in the passage of “significant” legislation.  It is here where there is 
noticeable difference in the performance between unified and divided governments.  Unified 
government provides the “heavy lifting” to get significant legislation passed (Coleman, 1999, 
p. 828).  While the emphasis in these studies is on domestic legislation, the impact of divided 
government and the heightened potential for gridlock is also felt in foreign policymaking.  
Peake (2002, p. 80) found that “when government is divided, presidents are forced to oppose 
a greater number of foreign policy bills initiated by Congress.” 
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 Deliberations over significant legislation are more likely to create executive-
legislative contention, especially when party control of government is divided.  The politics 
of agenda control is important in this respect (Steger, 1997, pp. 19-22).  The potential for 
overlapping agendas is lower when the president’s co-partisans are not in control of the 
levers of power in Congress.  There is greater potential for a “contested agenda” as opposed 
to “shared policy agenda” when there is divided party control of the Presidency and Congress 
(Conley, 2002, pp. 8-9).  Central to the analyses on party control and policymaking is the 
increased likelihood of presidential opposition to congressional initiatives during divided 
government.  Edwards, Barrett and Peake (1997) and Edwards and Barrett (2000) found that 
presidents are more likely to oppose legislation proposed by the opposition party controlling 
Congress.  The competition over space on the congressional agenda is a significant factor 
explaining executive-legislative contention during divided government.  Party control of 
Congress shapes the ability of presidents to assert control over the congressional agenda.  
This is in line with studies on the institutional presidency positing the importance of party 
composition of Congress in determining the legislative success rates of presidents (Edwards, 
1989; Bond & Fleisher, 1990). 
 This set of literature does not consider the role of interest groups in the executive-
legislative context.  It is focused on the impact of partisanship in policymaking.  But one of 
the factors that could explain the relationship between party control and group lobbying 
strategies is shift in agenda-setting dynamics.  The study by Bader (1996) pointed out that 
divided government promotes congressional assertiveness as the need to highlight policy 
differences between the branches increases.  This point is not lost on foreign policymaking as 
“opposition parties in Congress have forwarded their own foreign policy agendas” (Peake, 
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2002, p. 68).  There is a literature on congressional assertiveness in foreign policymaking to 
substantiate this claim (Tierney, 1994; Scott, 2002), for example.  Divided government 
reinforces partisanship, and it is under this condition where policy differences between the 
branches are most visible.  A shift in agenda-setting dynamics could determine the branch of 
government interest groups seek to target.  This idea will be further developed in the next 
chapter.  But as of now, the emphasis is on reviewing the literature animating the topic of this 
thesis.  The next set of literature examines relations between interest groups and the 
presidency.  This relationship is important to interest groups involved in foreign 
policymaking, yet research in this area is still in its embryonic stage. 
Connecting the Presidency with Interest Groups 
Presidential interaction with interest groups is consistent with the strategy of “going public” 
(Kernell, 2007).  However, presidents have to adjust their strategies of public leadership in 
response to increased partisanship in the policymaking environment.  As Cohen (2010, p. 35) 
observed, “rather than focus their energies on the mass public writ broadly, presidents have 
shifted much of their leadership efforts to narrower segments of the public, in particular, their 
party base, interest groups, and localities.”  Interest groups have to diversify their strategies 
in seeking access to a branch of government well insulated from public pressure.  Groups 
could gain access to the executive branch by demonstrating their clout in Congress, or to put 
it in another way, providing legislative lobbying services for the administration may be an 
effective way for interest groups to gain White House access (Schlozman & Tierney, 1986, p. 
330).  Loomis (2009, p. 405) pointed out that “being in a position to be used by the president 
may stand as an effective lobbying technique to a group that depends on maintaining solid 
ties to the executive branch” (emphasis in original).  Rather than resorting to the traditional 
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“outside-in” approach to lobbying, like-minded groups could be targets of the White House 
“inside-out” strategies, whereby groups become part of a continuing reciprocal relationship 
with executive-branch officials (Tenpas, 2005).  For groups lobbying foreign-policy 
decisions, this is an effective way to establish political influence. 
 The presidency is very much at the forefront in the development of the interest-group 
system.  Mark Peterson (1992a, p. 237) wrote:  “Modern presidents have the institutional 
means, and have demonstrated the willingness, to influence the interest-group system.”  This 
points to the potential for more direct interaction between the administration and outside 
groups.  And as Cohen (2010, p. 45) observed, “presidents may also aid the establishment of 
new interest groups who will then become their political and policy allies.”  The 
development of the Cuban American National Foundation to assist the Reagan administration 
in developing a hardline policy toward Cuba is a foreign-policy example consistent with this 
observation (Haney & Vanderbush, 1999). 
 The focus of the literature on the White House institutional links with interest groups 
is on the development of the Office of Public Liaison (OPL).  Although not formally 
established until the Nixon administration, Pika (1987) examines presidential liaison with 
interest groups during the Franklin D. Roosevelt and Truman administrations.  His other 
study (Pika, 2009) chronicles the development of the OPL from the Nixon to George W. 
Bush administrations.  The informality of the organization of the Executive Office of the 
President means that the task of interest-group liaison often spills into other jurisdictions, for 
example, the Office of Legislative Affairs (Collier, 1997).  The main focus of the literature 
concerns presidential-group interaction on domestic policy, with the exception of Wilson 
(1997) that examines group liaison on foreign-policy matters. 
29 
 
 The studies by Mark Peterson added analytical rigor to the research on presidential 
liaison with interest groups.  The objective of mobilizing interest groups, according to 
Peterson (1992b, p. 612), is “to fuse presidential and congressional perspectives by 
transforming the goals and resources of like-minded interest groups into the political assets 
of the White House.”  Building congressional and public support for presidential initiatives 
are the primary objectives.  Peterson proposed four patterns of presidential-group 
interaction.1  Changes in administration objectives and the congressional context are key 
factors shaping the presidential mobilization of groups.  As Peterson (1992b, p. 623) 
observed, “As changes occur in the larger political context and in presidential needs and 
objectives, the character of liaison activities and their prosecution adjust accordingly.”  It is 
clear that presidential liaison with groups is a strategy adapted to respond to increased 
partisanship not just in the legislative environment, but also within the interest-group system.  
An example Peterson provided was the Reagan administration’s mobilization of 
ideologically-compatible groups to secure passage of a conservative agenda, a strategy 
dubbed “Defund the Left” (Peterson, 1992b, pp. 617-9; Peterson & Walker, 1991).  A more 
recent example discussed in Loomis (2009) is the project spearheaded by super lobbyist 
Grover Norquist to transform the K Street corridor into a bastion of interest groups 
sympathetic to conservative causes. 
                                                            
1 By combining breadth (inclusive or exclusive) with focus (programmatic or representational), there are four 
possible executive-group interaction patterns.  The administration develops inclusive ties for programmatic 
needs to build consensus, in other words, to forge “inclusive relationships with diverse groups in order to bring 
them together in coalitions supporting the president’s programmatic objectives” (Peterson, 1992a, p. 234).  The 
second pattern posits developing inclusive ties with a representational focus to “solidify the president’s image 
and prestige among the general public” (1992b, p. 614).  The third pattern posits the administration developing 
exclusive ties with a programmatic focus to forge a “governing coalition,” that is, “mobilizing groups 
philosophically attuned to the president’s policy positions as part of a legislative coalition-building effort to 
support the administration’s policy initiatives” (1992a, p. 234).  The fourth pattern combines exclusive ties with 
a representational focus to emphasize outreach, “using the presidency as a place for groups outside of the 
political mainstream and with little previous access to government to gain a representational voice” (p. 234). 
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 In foreign-policy lobbying, interest groups have to target the executive branch 
because it is central to foreign-policy formulation and initiation.  More research is needed to 
investigate the executive-branch’s links with organized interests in the making of foreign 
policy.  Do the institutional links differ between domestic and foreign policies?  And if so, 
which White House institutions or executive agencies are involved in liaising with interest 
groups on foreign-policy issues?  Another area of research is the strategies interest groups 
use to penetrate the executive branch.  Since the executive branch is insulted from public 
pressure compared to Congress, interest groups may have to consider different techniques of 
influence.  The executive branch is not subjected to partisan politics because it is under one-
party control.  However, it is not immune to bureaucratic politics (Allison & Halperin, 1972).  
How do organized interests take advantage of division within the administration to exert 
influence over policymaking?  The issues raised here provide further avenues of research on 
the interaction between the executive branch and organized interests. 
 The next section reviews the literature on the role of interest groups in Congress.  The 
legislative branch is a preferred target for interest groups due to its permeability.  Congress 
may not be central to the foreign-policy process compared to the executive branch.  But on 
certain foreign-policy issues, Congress becomes the decision-making arena in the final stage 
of the policy process, for example, the role of the Senate in ratifying treaties.  Congress has a 
role to play in foreign policymaking, and thus a review of the literature on interest groups 
and Congress is in order. 
Interest Groups and Congress 
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The rise in congressional activism in foreign policymaking in the 1970s spawned a literature 
examining this topic (Franck & Weisband, 1979; Lindsay & Ripley, 1992; Ripley & Lindsay, 
1993; Lindsay, 1994).  With the exception of Tierney (1993; 1994) and Lindsay and Ripley 
(1992, pp. 425-6) that focus on the influence of interest groups in foreign policymaking, the 
study of interest groups and Congress is primarily focused on domestic policymaking.  An 
area of attention in the literature concerns the techniques interest groups use to develop 
access in Congress.  Studies by Tierney (1992), Richard Smith (1995), Wright (2003), and 
Wilcox and Kim (2005) discuss the strategies used by interest groups, including inside 
strategies to provide information to legislators and outside strategies aimed to mobilize the 
citizenry for political action.  The strategies interest groups use may not differ much between 
domestic and foreign policymaking.  However, with the rise in congressional assertiveness in 
foreign policy after the Cold War, there is impetus to probe deeper into the influence of 
societal pressure, and in particular, the role of interest groups in foreign policymaking.  A 
focus on legislative lobbying on foreign-policy issues may reveal that the techniques of 
influence groups use do indeed differ from their domestic-policy counterparts.  Research on 
interest-group involvement in Congress is well developed, but by no means exhausted.  
Further research on legislative lobbying of foreign policy is welcomed. 
Elections and Interest Groups 
Identifying the sources of influence for grassroots groups begins with how they use their 
membership bases.  As Paul and Paul (2009, p. 102) observed, “the main political power of 
grassroots organizations is linked directly to their main resource:  people, or more 
specifically, people who vote.”  An objective of outside lobbying is to signal to policymakers 
“how credible is an interest group’s claim that a particular issue is salient to large number of 
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constituents” (Kollman, 1998, p. 67).  A point Wright (2003, p. 90) made is that grassroots 
action simulates electoral mobilization.  The use of mass political action demonstrates to 
policymakers the electoral consequences associated with an issue.  While it is apparent that 
domestic issues are more likely to be contentious and play a more prominent role in deciding 
electoral outcomes, a set of literature has emerged that examines the electoral impact of 
foreign-policy issues.  How foreign-policy issues could be “activated” in election campaigns 
is an area of interest since electoral mobilization is a source of political influence for 
grassroots groups. 
 This set of studies challenged the view that foreign-policy issues have minimal 
impact on voter choices of presidential candidates.  Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida (1989) 
found that “many presidential candidates seem to place considerable emphasis on foreign 
affairs,” and they are not “waltzing before a blind audience” (p. 123).  The study by Nincic 
and Hinckley (1991) found that “across a wide range of voters and of electoral conditions, 
foreign policy issues provide a second substantial influence in interpreting the election 
result” (p. 351).  Anand and Krosnick (2003) examined the electoral impact of foreign-policy 
issues in the 2000 presidential election and found “clear indications that a wide range of 
foreign policy attitudes exists in the general public and appears to shape presidential 
candidate evaluations of many citizens” (p. 67).  There is consensus among these studies that 
foreign-policy issues do come into play in presidential elections. 
 Three conditions need to be satisfied in order for voter to evaluate presidential 
candidates based on their foreign-policy positions.  According to Aldrich et al. (2006, p. 
478), “First, the public must actually possess coherent beliefs or attitudes . . . about foreign 
policy.  Second, voters must be able to access these attitudes in the context of an election.  
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Third, the major party candidates must offer sufficiently distinct foreign policy alternatives 
so that voters who have accessed their available attitudes have a basis on which to make a 
choice.”  The concept here is attitude accessibility and it is dependent on the level of salience 
or importance voters attach to an issue.  And thus, the higher the level of importance voters 
attach to an issue, the attitudes of the voters become more accessible.  Lavine et al. (1996) 
examine the relationship between personal and national issue salience to attitude accessibility 
and found “a close correspondence between the personal importance of issues and the 
accessibility of attitudes on those issues across the full salience continuum” (p. 312).  There 
is consensus that attitude accessibility is a key variable in determining whether foreign-policy 
issues could be activated in an election campaign.  Aldrich et al. (1989, p. 135) wrote:  “The 
greater the foreign-defense attitude accessibility and the greater the distinctiveness of the 
candidates, the more important foreign and defense issues will be in voter choice.”  
Furthermore, Anand and Krosnick (2003, p. 67) found that “the most pronounced effects of 
foreign policy issues on candidate preferences occurred when the candidates took distinct 
positions and when voters both attached great importance to the issue and possessed a great 
deal of knowledge.” 
 Research in this area could be further developed and include how interest-group 
leaders shape the attitude accessibility of their members by mobilizing grassroots action.  A 
key indicator of attitude accessibility is the inclination of the public to pursue mass political 
action.  Outside lobbying not only demonstrates the intensity of group preferences on a 
certain issue, but more importantly, it signals to policymakers that there are likely electoral 
consequences (Kollman, 1998; Wright, 2003).  Anand and Krosnick (2003, p. 38) observed 
that “personal importance seems to be an effective indicator of cognitive, affective, and 
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behavioral involvement in an issue, the hallmarks of membership in an issue public.”  The 
logic here is that if members of an interest group are willing to pursue political action on 
behalf of an issue, then they are likely to vote based on their preferences on that issue.  For 
groups with large membership bases, establishing the “electoral connection” is a source of 
political influence.  This begins by understanding how leaders shape the attitude accessibility 
of their members to enhance the electoral clout of their organizations.  This is a step needed 
to connect the study of group strategies with research on the electoral impact of foreign 
policy. 
Conclusion 
The literature reviewed in this chapter provides the first step in developing the research 
agenda on the executive-legislative impact in group strategies on foreign-policy lobbying.  
Within the constellation of interest groups involved in foreign policymaking, the bulk of the 
scholarly attention has been devoted to the role of ethnic groups.  The centrality of ethnic 
interests in the study of societal influences in U.S. foreign policy demands greater attention 
to the role of grassroots organizations.  The use of outside strategies by these groups does 
raise implications regarding grassroots activism and increased pluralism in the foreign-policy 
process.  It is thus important to focus in particular on the strategies of grassroots groups in 
foreign-policy lobbying. 
 The institutional context is a major factor determining the selection of lobbying 
strategies.  The literature is more focused on interest groups developing access in Congress 
than the executive branch, which is more insulated from public pressure but central to 
foreign-policy formulation and initiation.  An issue the existing literature has yet to consider 
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is the impact of party control of American political institutions on interest-group strategies.  
Thus, it is important to investigate how the change from unified to divided government or 
vice versa influence the strategic choices of interest groups.  On certain foreign-policy issues, 
it is necessary to think in terms of the executive branch and Congress as interdependent in the 
policymaking process.  Interest groups do need to consider this when planning their lobbying 
strategies. 
 The primary source of political influence of grassroots groups is their members.  
Grassroots groups demonstrate their electoral clout by outside lobbying.  The potential by 
group leaders to convert electoral mobilization into actual political influence is supported by 
studies that examine the electoral implications of foreign policy.  Attitude accessibility of 
group members is based on their propensity to pursue political action on behalf of a cause.  
The use of outside lobbying could raise the electoral consequences associated with an issue.  
A point demonstrated in the literature on interest-group strategies is that there are many ways 
“outside lobbying forces policymakers to pay attention” (Kollman, 1998, p. 76).  Deploying 
mass electoral pressure through outside lobbying is one of them.  Further investigation along 
these lines would entail how group leaders raise the electoral stakes of an issue by shaping 
the importance or salience of an issue to their members. 
 This chapter discusses the main points in the literature animating the topic of this 
thesis.  The next chapter takes some of the ideas and suggestions offered here to develop the 
theoretical framework on the executive-legislative impact on group strategies in foreign-
policy lobbying.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES IN THE EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT:  A 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
This chapter establishes the theoretical framework for this study.  The underlying assumption 
of this study is the development of “mutually supportive relationships” between interest 
groups and policymakers (Haney, 2010, p. 1682).  Since U.S. political power is divided and 
shared between the executive and legislative branches, there are two separate yet 
interdependent decision-making arenas.  While most of the attention in the study of interest 
groups has been devoted to their relations with Congress (Smith, 1995; Wright, 2003), the 
role of interest groups, especially in foreign policymaking, also needs to examine how groups 
develop access to the executive branch, which may be the most important in foreign-policy 
formulation (Paul & Paul, 2009).  A challenge facing interest groups in foreign-policy 
lobbying is seeking political access to a branch of government that is insulated from public 
pressure compared to the porous nature of the legislative arena (Loomis, 2009). 
 An interest group’s decision to enter the policy arena begins with its choice of 
lobbying strategies.  The study by Gais and Walker (1991) examines the impact of 
organizational types on groups’ strategic choices.  In shifting from the internal to external 
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dimensions, Victor (2007) examines the impact of the legislative context on interest groups’ 
decisions to pursue direct (inside) or indirect (outside) strategies.  The decision to target 
Congress and/or the executive branch is important since interest groups must utilize their 
finite resources to maximize their lobbying effectiveness.  This is the path of research taken 
by McQuide (2010) examining how party control of the executive and legislative branches 
influences group decisions to target the respective decision-making arenas.  This study takes 
the ideas of Victor and McQuide further by examining how change in party control of 
government impacts the choice of strategies by interest groups to access the executive and 
congressional decision-making arenas. 
 The studies mentioned above focus on interest groups in domestic policymaking.  But 
as groups become more involved in foreign policymaking (Tierney, 1993), it may be 
necessary to consider whether studies developed to explain the behavior of interest groups in 
domestic-policy lobbying are applicable to foreign policy.  If not, an area of research is the 
consideration of ways in which theories of group lobbying could be shaped to better explain 
their growing involvement in foreign policymaking.  This begins by understanding interest 
group’s choices to lobby particular decision-making arenas and the strategies used to achieve 
political access. 
   Developing strategic compatibility between interest groups and policymakers is the 
basis by which groups enter the policy process.  The analogy of “pushing on an open door” 
(Haney, 2010, p. 1682) is appropriate here since interest groups are more likely to be 
successful when they are lobbying issues supported by policy entrepreneurs from either 
branch of government.  It is apparent that policymakers pushing an initiative need public 
support to generate legislative influence.  Policy entrepreneurs in this case would most likely 
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open the door for interest groups and be receptive to their policy advice.  This creates a fairly 
cost-effective way for interest groups to enter the policy process.  While attention is focused 
on presidential leadership of the public arena (Kernell, 2007; Cohen, 2010) and mobilization 
of interest groups (Peterson, 1992b; Pika, 2009), it is also possible for congressional leaders 
to “go public” and mobilize interest-group support, especially when conditions are ripe for 
them to propose initiatives that offer policy differences from those by the administration 
(Tierney, 1994, pp. 110-1).   
The existence of two separate yet interdependent decision-making arenas implies that 
there are times when both branches would produce complementary as well as competitive 
policy agendas.  However, with the frequent occurrence of divided control of the executive 
and legislative branches, the potential for a “contested agenda” and policy gridlock looms 
large (Conley, 2002, p. 8; Peake, 2002).  The impact of executive-legislative contention on 
group decisions to target one or both decision-making arenas is a question that has not been 
thoroughly investigated, especially in foreign policymaking.  As international issues become 
more politicized and partisan, the domestic political environment may become more critical 
in shaping the dynamics of foreign policymaking and determining policy outcomes.  Thus, a 
theoretical framework is proposed in this chapter on the impact of partisanship in executive-
legislative relations on the lobbying strategies of interest groups. 
Party Control Matters 
Divided party control of the executive and legislative branches has been a fixture in the 
contemporary American political landscape (Fiorina, 1992).  Recent studies (Edwards, 
Barrett, & Peake, 1997; Edwards & Barrett, 2000; Sinclair, 2000) have challenged Mayhew’s 
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(1991) findings that party control plays an insignificant role in determining legislative 
productivity.  There is greater potential for a “contested agenda” as opposed to “shared 
agenda” during split-party control of the Presidency and Congress (Conley, 2002, pp. 8-9).  
Divided party control creates incentives for congressional leaders of the opposition party to 
promote initiatives that accentuate the differences in policy priorities between Congress and 
the administration.  As Bader (1996, p. 5) observed, “Divided government highlights partisan 
and institutional differences.”  In other words, it tends to reinforce partisanship.  There is less 
incentive to follow the president’s lead when an assertive Congress is capable of setting the 
agenda—if the president is even initiating a congressional agenda at all.  For example, in the 
104th Congress (1995-96) when President Clinton confronted a Republican-controlled 
Congress, there was no presidential initiative on the congressional agenda (Edwards & 
Barrett, 2000, p. 122). 
 When the president does not offer legislative leadership, members of Congress look 
to their leaders for policy guidance.  There is a shift in momentum when Congress is doing 
much of the heavy lifting in placing its initiatives on the congressional agenda, especially if 
the opposition party has a commanding majority over the president’s co-partisans.  An 
assertive Congress looking for issues to differentiate itself from the president creates 
opportunities for interest groups to provide policy advice, and congressional leaders’ need for 
public support for their initiatives creates a basis for the development of strategic 
compatibility.  Interest groups are strategic in their selection of lobbying venues and divided 
government provides opportunities for groups to enter the policy process.  Since there is less 
incentive for Congress to delegate to the executive in setting the agenda under divided 
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government, and assuming congressional and group preferences are aligned, it is expected 
that interest groups are more likely to target Congress under divided government. 
 Unified party control of Congress and the Presidency does increase executive-
legislative concurrence since there is a higher potential for a “shared agenda” (Conley, 2002).  
For example, in the 103rd Congress (1993-94) when Clinton faced a Democratic-controlled 
Congress, presidential initiatives occupied 40.5 % of the total 37 bills on the congressional 
agenda, as opposed to zero during the Republican-controlled 104th Congress (Edwards & 
Barrett, 2000, p. 122).  The data clearly shows the impact of party control of Congress in 
shaping presidential legislative leadership (Bond & Fleisher, 1990; Edwards, 1989).  Unified 
government reduces the potential of Congress setting its own agenda as the levers of power 
are controlled by the president’s co-partisans.  Policy differentiation decreases when 
Congress and the presidency are controlled by the same party.  Since Congress is not looking 
for policies that would distinguish itself from the administration, a less assertive Congress 
would present fewer opportunities for outside groups to provide policy advice.  There is less 
need for policy ingenuity when Congress takes the lead from the president in setting the 
legislative agenda.  Without an assertive leadership in Congress willing to challenge the 
president, there is greater likelihood for Congress to delegate to the administration during 
unified government.  The executive branch is more likely to retain its role as the center for 
policy formulation when there is a high level of executive-legislative concurrence.  Since 
there is more incentive for Congress to delegate to the executive under unified government, 
and assuming executive and group preferences are aligned, it is expected that interest groups 
are more likely to target the presidential administration under unified government. 
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 The impact of divided government may be more pronounced in foreign policymaking 
than its domestic counterpart.  Since the executive branch is central to the foreign-policy 
process, an assertive Congress willing to challenge the president would intensify the “tug-of-
war” between the branches (Rosner, 1995).  Studies on congressional entrepreneurship on 
foreign policy (Carter, Scott, & Rowling, 2004; Carter & Scott, 2009) indicate that members 
of Congress choosing to lead usually come from the ranks of the opposition party.  The 
“politics past the edge” thesis (DeLaet & Scott, 2006, p. 183) is more likely to hold under 
divided government when there are incentives for both Congress and the White House to 
preserve their institutional prerogatives by highlighting partisan differences over foreign-
policy issues.  The point made here is that foreign-policy issues could be partisan given the 
executive-legislative context.  Bowling and Ferguson (2001, p. 183) wrote:  “divided 
government may impede policymaking in certain policy areas, have no effect in others, and 
perhaps even increase activity in other areas as partisans try to gain electoral advantages 
through credit-claiming or assigning blame.”  Divided government provides incentives to 
intensify inter-branch competition over foreign policymaking. 
 Another issue worth mentioning is different configurations of divided government.  
Since the legislative branch is divided into two chambers, it is possible for unified party 
control of both chambers of Congress or divided control between the House and Senate.  
Divided government under a split Congress provides an interesting twist to the research on 
the relationship between party control and policymaking.  There is the potential for both 
unified and divided party control between the executive and legislative branches when 
Congress is split.  There could be unified party control between the president and House, but 
divided control with the Senate, or vice versa.  The impact is felt in policymaking depending 
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on which chamber becomes the decision-making arena.  For example, the Senate is 
constitutionally tasked with ratifying treaties but not the House.  A split Congress creates the 
potential for intra-branch conflict since both chambers are controlled by different parties.  
Thus, gridlock is more likely to occur within the legislative branch than between Congress 
and the White House.  This creates a much more complex picture in executive-legislative 
relations, and how party control of Congress is configured would influence the lobbying 
behavior of interest groups.  As Bowling and Ferguson (2001, p. 184) observed, “Each of 
these configurations might influence output in different ways.  Divided government may 
mean the legislature is unified against the executive (inter-branch or simple divided 
government), or it may mean that the legislature is itself divided (intra-branch or compound 
divided government).” 
 If party control could shape the executive-legislative dynamics of the policymaking 
process, and which decision-making arena(s) interest groups seek to target, then it is possible 
to hypothesize the type(s) of lobbying strategies interest groups use in response to a 
particular policy environment.  It is safe to assume that under divided party control the policy 
process would be more conducive to conflict expansion (Schattschneider, 1960).  This is a 
time-honored strategy in American politics whereby groups seek to change the terms of the 
policy debate by bringing new actors into the process.  Outside lobbying is a conflict-
expansion strategy since groups are mobilizing grassroots support (Kollman, 1998).  
Demonstrating the potential for mass mobilization is aimed at influencing a large number of 
policymakers, thus outside lobbying is most likely to be successful in targeting Congress.  
Are there opportunities when groups outside lobby the executive branch?  It is not well 
understood how the executive-legislative context shapes group decisions to outside lobby, or 
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which decision-making arena(s) groups target with such strategies.  Since the focus of this 
study is on grassroots groups lobbying foreign-policy decisions, how they marshal their 
resources and use strategies of mass persuasion merits attention. 
 A proposition made here is that divided government motivates groups to outside 
lobby.  But taking this proposition one step further requires asking which decision-making 
arena would be most conducive to outside lobbying.  Since Congress is more likely to take 
the lead in setting the congressional agenda under divided government, interest groups would 
take the path of least resistance and target the legislative branch.  Congress is the most ideal 
lobbying venue and the need to influence a large number of lawmakers creates the optimal 
situation for interest groups to target the legislative arena with outside lobbying.  As much as 
interest groups pressure Congress to seek access to the policy process, congressional 
entrepreneurs also need outside support from groups to generate legislative influence for their 
initiatives.  Interest groups pressure legislators to adopt their preferences, but policymakers 
also need groups to outside lobby on their behalf to demonstrate a groundswell of support for 
their policy initiatives.   
 While the “pressure” aspect of outside lobbying is well documented (Kollman, 1998), 
the “support” aspect of it should also be considered a strategy whereby interest groups 
develop access to the policy process.  When policy differences between the branches are 
exacerbated by divided government, this increases the incentive for interest groups to 
develop grassroots support for congressional initiatives, which in turn, could be used to 
pressure the administration.  Groups are able to capitalize on the executive-legislative divide 
to increase their lobbying clout.  Building congressional support and using it to demonstrate 
the gap in policy preferences could be an effective strategy toward the executive branch.  
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Since outside lobbying is aimed at influencing a large number of legislators, a hypothesis 
advanced here is:  Interest groups are more likely to outside lobby Congress. 
Issue Salience 
Outside lobbying is aimed at mobilizing grassroots support and using it to mount pressure on 
policymakers.  It is a strategy used by interest groups to demonstrate the potential for mass 
political action.  As Schlozman and Tierney (1986, p. 185) observed, “an organization’s 
ability to convince policymakers that an attentive public is concerned about an issue and 
ready to hold them accountable for their decisions may be critical in determining policy 
outcomes.”  This is an asset for groups with large membership bases “since a large grassroots 
network can be instrumental in influencing Congress” (Paul & Paul, 2009, p. 199).  A 
primary function of outside lobbying, according to Kollman (1998, p. 67), is signaling “how 
credible is an interest group’s claim that a particular issue is salient to large number of 
constituents.”  In this context, he defines salience “as the relative importance people attach to 
policy issues” (p. 9).  Outside lobbying is effective in conveying to policymakers the 
willingness of a group’s members to pursue political action on behalf of a cause (Paul & 
Paul, 2009, pp. 112-8).  While outside lobbying “forces policymakers to pay attention” 
(Kollman, 1998, p. 76), policymakers also need grassroots pressure to build support for their 
initiatives.  However, their ability to convert public support into legislative influence is 
contingent on salience of the issue (Canes-Wrone, 2001; Canes-Wrone & de Marchi, 2002).  
Thus, issue salience is posited as a variable shaping the interaction between interest groups 
and policymakers.2 
                                                            
2 The term “policymaker” is used to identify officials inside government with policymaking potential.  In the 
U.S. political system, the president is the most important policymaker.  But there are other non-elected 
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 Outside lobbying is a multipurpose strategy since it both signals the salience of an 
issue to policymakers and shapes public awareness toward that issue.  The intensity of an 
interest group’s preference is usually hidden from public view unless the decision is taken by 
group leaders to outside lobby.  The propensity to outside lobby is a measure of group 
members’ willingness to pursue political action on behalf of a cause, thus demonstrating to 
policymakers the electoral implications associated with the issue (more on this later).  Group 
preferences become more visible and accessible to policymakers when the issue becomes 
more salient.  The study by Edwards, Mitchell and Welch (1995) found that “the salience of 
issues to the public directly affects their impact on the public’s evaluation of the president” 
(p. 121).  If interest groups could shape salience of an issue by mobilizing its members to 
outside lobby, then policymakers would take notice of such actions and adjust their 
preferences accordingly. 
 The discussion so far focuses on the “pressure” aspect of using outside lobbying to 
communicate issue salience to policymakers.  But developing a better understanding of 
group-policymaker interaction requires the “support” side to lobbying as well.  There is a 
long-standing tradition of studies on interest groups that focus on the information exchange 
aspect of group-government relations (Salisbury, 1969).   Lobbying in this regard could be 
considered “legislative subsidy” (Hall & Deardorff, 2006) since the information exchanged 
could determine how lawmakers vote on an issue depending on where interest groups stand.  
Outside lobbying is consistent with this aspect of research.  Kollman (1998, p. 70) observed:  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
executive branch officials (i.e. the National Security Advisor, Secretaries of State and Defense, etc.) who are 
important foreign-policy actors.  Members of Congress (House and Senate) have the ability to shape policy by 
casting votes and amending legislation.  Both elected and non-elected officials constitute the constellation of 
policy actors in the U.S. political system.  The focus of this study, however, will be on elected policymakers 
from both the executive and legislative branches, since they seem to be more susceptible to pressure from 
interest groups. 
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“The salience of policy issues among constituents, however is something policymakers do 
not tend to know about precisely, and most importantly, something about which they look to 
interest groups to inform them issue by issue (emphasis in original).  Lawmakers are 
dependent on interest groups for information on issues that are less salient yet may have 
implications on their electoral prospects.  It is on these issues groups are more likely to flex 
their muscles and outside lobbying would be most effective in shaping the preferences of 
lawmakers.3  While Kollman (1998) focused on the pressure side of outside lobbying, this 
study argues that this strategy could be a basis for an exchange of influence between groups 
and policymakers.  Issue salience is the variable mediating this exchange. 
 If policy entrepreneurs need legislative influence to get their initiatives through 
Congress, then the need for interest-group support to make an issue more salient becomes 
greater.  There is low probability that the mass public could be activated to generate support 
for non-salient policy issues because the general public usually does not care deeply enough 
to pursue political action.  Studies have shown that increasing public awareness on non-
salient issues have a positive effect on legislative influence (Canes-Wrone, 2001; Canes-
Wrone & de Marchi, 2002).  This is why interest groups through outside lobbying could 
provide such valuable services for policymakers.  Even the appearance of grassroots 
mobilization, in most cases, would be sufficient in converting issue salience into legislative 
influence.  There is greater appreciation when outside lobbying is a genuine expression of 
grassroots support; but as Kollman noted, it could also be a strategy of deception.  He wrote:  
                                                            
3 Kollman (1998, p. 71) recognizes the problem of endogeneity in outside lobbying as a costly signaling 
strategy.  Groups signal the intensity of their preferences to policymakers, but their actions increase salience of 
the issue.  So “how do they communicate a piece of information that is endogenous to their own actions?”  It is 
important to note that what interest groups are signaling is change in issue salience.  Policymakers demand this 
information to know how they should respond.  He wrote:  “The piece of information being signaled may be 
changing over time, but if the group is signaling the movement of that piece of information over time, then we 
are on firm conceptual ground.” 
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“Outside lobbying can communicate salience information even when a large number of 
groups have the ability to manufacture astroturf, or what looks a lot like grass-roots support 
even when it does not exist” (1998, pp. 76-7).4   
Outside lobbying could be a valuable tool for policymakers seeking to generate 
legislative influence for their initiatives.  The role of interest groups in shaping public 
awareness on non-salient issues makes it likely that outside lobbying would force 
policymakers to pay attention.  Thus, a hypothesis regarding the “supply” aspect of outside 
lobbying by interest groups is advanced here:  Policymakers are reliant on interest groups to 
mobilize grassroots support for issues lacking public awareness. 
Electoral Politics 
A major source of influence for groups with grassroots mobilization potential is “people, or 
more specifically, people who vote” (Paul & Paul, 2009, p. 102).  The use of electoral 
pressure is linked to issue salience because demonstrating the intensity of a group’s 
preferences to policymakers implies its members are willing to pursue political action.  
Grassroots action serves to inform lawmakers what to expect on election day.  Wright (2003, 
p. 90) observed:  “The principal value of grassroots mobilization, and one of the reasons that 
grassroots campaigning has become increasingly common and important, is that it simulates 
electoral mobilization” (emphasis in original).  Grassroots pressure is aimed primarily at 
Congress “because electoral cycles render legislators periodically accountable to their 
constituencies, [and] they are a natural target for the expression of citizen opinion” 
                                                            
4 Hedrick Smith (Smith H. , p. 251) in The Power Game made a similar point regarding grassroots/astroturf 
lobbying:  “Some members of Congress, especially those from marginal districts or junior members, are afraid 
to risk alienating large constituencies.  They dare not ignore any major pressure group, even if its pressure looks 
contrived.  For mass mail usually shows organizational force, and that threatens to touch the politician’s lifeline 
of survival and reelection.” 
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(Schlozman & Tierney, 1986, p. 185).  Two factors motivating the decision-making of 
legislators are sensitivity to constituency concerns and desire for re-election (Mayhew, 
1974).  It is at the congressional level where groups are more likely to develop “symbiotic 
relationships” with members of Congress to access the political process (Haney, 2010, p. 
1682; Watanabe, 1984, p. 53).  Exerting electoral pressure is contingent on the ability of 
groups to organize grassroots campaigns, and this depends on group membership presence.  
Groups with members concentrated in selected districts or states are limited in their ability to 
target a large number of lawmakers compared to groups with members dispersed across the 
country (Paul & Paul, 2009, pp. 102-112).  But targeting limited number of lawmakers may 
be more effective, especially if they are congressional leaders, for example, chairs of 
committees.  Groups with concentrated membership bases are more effective since they are 
better equipped to focus their lobbying on selected members of Congress, and in particular, 
those in “gate keeping” positions. 
 Using electoral pressure to influence policies may be effective on Congress, 
considering there are 535 elected officials (435 representatives and 100 senators), and 
congressional elections occur every two years.  However, the most important actor in the 
foreign-policy process is the most immune to public pressure.  As Paul and Paul (2009, p. 
203) observed in their study on ethnic lobbies and U.S. foreign policymaking, “the actors 
identified as having the greatest effect on foreign policy are the very actors that are most 
immune to ethnic group influence because they are the most difficult for ethnic groups to 
access” (emphasis in original).  The number of elected officials interest groups could target 
decline from 535 to 1 (the president and vice-president running on the same ticket) when 
groups decide to lobby the executive branch.  The ability to influence presidential decision-
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making by mobilizing mass electoral pressure is limited since presidential election occurs 
only once every four years.  Since the president is the only official elected nationally, no 
group has the resources to influence presidential contests in all 50 states.  However, groups 
with membership bases concentrated in selected states or districts may be able to play the 
“electoral card” since they are able to exert influence in the “battleground states,” which have 
become more significant in determining the outcomes of recent presidential elections.  How 
candidates stand on issues of importance to “grassroots activists” would affect how they vote.  
Group leaders would like to establish this connection in the minds of presidential candidates 
when campaigning in their membership strongholds.  As presidential elections become more 
closely contested, the need to respond to narrow interests, and in particular, preferences of 
interest groups in key swing states become greater.  One of the issues this study seeks to 
address is when outside lobbying is effective in influencing presidential decision-making.  
There are moments when the president is sensitive to public pressure.  That opportunity 
arrives when the president faces re-election during the fourth year of his first term.   
 Presidential contests are normally not decided by foreign-policy issues.  However, 
studies have challenged the prevalent view that foreign policy has minimal impact on voter 
evaluation of presidential candidates (Aldrich, Sullivan, & Borgida, 1989; Nincic & 
Hinckley, 1991; Anand & Krosnick, 2003).  Voters who regard foreign-policy issues as 
salient are more likely to evaluate presidential approval based on his handling of foreign 
affairs (Edwards, Mitchell, & Welch, 1995).  Interest groups have more leeway over shaping 
public attitudes on issues of low salience, and group leaders amplifying the importance of an 
issue to their members could increase an issue’s traction in an election campaign.  Members 
of interest groups may constitute important voting blocs.  And as single-issue voters, how 
50 
 
they vote may depend more on the candidates’ stances on salient issues than traditional party 
affiliation.  As Paul and Paul (2009, p. 63) observed, “elected officials may come to see 
ethnic groups as single-issue voters, where issues salient to the ethnic groups are more 
critical than partisanship in determining the voting decisions for members of the ethnic 
groups.  In this sense, ethnicity may be a wedge, allowing an enterprising politician to pry a 
group away from their ‘normal’ voting patterns.” 
If presidential elections are being decided in battleground states where candidates 
have to appeal to narrow segments of the public, and assuming that foreign-policy issues are 
important in these communities, it is possible for presidential candidates to devote significant 
attention to foreign issues while campaigning in those states or districts.  Outside lobbying 
functioning as a form of electoral simulation is important here since demonstrating grassroots 
action implies groups are “activating” an issue in an election campaign.  In other words, 
grassroots action serves as “rehearsal” for election.  It is under these circumstances where the 
domestic imperative may outweigh the strategic objectives of a foreign-policy decision. 
Presidents facing the electorate “do bend foreign policy issues to their own short-term 
electoral interests, delinking the conduct of foreign affairs from the international conditions 
to which it is the apparent response” (Nincic & Hinckley, 1991, p. 352).  Goldgeier (1999, p. 
10) observed:  “The policy entrepreneur may be pushing a policy forward both because he is 
thinking of strategic interests and because he is thinking about partisan politics and winning 
elections.” 
 Interest groups seek to expand their influence by mobilizing their members into 
action, and the lead-up to an election is the most opportune time to employ such tactics.  The 
point made here is that outside lobbying “simulates electoral mobilization” (Wright, 2003, p. 
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90).  If group members are willing to pursue political action on behalf of a cause, it is likely 
that their evaluation of candidates would be based on their positions on issues group leaders 
and members deem salient.  In states where members of interest groups constitute important 
voting blocs, foreign-policy issues that may not be important nationally but salient in those 
communities, may be influential in shaping the issue positions of presidential candidates.  
They are more likely to pay attention to the concerns of interest groups if their members have 
significant presence in states that could decide the outcome of a presidential election.  
Groups with members concentrated in closely-contested states are in a better position to raise 
the electoral stakes of an issue.  Therefore, a hypothesis is advanced regarding the 
relationship between group lobbying and elections:  Electoral pressure is likely to be a 
source of influence for interest groups in states where members constitute key voting blocs. 
Summary  
This chapter develops the theoretical framework of this study by positing three variables to 
explain the influence of party control of government, issue salience, and electoral pressure on 
the lobbying strategies of interest groups.  The first variable posits the importance of unified 
or divided party control of the executive and legislative branches on group decisions to target 
the respective decision-making arenas.  Since there are incentives for Congress under divided 
government to propose initiatives that highlight institutional and partisan differences, a shift 
in agenda-setting dynamics would likely create opportunities for interest groups to promote 
their preferences on the congressional agenda.  A hypothesis is advanced here:  Interest 
groups are more likely to target Congress under divided government.   
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However, since the presidential administration is more likely to retain its role as the 
center of policymaking, and the president’s co-partisans are in control of the levers of power 
in Congress, there is less incentive to differentiate between congressional and presidential 
agendas under unified government.  A hypothesis is advanced here:  Interest groups are 
more likely to target the executive branch during unified government.   
Another issue concerning the impact of the institutional context is the choice of 
lobbying strategies.  Groups with grassroots connection are primed to outside lobby because 
it is a strategy aimed at influencing a large number of policymakers, and thus is a useful 
strategy toward Congress.  But when is outside lobbying effective toward the executive 
branch, which is important to foreign-policy formulation but insulated from public pressure?  
The conflict-expansion potential of the policymaking process under divided government is a 
major factor.  It is under this situation where interest groups are more likely to drum up 
support for congressional initiatives to highlight policy differences.  A hypothesis is 
advanced here:  Interest groups are more likely to outside lobby Congress. 
 The second variable posits the assumption of interest groups increasing issue salience 
through outside lobbying.  Raising issue salience is needed to signal policymakers the 
intensity of an interest group’s preferences and the likelihood an issue would have electoral 
consequences.  While the “pressure” aspect of outside lobbying is well-established, this study 
seeks to develop the “supply” side as well.  Interest groups are more likely to exert leverage 
over non-salient issues, but it is on these issues where outside lobbying would prove crucial 
in assisting policymakers’ attempts in generating legislative influence.  A hypothesis is 
advanced here:  Policymakers are reliant on interest groups to mobilize grassroots support 
for issues lacking public awareness. 
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 The third variable posits the assumption of electoral pressure as an interest-group 
strategy.  A focus on foreign-policy lobbying must consider ways groups attempt to influence 
presidential decision-making through strategies of mass persuasion.  A president seeking re-
election may be responsive to public pressure and creates a situation where decision-making 
may be subjected to the influence of electoral politics.  The attentive public does have 
informed opinions about foreign policies, and they are able to evaluate presidential 
candidates based on their positions.  Demonstrating the intensity of their preferences is 
credible only if group members are willing to pursue political action.  Grassroots 
mobilization approximates what is likely to occur on election day.  Groups with members 
concentrated in battleground states are more likely to exert pressure in closely-contested 
elections.  Issues salient to these groups are likely to receive attention during the course of 
the presidential election campaign, and these are opportunities when candidates would be 
sensitive to interest-group concerns.  A hypothesis is advanced here:   Electoral pressure is 
likely to be a source of influence for interest groups in states where members constitute key 
voting blocs.   
The next chapter focuses on the research design of this study.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
DESIGNING QUALITATIVE METHODS IN THE STUDY OF INTEREST GROUPS:  A 
RESEARCH STRATEGY 
 
The objective of the research design is to connect the theoretical framework with the 
empirical research.  The case method is used in this study to establish this connection.5  This 
method is known for its use in “small-n” designs in which a limited number of cases are 
employed.6  The use of case studies in social-science research, either within- or across-case 
analyses, implies some form of comparison.  As Levy (2002, p. 433) observed, “nearly all 
case studies involve comparisons, whether they be explicit or implicit, across cases or within 
cases.”  The aim of this chapter is to discuss the use of case-study methods and how they 
                                                            
5 Case-study methods remain a dominant approach in international-relations research.  In their review of case-
study methods, Bennett and Elman (2008, p. 499) cited a study which found that 95% of U.S. IR researchers use 
qualitative analysis as their primary or secondary methodology. 
 
6 There is controversy over the definition of “case” in social-science research.  George and Bennett (2005, pp. 
17-18) defines a case as a “class of events.”  Gerring (2004, p. 341) defines it as “an in-depth study of a single 
unit . . . where the scholar’s aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena.”  Eckstein 
(1975, p. 85; Levy, 2002, p. 434) defines a case as “a phenomenon for which we report and interpret only a 
single measure of any pertinent variable.”  The use of case studies today is more complex and may involve 
multiple measurements of “pertinent” variables.  But as Levy (2002, p. 434) observed, “Precisely how one 
defines ‘case’ depends in part on the purposes of inquiry.”  The use of “case” in this study is consistent with 
George and Bennett’s definition, seeking a theoretically-informed explanation of a specific “class of events” 
within a foreign-policy event. 
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could help achieve the research objectives of this study.  It is divided into three sections:  
Opportunities and Challenges in Case-Study Methods; Case Selection; and Data Collection. 
Opportunities and Challenges in Case Methods 
Case-study methods bring together the investigative techniques of historians and social 
scientists in an integrated approach.  As George (1979, p. 61) observed:  “To this end, some 
features of the historian’s methodology for intensive, detailed explanation of the single case 
are combined with aspects of the political scientist’s conception of the requirements for 
theory and his procedures for scientific inquiry.”  Case-based methods are useful for studies 
investigating social relationships in which there exists limited number of observations.  And 
in some instances, a “small-n” design may be the only approach available.  Haney (1997, p. 
28) observed that “many of the problems and processes that we study in world politics and 
foreign policy are limited in number, and therefore the application of statistical procedures 
and construction of large-N studies is prohibited.”  The study of interest groups in foreign 
policymaking fits this category. 
 The study of foreign policy is interdisciplinary and situated between domestic politics 
and international relations (Milner, 1997).  As Hudson (2007, p. 9) observed, foreign-policy 
analysis provides “a natural bridge from IR [international relations] to other fields, such as 
comparative politics and public policy.”  The use of case-based methods in foreign-policy 
studies is well established and best exemplified in George and Smoke’s (1974) Deterrence in 
American Foreign Policy, which pioneered the method of structured, focused comparison.  
However, the diversity in the research agenda on foreign-policy studies has not been met 
with the use of diverse methods of social inquiry.  In the symposium in Comparative 
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Political Studies, Bennett and Elman (2007) noted that while there is a well-balanced use of 
quantitative and qualitative methods in studies on international relations and comparative 
politics, however, much of the research in American politics use quantitative-based methods.  
Recent research on U.S. politics has seen a greater tilt toward the use of quantitative methods 
than other fields of political science.  Pierson (2007, p. 150) documented that over 80% of 
the articles published in the leading journals on U.S. politics use statistical methods while 
less than 10% of them use qualitative methods.  “Qualitative work on American politics has 
not vanished—but it has been pushed to the periphery” (Pierson, 2007, p. 146).  The lack of 
diversification in research methods in American political science could partly explain why 
the IR discipline has been more influential in shaping foreign-policy studies, largely due to 
the discipline’s greater appreciation for diverse use of research methods.  Levy (2007, p. 198) 
noted:  “What is different about the study of American politics as compared to comparative 
and international politics is that qualitative scholars in American politics have been less 
inclined to contribute to this dialogue and that cross-method dialogue has had much less 
impact on empirical research in American politics.”  Research in U.S. politics could make a 
greater contribution if it were more receptive to the use of qualitative-based methods across 
the various subfields, and not just confined to public policy. The aim of this study is to 
integrate the understanding of interest-group behavior in U.S. politics to foreign 
policymaking, and the mode of inquiry used is the case method. 
One of the shortcomings of “small-n” research designs is susceptibility to selection 
bias.  As Collier and Mahoney (1996, p. 59) observe:  “Selecting extreme cases on the 
dependent variable leads the analyst to focus on cases that, in particular ways, produced 
biased estimates of causal effects.”  Studies that exhibit “biased” effects are limited in their 
57 
 
applicability to theory development and thus every researcher should take precaution to avoid 
it.  However, there is debate over what exactly constitutes selection bias and whether its 
effects on qualitative research are as damaging as initially claimed.7  Some argue that the 
effects of selection bias are different between qualitative and quantitative research.  George 
and Bennett (2005, p. 22) point out:  “Selection biases are indeed a potentially severe 
problem in case study research, but not in the same ways as in statistical research.”  Selecting 
cases on the dependent variable could “serve the heuristic purpose of identifying the potential 
causal paths and variables leading to the dependent variable of interest” (p. 23).  While there 
is consensus among researchers that “extreme” forms of selection bias should be avoided at 
all costs, there does not seem to be a solution in sight to what seems to be an intractable 
problem in social-science research.  The aim here is not to offer the “perfect design” but to 
underscore the approach to qualitative research used in this study that, in my opinion, avoids 
some of the common pitfalls associated with selection bias. 
Two of the strategies used in this study to mitigate selection bias are the incorporation 
of variance in the variables and use of within-case analysis, such as process tracing.  King, 
Keohane, and Verba (KKV) (1994) recommended that incorporating variance in the research 
design could avoid selection bias.  This is in line with the task George and Bennett (2005, pp. 
84-5) recommend:  Describing Variance in Variables.  In their words, “The researcher’s 
decision about how to describe variance is important for achieving research objectives 
                                                            
7 The issue of selection bias is discussed in King, Keohane, and Verba’s (KKV) (1994) Designing Social 
Inquiry (DSI).  Studies that suffer from selection bias tend to underestimate the causal relationship, thus limiting 
their explanatory scope.  Reviews and scholarly attention following the publication of DSI have raised issues 
whether KKV conflated selection bias with other issues in research design.  For example, there is disagreement 
between KKV and Collier and Mahoney (1996) over whether the “no-variance” issue is an “extreme” form of 
selection bias (KKV, p. 129).  While KKV issue a stern warning about research designs with no variance, 
Collier and Mahoney, however, regard selection bias and no variance as two separate issues.  It is permissible to 
have no variance if the study is not designed to investigate co-variation (1996, pp. 72-75). 
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because the discovery of potential causal relationships may depend on how the variance in 
these variables are postulated” (p. 84).  Variance is incorporated in this study to avoid an 
“extreme” form of selection bias when variables assume set values (King, Keohane, & 
Verba, 1994, p. 129).  One of the benefits of case-study methods and their contributions to 
theory development is the consideration of ways variables could assume different values. 
For example, the “party control” variable assumes that same- or split-party control of 
the executive and legislative branches impacts the politics of agenda control.  Whether 
Congress or the presidential administration takes the lead in the policymaking process 
depends on whether there is unified or divided government.  The agenda-setting dynamics 
between the branches, as hypothesized, could determine which decision-making arena(s) 
interest groups seek to target.  It has been common in contemporary U.S. politics to witness 
change in party control of Congress during the middle of a presidential term.  The change 
from unified to divided government (or vice versa) accounts for the variance in the “party 
control” variable, and the transition from the Democratic-controlled 103rd Congress (1993-
94) to the Republican-controlled 104th Congress (1995-96) is observed in this study.  
Although this did not come into play in this study, divided government could assume 
different formations.  One possible formation is a split Congress, the House and Senate 
controlled by different parties.  The House and Senate are tasked with different 
responsibilities, for example, the Senate is constitutionally mandated to ratify treaties—and 
in the ratification stage—the upper house becomes the decision-making arena.  The 
possibility of shift in party control of the House and/or Senate and when that occurs in the 
policy process is important in identifying various formations of divided government. 
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Another research strategy implemented in this study is the use of process tracing.8  It 
is through process tracing the investigator attempts to establish a causal relationship between 
the dependent and independent variables.  As George and Bennett (2005, p. 206) observed:  
“The process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the causal 
chain and causal mechanism—between the independent variable (or variables) and the 
outcome of the dependent variable.”  Process tracing is made “through uncovering traces of a 
hypothesized causal mechanism within the context of a historical case or cases” (Bennett & 
Elman, 2006, p. 459).  It is important to note that the causal mechanism—a key component in 
process tracing—is not directly observable but is inferred.  Levy (2002, p. 444) wrote:  “It is 
more useful to think of causality as an analytical construct, a component of our theories 
rather than something that can be inferred directly from empirical observation.”  Thus, 
process tracing is a “powerful method of inference” compatible with various case-study 
methods (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 30). 
The emphasis on connecting the steps in a causal process is what makes process 
tracing a popular analytical tool in studies on policymaking.  As Haney (1997, pp. 12-13) 
observed:  “One often-used strategy for studying the processes of policy-making has been the 
in-depth case study.  The goal here is to examine the details of a historical case and from that 
attention to detail extract lessons about how the process of policy-making works.”  Levy 
(2002, p. 443) agrees that process tracing is useful in testing causal relationships, 
“particularly those involving propositions about what goes on inside the ‘black box’ of 
                                                            
8 There is contention whether within-case analysis, such as process tracing, could help mitigate selection bias.  
Collier and Mahoney (1996, p. 71) argue that “within-case analysis is a valuable tool, but not for solving the 
problem of selection bias.”  Bennett and Elman (2006, p. 461) disagree:  “the selection bias critique does not 
apply in the same way to inferences drawn from within-case process tracing or causal process observations.”  It 
is possible that selection bias applies differently to qualitative research and the effects of selection bias could be 
moderated with the proper use of within-case analysis. 
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decision-making and about the perceptions of actors.”  Process tracing is also useful for cases 
in which the identification of “inflection points” or critical junctures in the decision-making 
process is necessary to test hypothesized relationships.  Key steps in the policy process need 
to be traced “through an intensive analysis of the evolution of a sequence of events within a 
case” (Levy, 2002, p. 443). 
Process tracing is a useful analytical tool for this study because it guides the 
reconstruction of the decision-making process.  King, Keohane, Verba (1994, p. 227) wrote:  
“Process tracing will then involve searching for evidence—evidence consistent with the 
overall causal theory—about the decisional process by which the outcome was produced.”  
Reconstructing the policy process is the key element in the use of case-based methods in 
foreign-policy analysis.  Testing the proposed theory requires identifying the turning points 
of the case to assess whether interest groups were successful in accessing the political 
process, and whether they are able to influence policy outcome(s).  It is next to impossible to 
“control” for a multitude of internal and external influences, especially in a pluralist 
policymaking setting such as the U.S.  Bureaucratic politics, executive-legislative relations, 
and electoral pressure are just some of the variables that need to be accounted for when 
assessing the domestic politics of U.S. foreign policy.  The case design takes into account the 
possibility of equifinality, that is, the potential for multiple explanations for the same 
outcome.  George and Bennett (2005, p. 98) wrote:  “analysts should be sensitive to the 
possibility that several considerations motivated the decision.”  Process tracing is a powerful 
tool in foreign-policy analysis because the investigator must be cognizant of multiple causal 
paths within the same case.  Thus, “Process tracing encourages the investigator to be 
sensitive to the possibility of equifinality” (p. 215).  The case used in this study is divided 
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according to the key turning points of the decision-making process, identified as the major 
domestic political developments within the given timeframe.  The next section discusses 
more in-depth the case-selection component of the research design. 
Case Selection 
As George and Bennett (2005, p. 83) observed, “case selection should be an integral part of a 
good research strategy to achieve well-defined objectives of the study.”  Since this study is 
based on a single-case research design, case selection becomes an even more important 
decision.  A case should be selected based on its relevance to the research question and rigor 
needed for theory development (Seawright & Gerring, 2008).  An issue surrounding case 
selection is the number of cases to employ in a research design.  There is contention over the 
utility of single-case designs, that is, when n = 1.  King, Keohane and Verba (1994) offered 
somewhat contradictory advice in the use of single cases.  George and Bennett (2005, p. 32) 
wrote:  “As DSI argues, studies involving only a single observation are at a great risk of 
indeterminacy in the face of more than one possible explanation, and they can lead to 
incorrect inferences if there is measurement error.”  However, by “maximizing leverage over 
research problems,” that is, by increasing the number of observations from a single case, 
problems cited above could be mitigated (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 208).   
The concern here is with the number of observations, not the number of cases.  Rarely 
is a single case confined to the observation of a variable that does not assume other values.  
Studies constructed in this manner faces problems of indeterminacy and measurement error, 
but they also suffer from an “extreme” form of selection bias, the “no variance” issue.  
Describing variance in variables is important because it implies there are multiple 
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observations within a single case.  Process tracing would also facilitate the discovery of 
variance, even when n = 1.  As Levy suggested, case method always imply some form of 
comparison, either within-case or across-case.  Within-case analysis is implemented in 
single-case designs.  Eckstein’s (1975) definition of “case” predicated on “a single measure 
of any pertinent variable” is not applicable when a single case could yield multiple 
observations from a set of variables.  Even if the case is designed to investigate one variable, 
by observing its variance over time, it is possible to increase the number of observations.  As 
KKV (1994, p. 208) observed, “what may appear to be a single-case study, or a study of only 
a few cases, may indeed contain many potential observations, at different levels of analysis, 
that are relevant to the theory being evaluated.” 
 The most appropriate case-selection strategy for this study is Eckstein’s (1975, pp. 
113-23) “crucial case studies.”  Levy (2008, p. 12) wrote:  “Most/least likely designs are 
based on the assumption that some cases are more important than others for the purposes of 
testing a theory.”  This study calls for the use of a “least-likely case,” which imposes a “hard 
test” on the proposed theory.  This criterion is based on what Levy (2002, p. 442) termed the 
“Sinatra inference,” that is, “if the theory can make it here, it can make it anywhere” (Bennett 
& Elman, 2007a, p. 173).  The investigator should have expectations that the case selected 
imposes tough conditions on the proposed theory, thus making it highly probable that the 
theory would be refuted.  But if the empirical evidence of the case provides support for the 
theoretical assumptions, then the explanatory power of the theory is strengthened (King, 
Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 209).  As George and Bennett (2005, pp. 121-2) observed:  
“Theories that survive such a difficult test may prove to be generally applicable to many 
types of cases, as they have already proven their robustness in the presence of countervailing 
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mechanisms.”  By imposing a single-case research design, the case selected in this study has 
to do a significant amount of “heavy lifting” to assess the theoretical assumptions behind the 
role of interest groups in foreign policymaking. 
 What constitutes a least-likely case?  It is beyond the scope of this study to compare 
the behavior of interest groups in both domestic and foreign policymaking.  Wildavsky’s 
(1966) “two presidencies” thesis suggested that the domestic politics of foreign policy may 
be different than its domestic counterpart, owing largely to increased presidential power and 
a deferential Congress in the foreign-policy arena.  He wrote:  “The United States has one 
president, but it has two presidencies; one presidency is for domestic affairs, and the other is 
concerned with defense and foreign policy.”  Wildavsky also noted that while there is a 
“stable structure” of interest groups involved in domestic issues, the interest-group structure 
on foreign affairs is “weak, unstable, and thin rather than dense.”  However, in a reappraisal 
of the “two presidencies,” Wildavsky and Oldfield (1989) found that the thesis was “time and 
culture bound.”  Presidential power in the foreign-policy arena eroded relative to the rise of 
an assertive Congress, and there was an increase in “domestic groups with foreign policy 
agendas.”  In a rebuttal to the original statement, both domestic- and foreign-policy arenas 
have merged into one—“a realm marked by serious partisan divisions in which the president 
cannot count on a free ride” (p. 58). 
 If the institutional context has changed to prevent the president from scoring easy 
victories in foreign-policy decisions, does this indicate that presidential power in foreign 
policy has declined?  It may be premature to dismiss the thesis entirely.  A revival in the 
research on the “two presidencies” (Canes-Wrone, Howell, & Lewis, 2008) does point to the 
fact that the president continues to hold considerable influence over foreign policy (Peterson, 
64 
 
1994).  The possibility of the existence of two different policymaking environments—one for 
domestic and the other for foreign policy—does imply that interest groups are likely to 
behave differently in both policy arenas.  When both executive and legislative branches are 
considered equals in domestic policymaking, interest groups are able to exercise greater 
latitude.  However, when the structure becomes hierarchical in foreign policymaking, this 
setup would inhibit interest-group activism.  Studies on the role of interest groups in foreign 
policymaking must have evidence that they are successful in accessing the branch of 
government insulated from public pressure and yet central to foreign-policy formulation.  
The ability to penetrate Congress would not be considered a least-likely scenario since it is a 
branch of government most opened to public pressure, and most interest groups have access 
to the legislative branch.  Cases that exhibit interest-group activism in foreign policy and 
success in gaining access to the executive branch have the qualities to impose a “tough test” 
for the proposed theory.  Thus, specifying the conditions which allow interest groups to gain 
access to the executive branch would constitute a least-likely case for this study if those 
conditions are satisfied. 
 Once the decision is made to test the proposed theory with a foreign-policy case, the 
next step concerns the particular case to use.  The foreign-policy domain may be more 
diverse than its domestic counterpart.  What is more striking about foreign policy is the 
diversity of the decision-making processes.  Considerable debate exists over the definition of 
crisis and non-crisis situations.  However, distinction could be made regarding the 
organization of the decision-making process.  During crisis, “attention and importance shift 
to small decision-making groups” (Haney, 1997, p. 19), while non-crisis policymaking, 
which normally involves structural and strategic issues, demands interaction between the 
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executive and legislative branches (Lindsay & Ripley, 1993, pp. 18-22).  Studies on crisis 
decision-making normally focus on executive-centered groups insulated from societal 
pressure (Allison & Zelikow, 1999).  However, this study focuses on a case in which the 
decision-making is subject to executive-legislative interaction, thus providing opportunities 
for interest groups to influence the policy process (Skidmore & Hudson, 1992). 
 Another issue is selecting the type of foreign-policy issue in which interest groups 
would normally not be expected to play a major role.  Interest groups are active on 
“intermestic” issues such as trade agreements.  Business organizations and labor unions are 
normally front and center in these policy deliberations (Jacobs & Page, 2005).  However, this 
study is focused on grassroots groups influencing international security issues.  The least-
likely criterion could be satisfied if the involvement of grassroots groups were influential in 
shaping the policy outcomes concerning these issues.  There is precedence in this area of 
study.  For example, Knopf (1998) shows the involvement of citizen movements in 
influencing U.S. arms control policy during the Cold War.  The edited volume by Krepon 
and Caldwell (1991) takes into account the role of public opinion and interest groups in the 
politics of arms-control treaty ratification.  Even a case of international security needs to 
consider domestic politics on the decision-making.  As Putnam (1988, p. 432) observed:  “A 
more adequate account of the domestic determinants of foreign policy and international 
relations must stress politics:  parties, social classes, interest groups (both economic and non-
economic), legislators, and even public opinion and elections, not simply executive officials 
and institutional arrangements.” 
 One of the issues in international security where domestic politics would be decisive 
in affecting its outcome is the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
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(NATO).  Since its establishment in 1949, NATO has undergone several rounds of 
enlargement during the Cold War era:  Greece and Turkey (1952); West Germany (1955); 
Spain (1982).  NATO expanded eastward after the Cold War with admission of Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary (1999), Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, and Romania (2004), and Albania and Croatia (2009).  According to Article 11 of 
the NATO (Washington) Treaty, “The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out 
by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.”9  Thus, 
amendments to the NATO Treaty requires the unanimous consent of all NATO member 
states, including the “advice and consent” of the U.S. Senate.  Admitting new members may 
not be a decision of peace or war, but the U.S. may come to their defense should they come 
under attack, as underscored in Article Five of the NATO Treaty.  U.S. commitment to the 
defense of its NATO allies is one of Washington’s most important security obligations on the 
global stage. 
 Domestic politics plays an important role since congressional action, and in 
particular, the two-thirds vote in the Senate is needed for ratification of NATO enlargement.  
The importance of domestic politics provides a more objective assessment of presidential 
power in foreign policymaking in relation to Congress and society at large.  There is 
expectation for executive-legislative interaction, and since Congress is involved, public 
opinion and interest groups would play a role to influence the decision-making in both the 
executive and legislative arenas.  Since policymaking proceeds according to the legislative 
process and is divided between both chambers of Congress, interest groups are expected to 
utilize the permeability of the legislative branch to exert policy influence.  NATO 
                                                            
9 The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 could be found in The Enlargement of NATO: Why Adding Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO Strengthens American National Security (1998, pp. 28-30). 
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enlargement as a possible case study satisfies all the criteria to examine the impact of 
executive-legislative dynamics on the behavior of interest groups in foreign policymaking. 
 The case selected focuses on the Clinton administration’s decision to enlarge NATO.  
The first round of enlargement of the post-Cold War era signified the start of NATO 
expansion into the former-Soviet sphere of influence.  There was debate over whether NATO 
should enlarge as a hedge against the possibility of a resurgent Russia or to promote alliance 
stability and democratization in Central and Eastern Europe.  The administration’s promotion 
of NATO as the centerpiece of its “democratic enlargement” strategy was at odds with the 
views held by conservative Republicans who favored supporting enlargement as a “neo-
containment” strategy.  The contending visions for an expanded NATO in post-Cold War 
Europe entered the U.S. political debate when the Republicans assumed control of Congress 
after the 1994 midterm election.  This was an issue that gained further political traction in the 
lead-up to the 1996 presidential election, especially in the pivotal “battleground states” of 
Midwestern and Northeastern U.S.  NATO enlargement thus presents an ideal case because it 
offers the opportunity to examine the domestic political dynamics of the foreign-policy 
process.  More importantly, the activism of the coalition of ethnic groups representing 
Americans of Central and Eastern European heritage lobbying for the admission of Poland, 
the Czech Republic, and Hungary into NATO and their perceived electoral clout in the 
battleground states increased the domestic political stakes involved.  The use of the U.S. 
politics of NATO enlargement as a case study could contribute to a better understanding of 
the lobbying strategies interest groups use to influence foreign policy decision-making. 
 The case is organized according to the major domestic political developments of the 
time period covered (1993 to 1998), and each chapter focuses on a particular stage in the 
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development of the NATO enlargement case.  The change from unified to divided 
government in January 1995 and the start of the administration’s campaign to secure the 
ratification of NATO enlargement are the two “turning points” that divide the case into three 
stages of policy development. 
Data Collection 
Process tracing puts an emphasis on empirical research to reconstruct the decision-making 
process.  Data collection is thus an important component in the research design of this study.  
Both primary and secondary sources are used in this case.  Researchers are inclined to use 
primary sources because they seem authoritative and recently declassified documents may 
provide insights into the inner workings of the decision-making process.  They could provide 
clues to a case.  However, George and Bennett (2005) advise that classified materials could 
be politicized to the extent where their veracity may be questioned.  It is thus necessary to 
verify primary sources in the context of secondary-source materials.  In their words, 
“Classified accounts of the process of policymaking cannot be properly evaluated by scholars 
unless the public context in which policymakers operate is taken into account” (p. 97). 
 The U.S. decision to enlarge NATO presents a case in which the reconstruction of the 
decision-making process is complicated by the lack of primary-source documents.  This was 
an important foreign-policy decision of the post-Cold War era, but the administration’s 
decision-making process was often informal.  Studies by Goldgeier (1999) and Asmus (2002) 
reached consensus on the informality and ambiguity of the decision-making process.  Asmus 
wrote:  “This is perhaps the most important, yet also the murkiest, period in the 
Administration’s internal deliberations and the one that future historians are likely to debate.  
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The decision to enlarge NATO was ambiguous and opaque, at times deliberately so, and it 
was a decision that hardly qualified as a model of executive branch decision making” (p. 59).  
The initial stage of the administration’s decision-making process was deliberately kept 
ambiguous to allow policy entrepreneurs the use of presidential speeches to promote NATO 
enlargement amid opposition within the administration (Goldgeier, 1999).  It is impossible to 
follow the paper trail if official policy channels were sidelined or avoided altogether.  Even if 
documents were produced, they most likely remain classified.10 
 Presidential statements and press releases are the primary-source materials used in the 
empirical research.  Goldgeier (1999) documented many of the important presidential 
statements related to NATO enlargement and his book is an authoritative source on the 
administration’s decision-making.  Complete transcripts of presidential speeches and White 
House press releases could be obtained through the Public Papers of the Presidents by the 
American Presidency Project (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu), Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents (accessed via ProQuest Central), and U.S. Department of State 
Dispatch (accessed via ProQuest Central). 
 With the lack of primary-source materials, newspapers would be used to help 
reconstruct the decision-making process.  It is useful to use primary- and secondary-sources 
together to verify the authenticity of the information between both sources.  Newspapers help 
“set the scene,” or in Larson’s (2001, p. 346) words, “reconstruct the environment in which a 
document was written.”  Newspapers are valuable in understanding the political context 
behind certain decisions.  Furthermore, “Newspapers are essential for establishing context.  
                                                            
10 Asmus’ (2002) Opening NATO’s Door provides glimpses of the memos of administration officials and 
departmental cables.  The author was granted access to the Department of State’s archives by an executive order 
signed by the Secretary of State.  The documents revealed in the book were verified and contained no classified 
material.  Asmus served as deputy assistant secretary of state from 1997 to 2000. 
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News accounts can help establish the atmosphere of the times, the purpose of speeches or 
statements, or the public reaction to a statement” (p. 345). 
 Archival research of newspapers has been facilitated by the arrival of the digital age.  
No longer is the use of the microfilm machine at the local library required to access news 
articles in storage.  The archives of the leading newspapers in the U.S. are now online and 
can be accessed via databases such as ProQuest and Factiva.  Articles from local and national 
newspapers could be obtained through the use of a search engine or online database.  They 
provide different contexts in the coverage of presidential activities.  National papers cover 
the president through the lens of Washington politics and tend to be more analytical while 
local coverage is more descriptive and supportive of the president (Eshbaugh-Soha & Peake, 
2008).  National papers provide better account of the policymaking environment, but local 
papers provide more focus in the coverage of local communities and are a valuable source of 
information on presidential activities outside the Washington D.C. area.  Using a variety of 
local and national newspapers provide a more accurate and objective account of the Clinton 
administration’s decision to enlarge NATO from beginning to end.  The major national 
newspapers used are the New York Times and Washington Post.  Both papers featured “beat” 
reporting, especially the articles by Michael Dobbs of the Washington Post.  An important 
source in the coverage of events on Capitol Hill is the Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report.   
 Empirical research for this case would not be complete without going through the 
websites of the ethnic organizations involved in lobbying for NATO enlargement.  The most 
important source is the Polish American Congress’ timeline on NATO enlargement 
(http://www.pac1944.org/history/history-nato.htm).  The Hungarian American Coalition’s 
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(http://www.hacusa.org) press releases provided coverage of ethnic-group activities related to 
NATO enlargement.  Another valuable publication is the weekly newsletter of the Ukrainian 
National Association, the Ukrainian Weekly (http://www.ukrweekly.com). 
Conclusion 
This chapter establishes the research design for this thesis.  First, I discuss the challenges and 
opportunities of the case method.  One of criticisms in the use of the case method is its 
susceptibility to selection bias.  Although there is contention over what exactly constitutes 
selection bias, there are ways to mitigate its adverse effects, and the two strategies 
implemented in this study are the incorporation of variance in variables and KKV’s advice to 
“maximize research leverage,” that is, by increasing the number of observations within a 
single case.  Second, case selection becomes an even more important decision since this 
study is dependent on a single-case design.  Eckstein’s “crucial case designs” is used as the 
selection criterion, and the use of a foreign-policy case to assess the assumptions of the 
theoretical framework imposes a “least-likely case.”  It is more likely that a “hard test” would 
be imposed if the case focuses on an international-security issue where interest groups are 
normally not expected to play a major role.  Thus, the decision is made to use the U.S. 
politics of NATO enlargement as the case study.  Third, the NATO enlargement case 
presents challenges in data collection, owing largely to the ambiguity of the administration’s 
decision-making process.  The use of both primary- and secondary-source materials would 
facilitate the “reconstruction” of the policy process.  Presidential statements comprise the 
bulk of research on primary-source materials, while the use of newspaper articles, especially 
those by the New York Times and Washington Post, provide valuable secondary-source 
materials. 
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 The next three chapters comprise the NATO enlargement case study.  They will be 
presented in chronological order.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CLINTON, INTEREST GROUPS AND THE U.S. POLITICS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT 
 
Introduction 
On 30 April 1998 the United States Senate ratified the admission of Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by the vote of 80 
to 19.  President Clinton said:  “American support for NATO is firm, our leadership for 
security on both sides of the Atlantic is strong, and there is a solid, bipartisan foundation for 
an active U.S. role in the world” (Towell, 1998).  The ratification of NATO enlargement 
signified the successful outcome of a major foreign-policy decision of the Clinton era.  But as 
Ron Asmus (2002, p. xxiv) observed, “NATO enlargement sparked one of the most 
passionate and fierce national security debates of the decade in the United States.”  While the 
Clinton administration promoted NATO enlargement as reaffirmation of U.S. security 
commitment to a unified, democratic Europe, George Kennan (1997), the architect of 
America’s Cold War containment strategy, called the decision:  “the most fateful error of 
American foreign policy in the entire post-cold-war era.” 
 At the center of the NATO enlargement debate was the future of U.S.-Russia 
relations.  Opponents argued that the end of the Cold War presented an unprecedented 
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opportunity for Washington to forge a new era of cooperation with Moscow (Gaddis, 1992).  
Expanding NATO into Central and Eastern Europe would be antagonistic toward Russia and 
energize domestic political forces skeptical of democratic reforms and integration with the 
West.  It would draw new lines of division in post-Cold War Europe and confirm suspicions 
that the U.S. seeks to enervate Russia.  Adding to the debate were the contending rationales 
for enlargement.  While the administration pursued the expansion of NATO largely as an 
extension of its strategy of “democratic enlargement” (Brinkley, 1997), the Republican 
rationale was based on a strategy of “neo-containment,” aimed at preventing Russia from 
asserting its influence in Central and Eastern Europe (Asmus, 2002, p. 120).  The contending 
visions of the Alliance placed front and center Russia’s disposition in the post-Cold War 
security architecture in Europe.  The administration sought to gain Moscow’s compliance by 
pursuing enlargement in tandem with an agreement to establish a NATO-Russia consultative 
forum.  However, there was fear that a NATO-Russia accord would provide Moscow with 
undue influence over Alliance decision-making. 
 Jeremy D. Rosner, Special Assistant to the President and Secretary of State for 
NATO Enlargement Ratification, said:  “unlike some foreign policy initiatives, it centers 
very distinctly around a specific vote, and one that requires a two-thirds margin” (U.S. 
Information Agency, 1997, p. 11).  Since NATO enlargement is a foreign-policy decision 
that requires congressional action, and most importantly, the “advice and consent” of the 
Senate, domestic politics and public opinion would play a major role in shaping its outcome.  
A notable factor is the partisanship between the Clinton administration and Republican-
controlled Congress.  Another factor was the involvement of the coalition of groups 
representing Americans of Central and Eastern European ethnic backgrounds lobbying for 
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the expansion of NATO into their ancestral homelands.  The focus of this case is on the 
impact of executive-legislative dynamics on the ethnic coalition’s decision to target the 
respective decision-making arenas and its choice of strategies to achieve political access. 
 Three variables posited in the theoretical framework animate the case analyses.  The 
first variable is party control.  The Republicans gaining control of both houses of Congress 
after the 1994 election was pivotal in the politics of NATO enlargement.  The policy 
dynamics shifted from the executive to congressional arena.  The change from unified to 
divided government and its impact on the ethnic coalition’s lobbying strategies is an issue to 
be explored.  The second variable is issue salience.  NATO enlargement was not an issue that 
generated much attention from the American public with the exception of the ethnic 
communities.  The proposition made here is that policy entrepreneurs seeking to generate 
legislative influence need interest groups to increase public awareness of their initiatives.  
Issue salience provides a link between interest groups and policymakers, and how this 
variable shapes the ethnic coalition’s interactions with officials in both the executive and 
legislative branches merits attention.  The third variable is electoral pressure.  One of the 
arguments made was that Clinton’s decision to enlarge NATO was motivated by electoral 
politics—to court ethnic voters residing predominately in the “battleground states” of the 
Midwestern and Northeastern U.S.  It was also argued that the House Republican leadership 
supported NATO enlargement for similar reasons.  Closely-contested elections provide 
opportunities for policymakers to prioritze domestic imperatives over strategic interests, and 
the need to appeal to an important voting bloc concentrated in key swing states may 
influence their decision-making.  The ethnic coalition’s use of electoral pressure in its 
attempts to influence the Clinton administration’s decision-making is an issue to be explored. 
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 Since the U.S. decision to enlarge NATO unfolded over a lengthy timespan (1993-
1998), the case is divided into three chapters, each focused on a particular time period and 
stage of development.  The two turning points are the change from unified to divided 
government after the 1994 midterm election and the start of the administration’s campaign to 
secure ratification of NATO enlargement in March 1997.  The first stage covers the period 
from September 1993 to November 1994, focusing on the Clinton administration’s internal 
deliberations over NATO enlargement and the beginning of the ethnic coalition’s lobbying 
campaign.  The second stage covers the period from the start of the 105th Republican-
controlled Congress in Janaury 1995 to the 1996 presidential election.  The third stage covers 
the period from the establishment of the administration’s NATO Enlargement Ratification 
Office in March 1997 to the Senate ratification vote on 30 April 1998.  The focus of this 
chapter is on the first stage. 
Origins of Debate (1993 – 1994) 
President Clinton and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake supported NATO expansion 
to anchor the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe in U.S.-led institutions.   
Lake unveiled the administration’s “democratic enlargement” strategy in a speech at the 
Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) on 21 September 
1993.  He said:  “The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of 
enlargement—enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies” 
(Goldgeier, 1999, p. 38; Lake, 1993, p. 659).  The term was coined by Jeremy Rosner, who at 
the time was director of legislative affairs and foreign-policy speechwriter at the National 
Security Council (NSC).  Commenting on a draft of the SAIS speech, Lake wrote to Rosner:  
“emphasize enlargement more” (Brinkley, 1997, p. 115).  The speech underscored three 
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major objectives of Clinton’s foreign-policy agenda:  “updating and restructuring American 
military and security capabilities, elevating the role of economics in international affairs, and 
promoting democracy abroad” (p. 112). 
 NATO enlargement served as the centerpiece for the “democratic enlargement” 
strategy toward Central and Eastern Europe.  As Asmus (2002, p. 25) observed, “NATO 
enlargement resonated with two of Clinton’s core convictions—a commitment to expand and 
consolidate democracy and his belief in the importance of modernizing America’s alliances 
in a globalized era.”  Lake’s SAIS speech revealed to the public that the administration was 
considering expanding NATO.  Clinton’s National Security Advisor said: 
If NATO is to remain an anchor for European and Atlantic stability, as the President believes it must, 
its members must commit themselves to updating NATO’s role in this new era.  . . . we will seek to 
update NATO—so that there continues, behind the enlargement of market democracies, an essential 
collective security (Lake, 1993, p. 660). 
Opposition emerged at the Defense Department.  Pentagon officials shared the view 
that NATO enlargement would negatively impact arms-control cooperation between 
Washington and Moscow. Incorporating former-Warsaw Pact members into the Alliance 
would be a major investment when defense spending should be reprogrammed for other 
regional contingencies.  The Pentagon’s position was simply that the Visegrad states (Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia) were not ready for membership and “fast tracking” 
them at this point would dilute the effectiveness of NATO (Talbott, 2003, pp. 97-99).  
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin said:  “enlargement would have to be raised at the end, not 
the beginning, of a process of achieving interoperability with NATO and meeting alliance 
political standards, and new members would have to be ‘contributors’ rather than 
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‘consumers’ of allied security” (Solomon, 1998, p. 28).  Aspin’s views were reinforced by 
comments he made at the NATO defense ministers summit in Travermünde, Germany in 
October 1993.  “We at this point are not offering membership to these countries.  We’re 
taking a step that will address some of their security concerns.  Ultimately, if these countries 
join the organization, we ought to make sure that they bring something to the organization” 
(Kinzer, 1993). 
The position of the State Department was somewhere in between those advocating 
“fast track” enlargement, such as Lake, and Defense officials who preferred not to expand 
NATO at all.  Secretary of State Warren Christopher supported a “go slow” approach.  An 
idea surfaced at the time was the Partnership for Peace, an initiative to enhance military-to-
military cooperation among NATO members, former-Warsaw Pact states, and European 
neutrals.  The brainchild of the idea was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John 
“Shali” Shalikashvili (Goldgeier, 1999, pp. 26-8; Talbott, 2003, pp. 98-9).  The Pentagon’s 
proposal for the Partnership for Peace was intended as a stand-alone program, aimed as an 
alternative to NATO enlargement.  However, Christopher’s statements at the time indicated 
that the Partnership for Peace could serve as a pathway for Central and Eastern European 
states to join NATO.  Speaking at the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels in 
December 1993, the Secretary of State said:  “The Partnership is an important step in its own 
right, but it can also be a key step toward NATO membership” (Goldgeier, 1999, p. 46).  
During this period, inconsistent statements between Christopher and Aspin regarding the 
objectives of the Partnership for Peace, as well as Lake’s support for “fast track” 
enlargement, reflected contention among the administration’s foreign-policy principals 
(Sciolino, 1994). 
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A NSC Principals Meeting was scheduled for 18 October to decide on the 
“deliverable” for President Clinton at the NATO Summit in January 1994 (Asmus, 2002, pp. 
49-51; Goldgeier, 1999, pp. 38-40).  The meeting was intended to be the follow-up to Lake’s 
speech in which he stated the President’s goal of updating NATO for the post-Cold War era.  
Clinton’s appearance at the NATO Summit created what Strobe Talbott, Ambassador-at-
Large for the former Soviet republics and later appointed Deputy Secretary of State, called an 
“action-forcing event” (2003, p. 97).  The bureaucratic battlelines had already been drawn.  
Supporters of “fast track” included Lake and Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis, while 
Defense remained vehemently opposed to enlargement. 
The decision was reached to promote the Partnership for Peace at the NATO Summit.  
The need to take a more cautious approach toward enlargement was reinforced by the 
political developments in Russia (Asmus, 2002, p. 49).  This view was expressed in Talbott’s 
memo to Secretary of State Christopher dated 17 October.  It stated:  “My recommendation 
bottom line is this:  Take the one new idea that seems to be universally accepted, the 
Partnership for Peacekeeping, which is truly inclusive, and make that, rather than expanded 
NATO membership (which is at least implicitly exclusive) the centerpiece of our NATO 
position” (Asmus, 2002, pp. 50-1).  Talbott “redoubled” his efforts to slow down the 
momentum among senior State officials toward fast tracking enlargement (Gordon, 1994).  
The memo was intended to make Christopher reconsider his support to provide “associate 
memberships” to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, a position Undersecretary of 
State Davis also advocated (Goldgeier, 1999, p. 37; Asmus, 2002, pp. 49-50).11 
                                                            
11 Davis’ memo to Christopher, dated 15 October, emphasized the need for the U.S. to assert leadership in 
Europe.  “We are close to losing the ability to lead the Alliance on NATO’s future . . . Western Europeans are 
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The issue left unresolved at the meeting was the overall goal of the Partnership for 
Peace.  Did the decision mean that the enlargement issue has been relegated to the 
backburner, or was the Partnership for Peace a potential gateway for NATO membership?  
The aim of the meeting was to agree on the “deliverable” for Clinton, not to decide on what 
the Partnership for Peace meant.  The latter remained a contentious issue within the 
administration.  As Goldgeier (1999, p. 41) observed, “The Partnership for Peace was the one 
idea that had the support of all the major players, which was not true of any of the specific 
issues associated with expansion.”  The Partnership for Peace was kept ambiguous to achieve 
consensus among the principals at the meeting.  But more importantly, the fear of 
destablizing Russia was a factor in the decision to abandon fast tracking in favor of a 
cautious approach toward enlargement.  However, this left the administration exposed to 
pressure from Republicans on Capitol Hill and the ethnic communities to define a clear path 
for Central and Eastern European states to enter NATO. 
After Talbott’s promotion to Deputy Secretary of State in Feburary 1994, he emerged 
as the “overseer of the effort to keep the enlargement train and Russia train running on 
parallel tracks” (Goldgeier, 1999, pp. 64-5).  His opposition to “fast track” enlargement made 
him a target of criticism by the ethnic groups.  They identified Talbott as the administration 
official who put the brakes on the aspirations of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to 
join NATO.  Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski said that Talbott was 
“extremely unpopular with these groups” (Kirschten, 1995).  Edith K. Lauer (2009), Chair 
Emeritus of the Hungarian American Coalition, remembered from a meeting with Clinton 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
becoming increasingly critical and uncertain of our resolve to remain seriously engaged in Europe” (Asmus, 
2002, p. 49). 
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administration officials in March 1994 an exchange between Talbott and the Polish American 
Congress’ national director Jan Novak. 
Talbott:  The question is – what kind of Russia will we have in the 21st century?  YOU feel Russia will 
revert to type and forsee a dangerous scenario; we see Russia more positively . . . building a benign 
democratic system. 
Novak:  Why did you invite us here, sir, if you think our experience with communism makes us unable 
to form a credible opinion about Russia?  What will happen, Mr. Talbott, if WE are right, and YOU are 
wrong? 
Another ethnic-group leader at the meeting, Donald Pienkos (1999) of the Polish National 
Alliance took note of Talbott referring to Americans of Central and Eastern European 
ancestry harboring hardline views toward Russia as “you people.”12   
Talbott endured criticisms from Senate Republicans during his confirmation hearing, 
accusing him of advocating a “Russia-first” policy.  Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) said:  
“PFP epitomizes the Administration’s ad hoc approach to European security problems.  It is 
a band-aide offered in place of corrective surgery” (Solomon, 1998, p. 29; Goldgeier, 1999, 
pp. 45-6).  Talbott (2003, p. 110) wrote that Republicans were encouraged in this line of 
attack by “powerful voices in the Polish American community.”  Ethnic-group leaders 
identified Talbott as an administration official of interest, largely due to his influence over 
both Russia and NATO enlargement policies, his friendship with President Clinton (both 
                                                            
12 The March 1994 meeting at the White House was a follow-up to the January meeting between administration 
officials and ethnic leaders in Milwaukee, WI. 
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were roommates at Oxford), and his role as the “administration’s most outspoken and 
influential Russophile” (Koszorus, 2007).13 
Talbott made his case that he was not against enlargement, but it had to be done 
correctly.14  Talbott (2003, p. 99) wrote:  “I saw NATO enlargement as an objective that not 
only made sense in theory but might work in practice—as long as we could avoid causing a 
train wreck . . . in our relations with Russia.”  In a letter to Professor George Grayson of the 
College of William and Mary, author of Strange Bedfellows: NATO Marches East, Talbott 
wrote:  “I was opposed to the idea of ‘fast track’ admissions per se, since I believed that the 
stakes were too high and the complexities too great to move precipitously; enlargement 
should be a deliberate process, not a quick one” (Asmus, 2002, pp. 44-5).  Fast tracking 
enlargement, in light of the political developments in Russia, would be tantamount to a 
policy of containment.  It would be interpreted as a no-confidence vote by the U.S. on 
Russian reforms and provide fuel for opposition forces there to weaken Yeltsin’s hold on 
power.  Talbott (1995) wrote:  “hedging against the possibility of resurgent Russian 
aggression is not the only, or even the main, reason for NATO’s taking in new members.”  
NATO should emphasize the Alliance’s role in consolidating democracies and civilian 
control of military forces in a unified Europe.  Bringing new members into NATO must be 
pursued in tandem with a cooperative agreement between Russia and NATO.  However, 
ethnic-group leaders backed by the Republicans were adamant that Talbott got the policy 
backwards.  Enlargement should be prioritized over cooperation with Russia.  
                                                            
13 The ethnic coalition met with Deputy Secretary of State Talbott four times from 1 April 1996 to 20 July 1998 
(Koszorus, 2007). 
 
14 The evolution of Talbott’s views on enlargement could be partly explained by his promotion to Deputy 
Secretary of State and the criticisms by Senate Republicans in his confirmation hearing.  As the number two 
official at State, he had to consider Russia policy in conjunction with NATO enlargement (Goldgeier, 1999, pp. 
36-8; 64-6; 157-8). 
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Search for Congressional Support 
The administration’s internal deliberations provides the starting point for the analysis on the 
role of interest groups in the U.S. decision to enlarge NATO.  After plans to offer Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia “associate memberships” were foiled by Talbott’s 
memo recommending a “go-slow” approach, the ethnic coalition began to pressure the 
administration on the “who” and “when,” in particular, the candidate states most qualified to 
join NATO and the date of their admission.  The executive-legislative context is important 
since the ethnic coalition’s strategy sought to pressure the administration by lining up 
congressional support (Koszorus, 2007).  During 1994, both chambers of Congress and the 
White House were under Democratic control, and thus there was unified party control of 
government.   
 Beginning in 1994, the ethnic coalition approached Republicans on Capitol Hill 
“seeking their support in stepping up the political pressure on the Administration on 
enlargement” (Asmus, 2002, p. 80).  Senators Lugar (R-IN) and Hank Brown (R-CO) 
emerged as the two entrepreneurs in the Senate on enlargement.  Lugar favored enlargement 
as a way to make NATO relevant for the post-Cold War era, and he ridiculed the 
administration’s proposal for the Partnership for Peace as “policy for postponement” 
(Goldgeier, 1999, p. 80).  Brown supported enlargement to ensure Central and Eastern 
Europe’s integration with the West.  It could also serve as part of a “get tough” policy toward 
Russia (Asmus, 2002, pp. 80-2).  But Senator Brown was also motivated by the potential of 
Congress to play an active role in shaping foreign policy.  He said:  “I wasn’t excited about 
playing a traditional role in the Senate; I wanted to change foreign policy, which was viewed 
as largely the preserve of the executive branch” (Grayson, 1999, p. 50).  In the House, the 
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key supporters of enlargement included Representatives Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) and 
Henry Hyde (R-IL).  Their motivation for supporting enlargement is the concentration of 
Polish Americans in their congressional districts.  There are approximately 28,000 Polish 
Americans in Gilman’s (NY-20) district and Hyde’s district is located in Chicago—a city 
with the biggest population of Polish ethnicity outside Warsaw (Goldgeier, 1999, p. 81; 
Dobbs, 1995; Gory, 1996). 
 The major legislation of the 103rd Congress (1993-94) on NATO enlargement in the 
House are the NATO Expansion Act of 1994, sponored by Rep. Gilman, and NATO 
Revitalization Act of 1994, sponsored by Rep. Hyde.  The Senate version of the NATO 
Revitalization Act was sponsored by Senator Roth (R-DE).  The NATO Expansion Act 
expressed a sense of Congress that “Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia 
should be in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute 
to the security of the North Atlantic area no later than January 10, 1999,” language that was 
later incoporated in the Republicans’ Contract with America (Goldgeier, 1999, p. 80; Asmus, 
2002, pp. 82-3). 
 The enlargement initiatives did not receive the adequate support in Congress needed 
for passage.  The only legislation that passed both houses and signed into law by President 
Clinton was the NATO Participation Act of 1994, which was amended in the International 
Narcotics Control Corrections Act of 1994 (Goldgeier, 1999, pp. 81-2; Solomon, 1998, p. 
66).  There was simply lack of support for NATO enlargement in the Democratic-controlled 
Congress.  Rep. Gerald Solomon (R-NY) (1998, p. 65) observed that the legislation died in 
committee “due to the lack of enough support in the House and vigorous lobbying on the side 
of the administration.” Administration opposition to congressional action was also a factor.  
85 
 
An example of this was a letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs 
Wendy Sherman to the Chairman of the House International Relations Committee Rep. Lee 
Hamilton (D-IN) requesting “references to particular states and specific timetables be 
deleted” from the NATO Expansion Act (Goldgeier, 1999, p. 81).  It is possible that 
Democratic leaders in Congress did not want to challenge the administration’s position 
regarding congressional involvement, and killing the bills in committee was a way to avoid 
confrontation with the White House.  This provides support for the proposition that under 
unified government Congress is more likely to delegate to the executive in setting the 
agenda. 
 The ethnic coalition was successful in gaining Republican support in Congress for 
NATO enlargment.  The language in the failed legislation would eventually make its way 
into the Contract with America, the Republican’s blueprint for gaining control of Congress in 
the upcoming midterm election.  The ethnic coalition lobbying Republicans in Congress 
exacerbated the policy differences between the branches, which played well into its overall 
strategy.  The Republican support contributed to the administration’s opposition—especially 
at a time of growing partisanship between the House Republican leadership and Clinton 
administration.  As Goldgeier (1999, p. 79) observed, the lack of administration support “fed 
congressional perceptions that President Clinton’s statements of support for enlargement 
reflected no real commitment to the issue.”  This line of thinking was reinforced by leaders 
of the ethnic coalition.  In their perspectives, there was perception the administration was not 
serious about enlarging NATO, largely due to the importance of Russia in Clinton’s foreign-
policy agenda.  
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 The most significant statement of Republican support was the inclusion of NATO 
enlargement in the Contract with America (Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008, pp. 89-90; Goldgeier, 
1999, pp. 82-4; Asmus, 2002, p. 83).  Unveiled in September 1994, the Contract outlined the 
GOP’s legislative agenda when it assumed control of Congress after the midterm election.  
The Contract’s national-security platform included a pledge to admit Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia into NATO by 1999, similar to the language expressed in 
the NATO Expansion Act.  The inclusion of NATO enlargement was not an act of 
bipartisanship, and as Asmus (2002, p. 85) observed, “the Republican embrace of NATO 
enlargement in the Contract with America was part of an effort to condemn the 
Administration’s foreign policy, not cooperate with it.”  It was intended as an indictment of 
what the Republicans and their ethnic supporters considered the administration’s “Russia-
centered path” toward enlargement (Kirschten, 1995).  The House Republican leadership 
developed the Contract “to highlight differences with the Democratic party in order to take 
control of the House” (Bader, 1996, p. 181).  The Contract was an attempt by Republicans to 
point out the administration’s weakness in its handling of key issues, and in the foreign-
policy area, Russia and NATO enlargement were high on their “hit list” (Asmus, 2002, pp. 
79, 85).  The Republicans backed by the ethnic leaders wanted to portray Clinton as being 
“soft” on Russia, and his administration’s lack of commitment to enlargement was a case in 
point.  They attempted to differentiate their party’s position by “underscor[ing] a harder-
edged rationale for enlargement as a hedge against Russian neo-imperalism” (Asmus, 2002, 
p. 83).  The Contract’s pledge on NATO expansion pointed out what the Republicans and 
ethnic coalition thought was the correct order of operations:  the self-determination of 
Central and Eastern Europeans should be prioritized over cooperation with Russia.15 
                                                            
15 The Contract’s tone regarding Russia reflected somewhat outdated assumptions of Russia having imperial 
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Mobilization of the Discontent 
After learning about the Clinton administration’s decision to promote the Partnership for 
Peace at the NATO Summit in Janaury 1994, groups representing Americans of Central and 
Eastern European ancestry worked together to lobby for the expansion of NATO into their 
ancestral homelands.  In their perspective, the decision not to invite Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia to join NATO was motivated in large part by Russian 
opposition to NATO enlargement.  The administration prioritizing the Partnership for Peace 
over enlargement suggested that Clinton’s acquiescence to Russian demands would further 
encourage Moscow’s belligerence toward its neighbors.  The portrayal of Clinton’s deference 
toward Russia provided the stimulus in shaping elite opinion, which in turn, sparked the 
mobilization of the ethnic communities.  Generating grassroots action was important to the 
ethnic coalition’s lobbying campaign as it helped raise public awareness of the issue, and 
most importantly, the attention of policymakers in both the administration and Congress.  
Two important op-eds in the Washington Post were important in this respect. 
 The op-ed by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak (1993) accused Clinton of providing 
“a sweetheart deal offering Russia virtual hegemony over most of the former Soviet Union 
and denying Eastern Europe entry into NATO.”  They suggested that Clinton seeking to 
delay NATO expansion was due in large part to his sensitivity over threats by the Russian 
military to destabilize Yeltsin if Eastern European states were allowed to join NATO.16    
                                                                                                                                                                                        
designs over Central and Eastern Europe.  The statement “Russia still has to prove that it will observe its new 
boundaries, which goes against its centuries-old imperial tradition and the beliefs of many within its military 
and government” underscores this point (Gillespie & Schellhas, 1994, p. 113). 
 
16 Yeltsin had allowed Poland to make its own decision regarding its entry into NATO.  However, in light of 
pressure from the Russian military and ultra-nationalist parties making inroads in the December 1993 
parliamentary election, there was a reversal in Yeltsin’s earlier position (Talbott, 2003, pp. 96-7). 
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Evans and Novak wrote that “administration sources say Yeltsin has been informed that 
NATO will not expand into Eastern Europe during Clinton’s presidency.”  The op-ed by Jan 
Novak (1993), national director of the Polish American Congress, followed a similar line of 
attack and argued that by providing Moscow with a “veto” over NATO expansion, the 
administration has in effect given Moscow “a ‘green light’ for ambitions to restore the 
Russian empire and to regain its sphere of influence in East Central Europe.”  Jan Novak was 
an instrumental figure of the ethnic coalition, due largely to his role as an interlocutor 
between the U.S. and Polish governments.  He played an important role in shaping public 
opinion on NATO enlargement.  Deputy National Security Advisor Samuel “Sandy” Berger 
said:  “People like Jan Novak, a Polish-American leader, affect your thinking—because of 
his experience, his life story and the logic and power of his arguments” (Asmus, 2002, p. 56). 
 The two op-eds provided the blueprint for the Polish American Congress’ efforts to 
inform lawmakers the dangers of the Clinton administration condoning Russia’s belligerence 
toward its neighbors.  In a letter to Senator Paul Simon (D-IL), dated 30 November 1993, 
Edward Moskal, President of the Polish American Congress, wrote:   
The prompt acceptance by the U.S. of Moscow’s “veto” against NATO membership of Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic has encouraged those around Yeltsin, who have not abandoned their 
ambitions, to restore the Soviet Union under the Russian banner and wish to restore the East-Central 
Europe to the Russian sphere of influence.  . . . Proposal of “Partnership for Peace” does not offer to 
neighbors of Russia and countries of East-Central Europe either a deterrent against potential aggressors 
or a credible prospect of achieving security under a NATO umbrella in the future” (Pienkos, 1995, p. 
189; Polish American Congress, 1999).17   
                                                            
17 The head office of the Polish American Congress is located in Chicago, Illinois, the home state of Senator 
Simon. 
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Moskal warned Senator Simon about the development of a “new Yalta,” a reference to the 
post-World War II partition of Europe by the U.S. and Soviet Union.  “We trust . . . that you 
will oppose vigorously any policy that could be perceived by Moscow as condoning tacitly or 
explicitly Russian ambition to dominate other countries either by coercion and military threat 
or economic blackmail” (p. 189). 
 It was around this time the Polish American Congress (PAC) contacted the White 
House requesting a meeting prior to the President’s trip to Europe in January 1994.18  This 
would provide an opportunity for ethnic-group leaders to convince the administration the 
importance of NATO enlargement in light of developments in Russia.  On 30 November 
1993, the Polish American Congress invited 18 ethnic organizations to its Washington D.C. 
office for a discussion on “Russian Neo-Imperialistic Policy” and “to extend, and share with 
you, our information and to discuss possibilities of coordinated action” (Polish American 
Congress, 1999).  The meeting on 6 December resulted in the establishment of the Central 
and East Europe Coalition (CEEC).  In an effort to step up pressure on the administration, 
Moskal called on the PAC’s state divisions and local chapters for a letter-writing campaign 
directed at the White House, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and Chairman 
of the Democratic National Committee David Wilhelm.  With this instance of outside 
lobbying, “the PAC took an overtly antagonistic position toward the Administration” 
(Pienkos, 1995, p. 190). 
 The first coordinated action by the CEEC sought to increase awareness within the 
ethnic communities on two issues of concern.  First, the letter-writing campaign was 
                                                            
18 On 1 December 1993, the Polish American Congress sent a letter to the White House stating:  “. . . Would 
you be kind enough to arrange a meeting for a delegation of the Polish American Congress with President 
Clinton at anytime convenient to him, between now and his departure for Brussels, Prague and Moscow . . .” 
(Polish American Congress, 1999). 
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regarded as a protest of the administration’s acceptance of Russia’s “veto” over NATO 
enlargement.  Second, the Partnership for Peace was inadequate to address the security 
situation in Central and Eastern Europe.  Did the outside lobbying force policymakers to pay 
attention?  The volume of communications generated by the letter-writing campaign was 
impressive.  The following is Pienkos’ (1999, p. 331) account: 
Thus, on one weekend alone, in December 1993, over 100,000 letters, postcards and mailgrams were 
addressed to the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the 
Democratic Party National Committee.  Telephone calls in the thousands were also directed to the 
White House, along with more than 14,000 e-mail messages over the internet. 
And as part of the effort to mobilize grassroots action, “the ethnic press and radio ran 
editorials, articles and appeals with sample letters addressed to the White House” (Polish 
American Congress, 1999). 
 It was reported that White House operators asked Jan Novak to curb the “deluge of 
communications” (Grayson, 1999, p. 162).  The administration responded by informing the 
ethnic-group leaders the President would make a foreign-policy address in Milwaukee on 6 
January 1994, prior to his departure for Europe.19  There would also be a meeting between 
administration officials and ethnic leaders the evening before the speech.  It is important here 
to discuss the proceedings of the “round table” meeting as it signified the first major 
exchange between the administration and CEEC. 
 The meeting on 5 Janaury 1994 was organized by Alexis Herman, the Director of 
Public Liaison—the White House office tasked with relations with interest groups.  Herman 
                                                            
19 It appears that electoral politics played a role in influencing the administration’s selection of sites to make 
foreign-policy addresses.  As Goldgeier (1999, p. 52) pointed out, Milwaukee was the “site of one 1992 Clinton 
campaign speech on foreign policy and home to a large number of Americans of central and eastern European 
descent.” 
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said:  “What I remember is the meeting we held in Milwaukee the day before the Vice 
President’s arrival when Sandy Berger spent more than three hours in a dialogue on issues 
ranging from NATO expanion to the war in Bosnia” (Kirschten, 1995; Goldgeier, 1999, p. 
53).20  Representing the administration were Deputy National Security Advisor Berger and 
Daniel Fried, Director of Central and Eastern European Affairs at the NSC.  There were 18 
ethnic leaders at the meeting, nine Polish Americans, five Hungarian Americans, two Slovak 
Americans, and two Czech Americans (Pienkos, 1995, p. 190; 1999, p. 332).  In what could 
be described as a “heated roundtable discussion” between administration officials and ethnic-
group leaders (Asmus, 2002, p. 64), the obvious topic was the prospects of Central and 
Eastern European states joining NATO. 
 What struck Pienkos, who represented both the Polish American Congress and Polish 
National Alliance, was the ambivalence administration officials shown toward the views of 
the ethnic leaders.  He (1999, p. 333) recalled:  “Yet our arguments met with no response 
from the Administration’s representatives.”  It is also important to get a sense of the 
administration’s perspective.  The following is Berger’s account of the meeting in an 
interview with Asmus (2002, pp. 64, 319 [fn. 12]): 
Fried and I met with a rather skeptical and extremely sophisticated coalition of leaders from the ethnic 
communities.  I knew then that the President wanted to enlarge.  But they never believed we would do 
it.  They believed that in the final analysis the Russian card would trump the enlargement card.  They 
believed that as a matter of power in the final analysis Central Europe would once again be sold out 
like it had been sold out before.  We went on for hours and we still did not convince them.  They were 
also pressing quite hard on questions, such as, ‘who would come in’ and criteria questions to which we 
did not yet have answers.   
                                                            
20 Vice President Gore substituted for the President after Clinton learned about the passing of his mother. 
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 The ethnic leader who made his presence known was the Polish American Congress’ 
Moskal, who challenged Berger and the administration’s proposal for the Partnership for 
Peace as tantamount to “a ‘second Yalta’, leaving Poland and its neighbors outside of the 
NATO security framework” (Pienkos, 1999, p. 334).  Moskal’s leadership of the ethnic 
coalition’s campaign for NATO expansion was recognized when he “[went] beyond 
diplomatic niceties and [engaged] in a form of political hardball.”  With congressional 
elections to be held in November 1994, Moskal suggested that the administration “would 
face some unpleasant consequences if it ignored the views of twenty million Americans of 
East Central European heritage on the NATO enlargement issue” (Pienkos, 1999, p. 334).  
The Polish American Congress’ contribution to the NATO enlargement lobby was the size of 
the ethnic community the organization represents.  Pienkos (1995, p. 192) recalled from the 
meeting, Moskal’s willingness to “take off the gloves . . . clearly demonstrated the PAC’s 
leadership position at the session.”  What was intended to be a two-hour meeting ended up 
being over four hours long.21 
 What impact did the meeting in Milwaukee had on the administration’s policy on 
NATO enlargement?  From the ethnic leaders’ perspectives, the points exchanged were 
reflected in Vice President Gore’s speech the following morning.  Stanislaus Blejwas of the 
Polish American Congress said to Moskal and Pienkos after the meeting:  “They’re [White 
House speechwriters] going to be busy revising the President’s speech tonight” (Pienkos, 
1999, p. 334).  Pienkos (1995, p. 192) observed that “the speech itself had very evidently 
been redrafted overnight and reflected in time and emphasis a number of points made at the 
                                                            
21 As Pienkos (1999, pp. 333-4) recalled, the meeting began at 8:15 pm.  Herman wanted to conclude at 10:15 
pm, but Moskal interjected.  He said:  “It’s too early to end.  Not all of us have had the chance to speak our 
minds on the subject.”  As a result, the meeting was extended for another two hours and ended at 12:30 am. 
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previous evening’s discussion.”  Gore (1994, p. 15) spoke at Pabst Theatre in Milwaukee on 
the morning of 6 January 1994 and said:  “The Partnership is a new way of drawing 
communist states into cooperation with the rest of Europe.  It advances an evolutionary 
process of formal NATO enlargement, a step toward adding new members of NATO.”  After 
listening to the speech, Pienkos (1999, p. 335) sensed that “an argument has been made for 
NATO enlargement.”  Grayson’s (1999) account is consistent with the views of the ethnic 
leaders present at the speech that there was a perceptible shift in administration policy as a 
result of the meeting.  The Partnership for Peace was no longer promoted as an alternative to 
enlargement but as a pathway toward NATO membership (Grayson, 1999, pp. 162-3).  
Although this position has been made by administration officials, most notably by Secretary 
of State Christopher at the NATO foreign ministers meeting (Kinzer, 1993; Goldgeier, 1999, 
p. 46), Gore’s speech marked the first time that the Partnership for Peace as a pathway to 
NATO membership was announced before a domestic audience. 
 What about the administration’s perspective?  The outside lobbying by the ethnic 
coalition did force policymakers to pay attention and the result was the meeting with 
administration officials in Milwaukee.  Domestic pressure served another purpose.  It may 
have been used by policy entrepreneurs to overcome bureaucratic opposition to enlargement.  
Goldgeier (1999, p. 79) identified Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard 
Hoolbrooke as an entrepreneur who used domestic pressure to shape NATO policy in a pro-
enlargement direction.  The inclusion of NATO enlargement in the Contract for America and 
pressure from the ethnic communities were pivotal domestic factors.  As Asmus (2002, p. 84) 
observed, Republican support for NATO enlargement “made any prospects of [the 
admininstration] backing down increasingly difficult if not impossible.”  The ambiguity of 
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the Partnership for Peace was not the result of sloppy policymaking, but was intentionally 
designed to allow entrepreneurs in the administration to proceed cautiously with NATO 
enlargement without provoking further bureaucratic opposition. 
 Domestic pressure may have played a role in shifting the Partnership for Peace from 
its initial emphasis as a stand-alone military cooperation program to a pathway to NATO 
membership.  From the recollections of the ethnic leaders present at Gore’s speech, including 
Pienkos, “the Clinton Administration had changed its policy on NATO enlargement” (1999, 
p. 330 [fn 2]).  Addressing the concerns of the ethnic communities through a presidential 
speech may be important in its own right, but achieving domestic support for the partnership 
program was crucial in convincing Central and Eastern European governments the value of 
participation.  Poland’s participation was key to the program’s success, but it was the country 
most vocal in its opposition.  The Partnership for Peace was regarded by Central and Eastern 
European governments as “a potential dead end than a first step toward NATO membership” 
(Asmus, 2002, p. 54).  The program would be pointless if Central and Eastern European 
states were not willing to join.  A State Department official said:  “If they don’t believe in the 
partnership then it serves no purpose” (Williams, 1994).  The Polish government, through its 
representatives in the U.S., was keen to gauge domestic pressure on NATO enlargement, and 
it had connections with the Polish diaspora.  Reinforcing the transnational link were leaders 
of the Polish American Congress, especially Jan Novak.  If the administration could persuade 
ethnic leaders the value of the Partnership for Peace, then they could convince the 
governments of their ancestral homelands that participation in the Partnership for Peace 
provides a clear path toward NATO membership.  The administration’s need to achieve 
domestic support was possibly aimed at getting the participation of Poland and other Central 
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and Eastern European states, and central in this respect was shifting the partnership program 
in a pro-enlargement direction. 
 The statements by President Clinton in his European trip reflected this shift in 
administration policy.  At the NATO Summit in Brussels on 10 Janaury 1994, Clinton (1994) 
said:  “The Partnership for Peace . . . enables us to prepare for and to work toward 
enlargement of NATO when other countries are capable of fulfilling their NATO 
responsibilities.”  Clinton clarified the aim of the partnership program at a meeting with the 
heads of the Visegrad states in Prague on 12 January.  “While the Partnership is not NATO 
membership, neither is it a permanent holding room.  It changes the entire NATO dialog so 
that now the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and 
how” (1994a).  A factor precipitating this shift in administration policy was domestic 
pressure.  The outside lobbying by the ethnic communities and Republican embrace of 
NATO enlargement in the Contract with America provided evidence of domestic support for 
expanding NATO.  The potential of Central and Eastern European governments to withhold 
cooperation was another factor in compelling administration officials to make the partnership 
program more enticing in the eyes of Visegrad leaders.  Thus, a confluence of domestic and 
international factors help entrepreneurs in the Clinton administration to proceed with a 
cautious approach in expanding NATO. 
The Influence of Electoral Politics 
One of the forces driving the domestic politics of NATO enlargement was the issue’s appeal 
to an influential voting bloc.  Both the administration and Congress were aware of a 
constituency in favor of NATO enlargement residing predominately in the “battleground 
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states” of the Midwestern and Northeastern U.S.  Asmus (2002, p. 80) observed:  “It was a 
constituency that usually voted Republican but one where Clinton had registered strong gains 
among so called ‘Reagan Democrats’ in 1992.  It was a constituency that Republicans 
wanted to bring back to their fold.”  Goldgeier (1999, p. 61) also pointed out:  “Americans of 
central and eastern European descent are important constituencies in key Midwestern and 
Northeastern states, such as Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and New York.”  Data obtained 
from Dobbs (1995) shows that 15% of Illinois’, 15% of Michigan’s, 18% of Pennsylvania’s, 
and 10% of New York’s populations are of ethnic Eastern European origins.  Although they 
make up only 8.5 % of the total U.S. population, “they are concentrated in the Northeast and 
Midwest in sufficient numbers to be a potential swing vote” (Kirschten, 1995).  The potential 
by ethnic leaders to mobilize this influential bloc into action was seen in the letter-writing 
campaign.  Many of the ethnic leaders invited to the Milwaukee meeting were top-flight 
activists for the Clinton presidential campaign in 1992 (Pienkos, 1999, p. 332).  The appeal 
of NATO enlargement to an influential bloc of voters and their demonstration of political 
activism partly explained why a foreign-policy issue found political traction and became a 
hotly-contested item between Democrats and Republicans in the lead-up to the 1996 
presidential election.22 
                                                            
22 Dick Morris, who served as adviser for the 1996 Clinton campaign, disputed the assertion that Clinton 
supported NATO enlargement largely because of the “Polish vote.”  In an interview with Asmus (2002, p. 312 
[fn. 27]), Morris said:  “One of the great myths about NATO enlargement is that the President cared about it for 
domestic reasons.”  He also denied the existence of the “Polish vote.”  In an interview with Goldgeier (1999, p. 
166), Morris said:  “Neither I nor the president ever believed there is such a thing as a Polish vote.” 
 
However, critics saw Clinton’s support for enlargement largely as an attempt to win votes in the battleground 
states where the ethnic communities are influential.  The main proponent of this view is Michael Mandelbaum 
(2010, pp. 70-1) who wrote:  “The Clinton administration’s principal motive for expanding NATO was to make 
political gains in advance of the 1996 presidential election among American voters of Polish, Hungarian, and 
Czech heritage by promising NATO membership to the countries from which their forebears had immigrated.” 
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 The Republican leadership was motivated by electoral considerations to include 
NATO enlargement in the Contract with America, the blueprint for the GOP to retake control 
of Congress.23 It was aimed to bring voters of Central and Eastern European ancestry back 
into their fold.  Newt Gingrich, who would become House Speaker in the 104th Congress 
(1995-96), said:  “NATO enlargement was the right thing to do for foreign policy and 
ideological reasons and it was the right thing to do for political reasons” (Asmus, 2002, p. 
80).  In the lead-up to the 1994 midterm election, Republicans needed issues that were both 
partisan and enjoyed wide public support.  Republican leaders were sensitive to public 
opinion when searching for issues to include in the Contract.  Gingrich insisted that every 
issue had to have at least 60 to 70 percent public approval.  He said:  “Politics is about public 
opinion and gathering public support” (Bader, 1996, p. 187).  Finding partisan issues would 
help Republicans demonstrate policy leadership and highlight differences with the 
administration.  On the foreign-policy front was the use of NATO enlargement to attack 
Clinton for being “soft” on Russia, an issue which garnered attention and political activism 
of the ethnic communities.  A definite plan to bring four Visegrad states into NATO by 1999 
resonated with a commitment to “Strong National Defense,” one of the platforms in the 
Contract.  The Republicans wanted to show they are “decisive, tough, and capable of dealing 
with troubles overseas” (Bader, p. 192).  Gingrich said:  “even if the President had spoken 
out more clearly in favor of enlargement we [members of the GOP] would not have believed 
him because he simply lacked credibility” (Asmus, 2002, p. 85). 
 The Republicans winning control of both houses of Congress in the 1994 midterm 
election was a watershed moment for the Clinton presidency.  The Democrats’ loss of 
                                                            
23 The NATO enlargement language in the Contract with America was drafted at the conservative Heritage 
Foundation (Grayson, 1999, p. 169). 
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Congress, according to Talbott (2003, p. 138), was a “blow to the administration on every 
front, including foreign policy.”  With the Republicans’ plan to legislate on the Contract with 
America when the 104th Congress convened in January 1995, the NATO enlargement issue 
moved to “center stage in American politics” (Asmus, 2002, p. 83).  And as Goldgeier (1999, 
p. 62) pointed out, “the political imperatives of the administration to stay out in front on this 
issue heightened.”  From the perspectives of the ethnic leaders, a Republican-controlled 
Congress provided a major push for their lobbying efforts, considering NATO enlargement is 
one of the commitments in the Contract.  Pienkos (1995, p. 194) observed that the prospects 
for securing Poland’s NATO membership improved “thanks to the results of the November 
Congressional elections.”  The change from unified to divided control of government was a 
significant development in the NATO enlargement case.  The next chapter covers the period 
from the start of the 104th Congress to the 1996 presidential election. 
Summary 
To recap the major developments of this chapter, the event that sparked the ethnic coalition’s 
lobbying campaign for NATO enlargement was the administration’s decision to prioritize the  
Partnership for Peace over offering invitations to Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Slovakia to join NATO at the Alliance’s summit in Brussels in January 1994.  The first 
coordinated action by the ethnic coalition was a massive letter-writing campaign directed at 
the White House.  In response, the administration invited ethnic leaders to a meeting in 
Milwaukee the evening before President Clinton’s speech.  Although it was expected that the 
ethnic coalition would lobby the executive branch when there is unified government, 
especially at the agenda-setting stage, however, it was unexpected that the ethnic leaders 
outside lobbied the White House, considering it is the executive-branch institution most 
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insulated from public pressure.  The ethnic coalition’s lobbying for congressional initiatives 
to define the “who” and “when” of enlargement met with mixed results since most of the 
bills died in committee.  This was largely attributed to lack of congressional interest and 
support, but administration opposition was also a factor.  There was less executive-legislative 
contention and greater inclination by congressional leaders to defer foreign-policy matters to 
the White House under unified government.  Since Congress has yet to be established as a 
base of support for the ethnic coalition, the focus of its lobbying for NATO enlargement 
during unified control of government was the executive branch.   
The major action by the ethnic coalition to generate public awareness on the NATO 
enlargement issue was the letter-writing campaign.  If the intent was to force policymakers to 
pay attention, then it did its job.  It demonstrated the potential of the ethnic communities for 
mass political action, and thus conveying to policymakers the electoral consequences 
associated with the issue.  The size of the Polish-American community in key battleground 
states was an asset the Polish American Congress brought to the ethnic coalition’s campaign 
for NATO enlargement.  The ability to mobilize electoral pressure provided ethnic leaders 
with a major source of political influence.  The outside lobbying made officials in both the 
executive and legislative branches aware of the intensity of support for NATO expansion in 
the ethnic communities and the electoral consequences associated with the issue.  The 
activism of the ethnic communities raised the political stakes on the enlargement issue 
between the Democrats and Republicans.  The GOP winning majority control of both houses 
of Congress in the 1994 election and its plan to legislate on the Contract with America 
guaranteed that NATO enlargement would receive congressional action at the start of the 
105th Congress in January 1995.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
DIVIDED GOVERNMENT AND THE REPUBLICAN CHALLENGE 
 
The 104th Congress convened on 4 January 1995 and marked the first time in 40 years the 
GOP assumed control of both the House and Senate (Cooper & Dewar, 1995).  True to their 
promise in the 1994 campaign, the House Republicans began legislating on the platforms of 
the Contract with America, including its commitment to expand NATO into Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia.24  A Republican-controlled Congress sought to 
differentiate itself from the policy positions of the Clinton administration, and on the foreign-
policy front, the issue the GOP sought to highlight was policy toward Russia.  Clinton’s 
accommodation of Russian anxiety over NATO expansion fueled the Republican attack on 
the administration’s foreign policy.  The articulation of a realist rationale for enlargement “as 
insurance against any return to Russian domination” underscored the Republicans’ hard-line 
approach toward Russia (Williams, 1994; Dueck, 2010).  Richard Lugar (R-IN), the second-
ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said that Russia “is seeking 
to gain an implicit or explicit veto over NATO’s future and the future of the American role in 
                                                            
24 The Contract promised that all 10 platforms will be legislated within the first 100 days of the 104th Congress.  
It is stated in the advertisement of the Contract in the October 22-28 1994 edition of TV Guide:  “If we break 
this contract, throw us out.  We mean it” (Bader, 1996, pp. 174-5). 
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Europe.”  Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) said:  “I want to make sure the administration 
moves away from a Russia-first policy” (Williams, 1994).   
 The focus of this chapter is on the developments from January 1995 to November 
1996.  Central to the analysis is the change from unified to divided government as 
Republicans assumed control of both the House and Senate at the start of the 104th Congress.  
It is important to note that congressional assertiveness on foreign policy, and NATO 
enlargement in particular, stemmed from the Republican-controlled House.  The Contract 
with America was a pledge taken by majority of GOP House members in their 1994 
campaign (Lippman, 1995).  The congressional initiatives on NATO enlargement provided a 
platform for the ethnic coalition to pressure the administration to define the “who” and 
“when,” that is, the countries qualified to join NATO and year of their admission.  The 
administration resisted congressional pressure for a number of reasons, including executive 
control over foreign policymaking, domestic developments in Russia, and in particular, 
concerns over Yeltsin’s hold on power. The electoral schedules of both the U.S. and Russia 
also impinged on the politics of NATO enlargement.  Clinton announced the “first group of 
countries” would join NATO by 1999 after the Russian presidential election in July 1996 and 
two weeks before the U.S. presidential election in November 1996, a move perceived as an 
attempt to win votes from the ethnic communities in the “battleground states.”  This provides 
the context for the analysis on the lobbying activities of the ethnic coalition during the 
second stage of the NATO enlargement case. 
The Republican Challenge 
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The ethnic leaders shared the views with the House Republican leadership regarding the 
administration’s tolerance for Russia’s belligerent behavior and lack of development on 
NATO enlargement.  The Polish American Congress sent a memorandum to all members of 
the 104th Congress “restating its support of NATO membership for Poland and questioning 
NATO’s resolve on the matter of expansion in the face of Russian bellicosity” (Pienkos, 
1995, p. 195).  The first action of the 104th Congress to define the “who” and “when” of 
NATO enlargement was the National Security Revitalization Act (H.R. 7), the bill designed 
to enact the national-security platform of the Contract with America into law.  Congressional 
assertiveness, particularly the efforts by House Republican leaders to legislate on the 
Contract with America within the first 100 days, provided a platform for the ethnic coalition 
to increase pressure on the administration.  Attention was on Title VI of the Act:  Expansion 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.25  The Polish American Congress issued a 
legislative alert to all divisions and chapters regarding Title VI of H.R. 7 on 6 February 1995, 
and a legislative alert was later issued for the Senate version on 16 February.   
Contention between the Republican-controlled House and the Clinton administration 
reinforced the ethnic coalition’s strategy of using congressional support to pressure the 
administration.  The ethnic coalition injected partisanship into the NATO enlargement issue 
by supporting a bill that originated with the Contract with America.  Evidence of the partisan 
nature of the Contract-related bills could be seen in the disparity between the number of 
Republican and Democratic co-sponsors.  For example, among the 138 co-sponsors of H.R. 
7, only one was a Democrat.  The House floor vote was partisan as well; 241 Republicans 
                                                            
25 The language on NATO enlargement in the National Security Revitalization Act was quite similar to that in 
the Contract with America with one exception:  the exact date of January 10, 1999 was revised to “in the near 
future.” 
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voted “yea,” while 181 Democrats voted no.26  Administration opposition to the enlargement 
initiatives only encouraged further legislative action by the House Republicans, thus 
providing more opportunities for the ethnic coalition to use congressional support to pressure 
the administration. 
Leading the administration’s opposition to the National Security Revitalization Act 
were Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Secretary of Defense William Perry.  
Opposition was motivated by the partisan tone of the legislation and congressional efforts to 
restrict presidential flexibility in foreign policymaking.  In an op-ed in the New York Times, 
Christopher and Perry (1995) recommended a presidential veto.  Regarding its language on 
NATO enlargement, “the bill unilaterally and prematurely designates certain European states 
for NATO membership.  NATO should and will expand.  . . .  But new members must be 
ready to undertake the obligations of membership, just as we and our allies must be ready to 
extend our solemn commitments to them.”  This was interpreted by ethnic leaders as further 
evidence of the administration seeking to delay, or possibly, derail the aspirations of their 
ancestral homelands to join NATO.  House Republican leaders may have been motivated to 
criticize the administration’s foreign policy on partisan and electoral grounds, but their line 
of attack was encouraged in part by leaders of the ethnic coalition.  Not only were relations 
between the administration and Republican-controlled Congress going from “bad to worse” 
(Asmus, 2002, p. 119), relations between the administration and leaders of the ethnic 
coalition were deteriorating as well. 
                                                            
26 Source:  H.R. 7—104th Congress:  National Security Revitalization Act (1995).  Retrieved August 12, 2013, 
from http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/104/hr7. 
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In response to administration pressure for the naming of specific countries and 
reporting requirements be removed from the Amendments to the NATO Participation Act of 
1994, the Polish American Congress, in a letter to Congress on 5 October 1995, accused the 
State Department of an “all-out effort” to “kill” the legislation (Solomon, 1998, p. 87; 
Goldgeier, 1999, p. 100).  In a letter to President Clinton on 30 October, Moskal of the Polish 
American Congress expressed concerns that “further delay may mean that the answers to 
your questions ‘When?’ and ‘Who?’ will be ‘No One’ and ‘Never’.  . . .  We look forward, 
Mr. President, to indications and actions on the part of your Administration that will dispel 
the growing perceptions of 19 million Americans with roots in Central and Eastern Europe, 
including 10 million Polish Americans, that the next Clinton Administration will continue a 
policy of deferring decisions on NATO enlargement, leaving the issue to your successor” 
(Goldgeier, 1999, p. 100).   
Keeping the lines of communications opened with the Clinton White House was part 
of the effort in stepping up pressure on the administration.  The CEEC presented President 
Clinton a position paper on NATO expansion on 26 January 1996.  It raised concerns about 
the lack of “forceful advocacy by the administration to obtain consensus among the NATO 
allies for NATO expansion beyond vague and non-committal statements that sometime in an 
unspecified future some unnamed countries may join the Atlantic community.”  The position 
paper also pointed out that the legislation the CEEC supported had been “vigorously 
opposed” by the State Department.  Another concern was the administration “defer[ring] 
indefinitely any decision on enlargement” in the face of “aggressive Russian nationalism.”  
Directing attention to the concerns within the ethnic communities regarding the Clinton 
administration’s indecision on NATO expansion, which may encourage further Russian 
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aggressive behavior, the position paper stated:  “there is growing perception among the 
communities represented by this coalition that the countries [of] our heritage will not be 
permitted to join the Atlantic community of free and democratic nations during the present 
administration.  Instead, we see the United States on the road to strategic cooperation with 
Russia, to the exclusion of the interests and equal participation of the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe.”27 
Clinton met with leaders of the CEEC on 12 Feburary 1996 at the White House where 
he reiterated his administration’s support for NATO enlargement.  In the meeting, “the 
president assured the coalition he would not delay or abandon the timetable for NATO 
enlargement and agreed with coalition members that Russian rhetoric had gotten 
irresponsible on the question of NATO” (Iwanciw, 1996).  Not satisfied with the response 
from the administration, the ethnic coalition continued to provide support for the Republican-
backed initiatives on NATO enlargement.  The major piece of legislation to this effect was 
the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996 (H.R. 3564), sponsored by Chairman of the 
House International Relations Committee Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY).  It 
authorized $60 million to facilitate Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in their 
transition to NATO membership (Solomon, 1998, pp. 99-100).28  The naming of specific 
candidate states eligible for U.S. assistance again became a point of contention between 
Congress and the administration.  In a letter to Gilman dated 9 May 1996, Clinton wrote:  
“Your legislation specifically urges me to designate Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary as eligible for assistance under the NATO Participation Act.  These countries are 
                                                            
27 The CEEC position paper on NATO enlargement was published in the periodicals of the ethnic organizations, 
including the Ukrainian Weekly (1996). 
 
28 The Senate version added Slovenia.  Slovakia dropped out of the running to be a NATO member due to the 
authoritarian practices of its leader Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar (Asmus, 2002, pp. 154-5). 
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indeed making substantial progress and I agree they will be strong candidates for early 
NATO membership when the Alliance decides to move forward.  At this stage, however, 
writing into law a narrow list of countries eligible for special assistance could reduce our 
ability to work with other emerging democracies that are also making significant progress” 
(Goldgeier, 1999, p. 103). 
There was a pattern of the ethnic coalition stepping up its lobbying for congressional 
initiatives after the administration voiced its opposition.  This occurred on 20 June when 
Frank Koszorus of the American Hungarian Federation, representing the CEEC, testified 
before the House Committee on International Relations in support of the NATO Enlargement 
Facilitation Act.  He said: 
The coalition endorses H.R. 3564 because it addresses the heretofore glacial pace of NATO’s 
expansion.  The collapse of the Soviet Union has left a dangerous security vacuum in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  That region must be rapidly reintegrated with the West to provide it with a sense of 
security and to [shore] up the new democracies.  . . .  In January 1994, the Clinton administration 
committed itself to the integration of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe into the 
defense structure of the Atlantic community.  More than 2 years later, the questions posed by the 
President, when the process of NATO enlargement will begin, and who will join, remain largely 
unanswered.” (American Hungarian Federation, 1996). 
The ethnic coalition played a role in lining up a bipartisan group of co-sponsors for the 
NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act.  Of the total 34 co-sponsors, 19 of them were 
Republicans and 15 Democrats.29  The legislation passed the House on 23 July 1996 by a 
                                                            
29 Of the total 34 co-sponsors, 18 of them were from states where the ethnic communities are politically 
influential.  They are:  Sam Gejdenson (D-CT); Martin Hoke (R-OH); Tim Holden (D-PA); Henry Hyde (R-IL); 
Marcy Kaptur (D-OH); Peter King (R-NY); William Lipinski (D-IL); Carolyn Maloney (D-NY); Jack Quinn 
(R-NY); Gerald Solomon (R-NY); Rosa DeLauro (D-CT); Steven LaTourette (R-OH); Eliot Engel (D-NY); 
Jose Serrano (D-NY); Richard Durbin (D-IL); Christopher Shays (R-CT).  Source:  
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vote of 353 to 65 and Senate on 25 July by 81 to 16 (Solomon, 1998, p. 99; Towell, 1996).  
President Clinton signed it into law on 30 September 1996.  Chairman Gilman acknowledged 
the role played by the Polish American Congress in building congressional support for the 
legislation.  In a letter to Moskal dated 17 October 1996, Gilman wrote:  “It is no 
exaggeration to say that we probably could not have passed the NATO Enlargement 
Facilitation Act without the personal involvement of Myra and Casimir Lenard of your 
Washington office and other members of the Polish American Congress.  The PAC’s 
assistance in mobilizing grass roots support for our bill was absolutely critical in ensuring the 
broad-based bipartisan support within the Congress that we needed in order to enact the 
legislation” (Polish American Congress, 1999). 
 The Clinton administration’s decision to enlarge NATO was held hostage by the 
political calenders in both the U.S. and Russia.  Talbott (2003, p. 217) noted:  “This schedule 
was intended to diminish both the impact of enlargement on Russian domestic politics and 
the perception that it was driven by American domestic politics.”  The Republican-backed 
legislation and lobbying by the ethnic coalition increased domestic pressure on the 
administration to commit to a timetable on enlargement.  As long as Clinton did not 
announce when enlargement would occur, from the perspectives of the ethnic communities, 
there was fear that the final response may be “never.”  Clinton could not afford to alienate 
voters of Central and Eastern European ancestry in the highly-contested “battleground states” 
in the lead-up to the 1996 presidential election.  But Clinton also had to be sensitive to 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
http://govtrack.us/congress/bills/104/hr3564.  Of the total 353 “yea” votes for H.R. 3564, 194 were from 
Republicans and 157 from Democrats.  Source:  http://govtrack.us/congress/votes/104-1996/h338. 
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domestic developments in Russia and Yeltsin’s re-election would ensure continuation of 
bilateral cooperation on a range of issues, including NATO enlargement. 
The administration was in a precarious balance before the Russian presidential 
election.  Congressional pressure, backed by the ethnic coalition, increased the U.S. domestic 
political stakes regarding NATO enlargement.  Clinton had to address concerns among ethnic 
leaders that his administration was not committed to enlargement; however, he could not 
push enlargement to the point of provoking a backlash in Russian domestic politics and 
thereby risking Yeltsin’s re-election.  It is true that NATO enlargement was held hostage by 
domestic politics of both countries.  Clinton prioritized the domestic political imperatives 
over strategic interests only after the Russian presidential election, especially the importance 
of the NATO enlargement issue to over 20 million voters whom the CEEC purportedly 
represented.  Clinton signing the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act into law was important 
in this respect and indicated willingness on the part of his administration to work with 
Congress to expand NATO.  Goldgeier (1999, p. 106) observed, “And on balance for the 
administration, the strategic benefits of putting NATO enlargement on a concrete path and 
the political benefits of taking credit for the policy with the ethnic community outweighed 
the concern about managing Russia.” 
The Impact of Congressional Support 
On an issue largely regarded by members of Congress with “favorable indifference,” 
(Goldgeier, 1999, pp. 78-9), there was need to raise public awareness on NATO enlargement.  
The legislative alerts issued by the Polish American Congress provided evidence of attempts 
to drum up support for the congressional initiatives within the ethnic communities.  
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Generating congressional support was a component of the ethnic coalition’s strategy to 
pressure the administration  However, this was successful only if the ethnic coalition could 
demonstrate to lawmakers the intensity of preferences at the grassroots level.  It is this aspect 
where outside lobbying is effective in converting issue salience into legislative influence.  
The statements by the CEEC as an organization with 18 ethnic organizations representing 
over 22 million Americans demonstrated its potential for grassroots mobilization.  A 
policymaking environment conducive to the ethnic coalition’s strategy arrived when 
Republicans captured control of Congress.  There are political and institutional incentives for 
Congress to highlight policy differences under divided government.  A shift in executive-
legislative dynamics shapes the lobbying strategies of interest groups, and in this case, an 
assertive Congress provided the ethnic coalition with the platform to generate the 
congressional support necessary to pressure the administration. 
The congressional initiatives were aimed at pressuring the administration to identify 
the candidate states and when NATO enlargement would occur.  These were key issues 
ethnic leaders sought answers in their meetings with administration officials.  Public pressure 
was ineffective in changing the administration’s attitude regarding congressional action on 
NATO enlargement.  As Gilman (1997) observed, the administration reacted to 
congressional initiatives “with indifference, if not downright hostility.”  Differences over the 
prioritization of U.S.-Russia cooperation and NATO enlargement was the basis for 
contention between the Clinton administration and the ethnic coalition, backed by the House 
Republican leaders.  A change in the attitude on the part of the administration was not 
detected until after the Russian presidential election.  What aspect of the ethnic coalition’s 
strategy was effective in putting pressure on the administration?  Outside lobbying was 
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effective in making the case that the administration’s position was at odds with congressional 
and public opinion.  This imposed pressure on Clinton to take positions popular with 
mainstream views.  House Republican leaders saw the political benefits of NATO 
enlargement and provided the ethnic coalition with support to pressure the administration.  
The ethnic communities vocal in their support for NATO enlargement increased partisan 
contention between the branches and electoral stakes of the issue in the lead-up to the 1996 
U.S. presidential election. 
One of the issues that emerged early in the debate was whether NATO enlargement 
was ratifiable (Asmus, 2002, p. 86).  With the exception of members of Congress 
representing districts and states with high concentrations of voters of Central and Eastern 
European ancestry, “there was absolutely no reason for the vast majority of congressional 
representatives and senators to spend much time on an issue about which few constituents 
cared” (Goldgeier, 1999, p. 78).  Congressional support cannot be underestimated since the 
final stage of the policy process required the “advice and consent” of the Senate.  An 
important objective of outside lobbying is forcing policymakers to pay attention, and by 
raising awareness on the NATO enlargement issue, the ethnic coalition was able to motivate 
a large number of lawmakers and thus generate legislative momentum for the enlargement 
initiatives.  They helped register congressional support for NATO enlargement.  The ethnic 
coalition encouraged congressional assertiveness on the NATO enlargement issue, and the 
congressional initiatives in turn reinforced its lobbying efforts.  Republicans on Capitol Hill 
were adamant that they pushed the administration to embrace NATO enlargement.  For 
example, Rep. Gerald Solomon (R-NY) (1998, p. 135) wrote:  “Again, it was Congress itself 
that had led the way on the enlargement issue.”  Although a major part of its strategy was to 
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pressure the administration, the GOP support the ethnic coalition built would become 
important in the ratification stage. 
The Impact of Electoral Politics 
There was perception that Clinton supported NATO enlargement because of the issue’s 
appeal to voters of Central and Eastern European ancestry residing predominately in the 
battleground states.  This was an argument used by enlargement opponents to discredit the 
administration’s decision (Friedman, 1997; 1998; Mandelbaum, 2010, pp. 70-1).  The impact 
of electoral politics on the U.S. decision-making was not lost among NATO heads of 
government.  In a conversation between Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien and his 
Belgian counterpart Jean-Luc Dehaene at the 1997 NATO Summit in Madrid, Chretien said:  
“All this for short-term political reasons, to win elections” (Paul & Paul, 2009, p. 1).  This is 
not to suggest that electoral politics was the primary motive for Clinton’s decision to enlarge 
NATO; other factors came into play, including relations with Russia, stability in Central and 
Eastern Europe, and need to modernize the Alliance for the post-Cold War era.  However, 
electoral politics did drive the decision-making at certain points, most notably, Clinton’s 
announcement that the “first group of countries” would join NATO by 1999 before a 
predominately Polish-American audience in Detroit two weeks before the 1996 presidential 
election. 
 The choice of Detroit follows a pattern of administration officials selecting cities with 
high concentrations of Central and Eastern European ethnics as locations for “major 
addresses” on NATO policy.  Milwaukee in January 1994, Cleveland in January 1995, and 
Detroit in 1996 made it obvious that administration officials were aware of public interest on 
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NATO enlargement in these communities.  Goldgeier (1999, p. 62) wrote:  “Clinton’s 
emphasis on enlargement in front of ethnic communities in places like Cleveland and Detroit 
in 1995-96 provides clear evidence of the perceived political value of NATO expansion.”  
With two weeks to go before the presidential election, Goldgeier noted in a conversation with 
Chief of Staff Leon Panetta that the “political imperatives of naming a date in front of an 
ethnic audience were obvious” (p. 106).  The administration establishing lines of 
communication with ethnic-group leaders was consistent with a strategy to “continue and 
expand the unprecedented access to the White House and key Administration decision-
makers for the leadership of the ethnic communities” (Mitchell, 1997).  Electoral 
considerations played a role in the administration’s decision to forge ties with the ethnic 
communities. 
 The power of the ballot is a source of political influence for groups with grassroots 
mobilization potential.  This was reflected in statements by leaders of the ethnic coalition.  
Eugene Iwanciw of the Ukrainian National Association, one of the founding organizations of 
the CEEC, said: “There are 23 million Americans who trace their heritage to Eastern Europe, 
including over 9 million Poles.  There are a dozen states—very important states for any 
presidential election—where they constitute more than 5 percent of the electorate.  Taking an 
expansionist position on NATO is a no-lose way of appealing to these voters” (Dobbs, 1995).  
The reason for Clinton’s choice of Detroit for the announcement, according to Casimir 
Lenard, director of the Washington D.C. office of the Polish American Congress, was:  “He 
[Clinton] needed votes.  That’s how it happened” (Longworth, 1998).  Former National 
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, a proponent of enlargement, underscored the electoral 
factor:  “The NATO expansion issue has galvanized the ethnic groups into action.  If Clinton 
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is going to win the next election, he will have to win in the old industrial belt, which begins 
in Connecticut and ends in Illinois, where the ethnic groups are very strong” (Dobbs, 1995). 
 The ethnic leaders wanted to impress on the Clinton campaign that support for the 
President within the ethnic communities was far from assured, largely due to the 
administration’s position on enlargement.  As long as the administration remained 
uncommitted to announcing the date of enlargement, there was still possibility that it may 
never occur.  The political stakes increased when the Republican presidential candidate, 
Senator Robert Dole (R-KS), on 4 June 1996 endorsed the NATO Enlargement Facilitation 
Act at an event on Capitol Hill with former Polish President Lech Walesa and House Speaker 
Newt Gingrich, where Dole criticized the Clinton’s administration’s “deliberately slow” 
approach to enlargement and spending time “studying and discussing, but not acting” 
(Dobbs, 1996).  Dole promised that by 1998 Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary would 
join NATO (Asmus, 2002, pp. 165-6; Goldgeier, 1999, pp. 102-3; Hoagland, 1996). 
 NATO enlargement emerged as a campaign issue for Americans of Central and 
Eastern European background.  The letter-writing campaign directed at the administration 
and legislative alerts issued for the congressional initiatives on enlargement demonstrated 
their political activism on behalf of the issue.  However, in order for a foreign-policy issue to 
be “activated” in an election, voters have to be able to discern differences in the position 
between candidates (Aldrich, Sullivan, & Borgida, 1989).  Dole promised 1998 and Clinton 
1999 when the “first group of countries” would join NATO.  But was this significant enough 
for the issue to be activated in an election?  From the perspectives of the ethnic voters, 
announcing the date meant that NATO enlargement would occur.  Clinton’s delay reinforced 
skepticism within the ethnic communities regarding the administration’s commitment to 
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enlargement.  The Republican Party, since assuming control of Congress, sought to define a 
tougher approach in U.S. policy toward Russia (Williams, 1994).  The Republican 
presidential candidate’s position on NATO enlargement underscored a rationale of hedging 
against Russia seeking to reassert its influence in Central and Eastern Europe.  This 
contrasted with the administration’s rationale of emphasizing a “strong and cooperative 
relationship between NATO and Russia” (Mitchell, 1996).  In a speech at the World Affairs 
Council of Philadelphia on 25 June 1996, Dole said: 
President Clinton’s misguided romanticism towards Russia has led him and his advisers to try to fine-
tune the intrigues of Russian domestic politics instead of guarding against the nationalist turn in 
Russian foreign policy that has already occurred.  . . .  And many of those challenges were excused, 
ignored and even encouraged by the Clinton Administration.  . . .  Russian officials have conducted a 
campaign of threats against NATO expansion, and President Clinton got the message.  He deferred and 
delayed, placing the threats of Russian nationalists before the aspirations of democrats in countries like 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.  . . .  I will stand firmly with the champions of democracy.  I 
will not grant Russia a veto power over NATO enlargement (New York Times, 1996). 
 There was evidence that leaders of the ethnic coalition sought to energize their 
lobbying campaign through electoral politics.  On 21 May 1996, Dole met with leaders of the 
CEEC at a breakfast meeting on Capitol Hill.  The presumptive Republican presidential 
nominee reiterated his support for NATO enlargement and said:  “We must not allow Russia 
to intimidate its neighbors and to dictate the course of U.S. policies on aid and NATO 
expansion.  We must make it clear to the Russians that while we are willing to engage in a 
dialogue with them on NATO security matters, we will act in our own interests” (Ukrainian 
Weekly, 1996).  Leaders of the CEEC also met with the chairmen of the Democratic and 
Republican national committees to have NATO enlargement adopted in their platforms 
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before their party conventions (Koszorus, 2007).  While the Democratic party platform 
expressed a pledge to “add new Central European members to NATO in the near future,” the 
GOP platform was more explicit in stating the Party’s support “for Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary to enter NATO by 1998” (Polish American Congress, 1999). 
 It was at the May 1996 meeting when CEEC leaders suggested that Dole should 
address members of the ethnic coalition in Detroit.  There was an opportunity in July when 
Dole was in town for a Republican National Leadership Award Dinner; however, the idea 
was rejected by his campaign advisors.  It is worth noting that Dole was “trailing badly in 
polls across the industrial Midwest and Northeast” at the time (Harden, 1996).  Central to the 
Republican prospects of winning the White House was, according to political consultant 
Roger J. Stone, “the blue-collar Catholic vote” (Kirschten, 1995).  A meeting with members 
of the coalition might help win back the support of the “Reagan Democrats.”  Julie Finley, 
co-chair of Dole’s Finance Committee and member of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO, 
recalled the failure to seize the opportunity reflected a “complete breakdown in advance 
work, scheduling, and political judgment” (Grayson, 1999, p. 97). 
 The Clinton administration notified the CEEC that the President would make a 
“major address” on NATO policy in Detroit and asked the CEEC to ensure the event would 
be “well attended” (Koszorus, 2007; Grayson, 1999, p. 97).  The Detroit area is a well-known 
location for presidential addresses on Central and Eastern European policy owing to the 
concentration of communities who traced their ancestry to that part of the world.  Former 
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft (1999, p. 48), in choosing the location for 
President George H. W. Bush’s April 1989 speech on Eastern European policy, wrote:  
“They [White House planners] hit upon the town of Hamtramck, Michigan, a Detroit enclave 
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and a natural for the speech.  Its hallmark was patriotism, it had a high concentration of 
families with ties to Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, and it had lots of Reagan Democrat 
blue-collar workers” (Goldgeier, 1999, p. 106).  The perceived political value of a foreign-
policy speech before a predominately Polish-American audience was apparent among 
Clinton campaign aides.  They acknowledged that “Detroit was regarded as a good choice for 
such a speech because of its population of Central and Eastern European ethnics” (Harris, 
1996).30  White House spokesperson Michael McCurry said:  “It is certainly true that this 
subject is of keen interest in communities here in the United States that have an ethnic 
identity with these countries” (Thomma, 1998). 
 On 22 October 1996, Clinton spoke at Fisher Theater in downtown Detroit and 
underscored his administration’s commitment to NATO enlargement.  He said:  “Today I 
want to state America’s goal.  By 1999, NATO’s 50th anniversary and 10 years after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, the first group of countries we invite to join should be full-fledged 
members of NATO.”  With an eye toward securing domestic support for Senate ratification, 
Clinton went on:  “I look forward to working with Congress to ratify the accession of new 
members, to provide the resources we need to meet this commitment, to secure the support of 
the American people.  It will advance the security of everyone:  NATO’s old members, new 
members, and nonmembers alike” (1996, p. 2143). 
 On 5 November 1996, President Clinton was re-elected to a second term, defeating 
Dole by 379 to 159 electoral college votes (Balz, 1996).  Clinton won Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
Illinois, and Michigan, states historically having “unusually large concentrations of 
                                                            
30 The coverage in the Washington Post emphasized that the speech was aimed “in part at ethnic voters.”  See 
also the op-ed “NATO and the Campaign” (1996). 
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Americans of Eastern European ethnic background” (Garrett, 1978, p. 312).  Balz (1996) 
wrote:  “Clinton sailed to a near-sweep through the nation’s industrial heartland, recording 
victories in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois and Missouri, the 
area that Dole once believed held the key to his hopes but where he never dented the 
president’s early leads.”  In a state famous for its “Reagan Democrats,” Clinton won 
Michigan with 51.69% of the popular votes.31  The closely-contested nature of electoral 
politics in Michigan may have motivated the Clinton campaign to choose Detroit as the site 
for the President’s speech on NATO enlargement.  The failure by the Dole team to organize 
an event for ethnic leaders in July 1996 may be one of the “what if” moments of the 1996 
presidential election year, considering many of the ethnic leaders are top Democratic Party 
activists and played a role in helping Clinton win these states in 1992.  Clinton solidifed his 
support among Polish Americans.  As Grayson (1999, p. 98) observed, “Polish Americans 
awarded Clinton nearly half their votes, up from 44 percent in 1992 and 42.3 percent for 
Dukakis in 1988.”  Of the 10 congressional districts with the highest concentrations of Polish 
Americans, Clinton beat Dole in eight of them (Goldgeier, 1999, p. 100).32  The following 
table shows the concentrations of Polish Americans in some of the congressional districts 
Goldgeier identified.  The data is based on the 1990 census and cited from Gory (1996, p. 
209). 
Concentrations of Polish Americans in Selected Congressional Districts 
State and Congressional 
District 
Number of Polish 
Americans (1990 census) 
Total Number of Persons 
(1990 census) 
Percentage of Polish 
Americans (%) 
NY-30 145,436 580,818 25.04 
WI-4 134,787 543,482 24.81 
                                                            
31 Source:  http://uselectionatlas.org. 
 
32 They are:  NY-30; WI-4; IL-3, 5, 6, 13; MI-10, 12, 16; PA-11 (Goldgeier, 1999, p. 194 [fn. 70]).   
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IL-3 130,432 570,902 22.85 
IL-5 113,132 571,053 19.81 
PA-11 108,254 565,802 19.13 
MI-12 109,919 580,987 18.92 
MI-10 98,645 580,974 16.98 
IL-13 88,722 571,344 15.53 
MI-16 88,802 580,884 15.29 
 
 The importance of the battleground states, and the high concentrations of Central and 
Eastern European ethnics in these states, do not suggest that NATO expansion was the issue 
that decided the outcome of the 1996 presidential election.  In a closely-contested state like 
Michigan, however, there is perception that a single issue such as NATO expansion may 
prove decisive.  The Clinton campaign saw the political value of organizing a NATO-related 
speech in Detroit two weeks before the election, while the Dole campaign missed an 
opportunity to appeal to a group of ethnic leaders vociferous in their support for the 
admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into NATO.  A president running for 
re-election has certain advantages.  As head of state of a NATO member—and by far the 
most influential—Clinton could call for a NATO Summit where a decision could be made to 
invite the Visegrad countries into NATO, exactly what Clinton stated in his “Detroit speech.”  
While Dole stated his support for bringing the three countries into NATO by 1998 based on a 
rationale that was closer to the preferences of the ethnic leaders, the only promise the 
Republican presidential nominee could make was an earlier date.  And Dole could deliver on 
that promise only if he is elected president. 
 The ethnic coalition’s strategy throughout the election year was to demonstrate the 
clout of the ethnic communities as the potential “swing vote” in the election.  The ethnic-
group leaders were able to increase the political stakes on NATO enlargement by conveying 
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to Democrats and Republicans the importance of this issue in the ethnic communities.  The 
meetings with Dole and GOP officials allowed the ethnic leaders to extract more political 
leverage.  They were able to use this leverage to pressure the administration, suggesting that 
support within the ethnic communities remained undecided based largely on the 
administration’s position.  The ability for the ethnic leaders to extract concessions from both 
the Clinton and Dole campaigns was based on the premise that support within the ethnic 
communities was “up for grabs.”  Perception matters in politics, and ethnic leaders played 
this up to their advantage.  It was noticeable that from July 1996 onwards administration 
officials became more committed to expanding NATO.  The political and strategic tracks 
became aligned after the Russian presidential election.  But the political track began to gain 
momentum as the U.S. presidential election approached.  And as Goldgeier (1999, p. 107) 
observed, “any electoral benefits would come from those favoring enlargement; there is no 
American constituency that votes based on a concern about a good relationship with the 
Russians.”  This set the stage for Clinton to announce in front of a predominately Polish-
American audience that NATO would expand by 1999. 
 It is difficult to ascertain how Americans of Central and Eastern European ancestry 
voted based on the NATO enlargement issue (Grayson, 1999, p. 98).  However, their 
concentration in the battleground states, higher than national average voter turnout, and 
identification as “Reagan Democrats” helped establish a pattern that illustrated their potential 
for political activism.  Statements by the ethnic coalition as an organization composed of 18 
national grassroots organizations representing over 20 million Americans implied the 
potential for electoral pressure.  Outside lobbying provides a “rehearsal” for what is likely to 
occur on election day.  The objective of outside lobbying is to force policymakers to pay 
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attention.  By demonstrating political activism on behalf of NATO enlargement, the ethnic 
communities were successful in making known to policymakers that their issue of concern 
would bear electoral consequences. 
Summary 
This chapter focuses on the developments from January 1995 to November 1996.  Two key 
events are important to the analysis at this stage:  the Republican takeover of Congress and 
the 1996 presidential election.  The shift in party control of both houses of Congress marked 
the beginning of divided government, a pattern that would last through the remainder of the 
Clinton presidency.  The pledge by the House Republicans to legislate on the planks of the 
Contract with America, including NATO enlargement, provided the platform for the ethnic 
coalition to intensify its lobbying.  The ethnic coalition’s support for the congressional 
initiatives, combined with administration opposition, increased contention between the 
executive and legislative branches.  Divided government provided opportunities for House 
Republicans to highlight policy differences, and this benefited the ethnic coalition’s strategy 
of using congressional support to pressure the administration.  There is support that groups 
are more likely to lobby Congress when the legislative branch takes the lead in setting the 
agenda. 
The other major event of this period was the 1996 presidential election.  The 
Democratic and Republican parties were aware of a powerful constituency in the 
battleground states vociferous in its support for expanding NATO into Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary.  The ethnic coalition sought to energize its lobbying campaign 
through electoral politics.  The outside lobbying demonstrated the ethnic communities’ 
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political activism, and more importantly, political mobilization served as a “rehearsal” for 
deploying mass electoral pressure.  This was by far the most important source of political 
influence for the ethnic leaders.  Statements by the ethnic coalition representing over 20 
million Americans intimated their electoral clout ahead of the presidential election.  Both the 
Clinton and Dole campaigns devoted attention to the NATO expansion issue in states with 
high concentrations of Central and Eastern European ethnics.  But Clinton, running as the 
incumbent for re-election, was in a better position to deliver on his campaign promises.  In 
Michigan, a closely-contested state where Clinton won by a two-percent margin, and a state 
in which 15 % of its population is of Eastern European ethnic ancestry (Dobbs, 1995), it was 
apparent that announcing when the first group of countries would join NATO had political 
benefits.  The “Detroit speech” reaffirmed the administration’s commitment to NATO 
enlargement and may have helped Clinton solidify his support within the ethnic communities 
in the 1996 presidential election.  Groups with members concentrated in key swing states are 
more effective in demonstrating mass electoral pressure.  This could be considered a strategy 
to influence presidential decision-making as election day approaches.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE CAMPAIGN FOR RATIFICATION 
 
President Clinton declared NATO enlargement a top foreign-policy priority for his second 
term.  In the State of the Union speech on 4 February 1997, Clinton (1997) said: 
To that end, we must expand NATO by 1999, so that countries that were once our adversaries can 
become our allies.  . . .  And we must build a stable partnership between NATO and a democratic 
Russia.  An expanded NATO is good for America, and a Europe in which all democracies define their 
future not in terms of what they can do to each other but in terms of what they can do together for the 
good of all—that kind of Europe is good for America. 
An office was established at the State Department in March 1997 to spearhead the 
administration’s ratification campaign.  Jeremy D. Rosner, who served in the National 
Security Council during Clinton’s first term, was appointed Special Advisor to the President 
and Secretary of State for NATO Enlargement Ratification.  His office was tasked with two 
important objectives:  building congressional and public support for NATO enlargement.  
Two developments on the international stage helped facilitate the ratification process.  First, 
the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed in May 1997, which provided Moscow with a 
“voice” but not “veto” over Alliance decision-making (Asmus, 2002, pp. 175-211; 
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Goldgeier, 1999, pp. 110-7; Talbott, 2003, pp. 217-50).  Second, a NATO Summit was 
convened in Madrid in July 1997 where allies invited Poland, the Czech Republic, and 
Hungary to join the Alliance as full members.33  In the United States, the ratification process 
officially began when President Clinton submitted the protocols of accession to the Senate on 
11 Feburary 1998.  In an address at the White House, Clinton said:  “Successful ratification 
of these Protocols demands not only the Senate’s advice and consent required by our 
Constitution, but also the broader, bipartisan support of the American people and their 
representatives” (Clinton W. J., 1999, p. 97). 
 The focus of this chapter is on the developments from March 1997 to the Senate vote 
on 30 April 1998.  Central to the analysis is the administration’s objective to achieve an 
overwhelming ratification of NATO enlargement.  Divided government returned after the 
1996 election as Republicans retained control of both chambers of Congress.  While the 
Republicans lost seats in the House, the GOP increased its majority in the Senate by two 
seats (Yang & Pianin, 1996; Dewar & Vobejda, 1996).  From 1994 to 96, most of the 
congressional action on NATO enlargement was initiated by the House.  However, the 
Senate became the decision-making arena in the ratification stage.  Reinforcing the goal of 
securing ratification in the Republican-controlled Senate was a strategy to build a 
groundswell of public support for NATO enlargement.  The ethnic groups, who earlier 
demonstrated their support for bringing Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into 
NATO, became part of the administration’s campaign to round up grassroots support for 
enlargement.  Another important pro-enlargement group that emerged on the scene in mid-
                                                            
33 The decision to invite three countries at the Madrid Summit was not consensual at first.  France and Italy 
lobbied for a larger group, including Romania and Slovenia.  It was decided that a group of three best signified 
NATO’s open door policy.  Admission of a larger group may jeopardize momentum for the next round of 
enlargement (Asmus, 2002, pp. 212-50; Goldgeier, 1999, pp. 117-22). 
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1997 was the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO.  The administration working with like-
minded groups to build grassroots support for NATO enlargement proved decisive in 
generating bipartisan consensus amid partisanship in executive-legislative relations.  Rosner 
said:  “There is still a foundation for bipartisanship in foreign policy, but you have to work 
for it.  . . .  You have to pick the right fights and fight hard” (Dewar, 1998).  While much of 
the case study so far is focused on the pressure aspect of group strategies, this chapter 
focuses on the supply aspect—that is, the strategies interest groups use to help the 
administration achieve its policy objective:  the ratification of NATO enlargement. 
The Impact of Republican Control 
The composition of the Senate after the 1996 election was a factor in Rosner’s choice of 
ratification strategy.  Senator Bob Kerrey (D-NE), chairman of the Senate Democratic 
Campaign Committee, said:  “The Senate will stay Republican, and it is going to be much 
more conservative than it was before—much more conservative” (Dewar & Vobejda, 
1996).34  The record number of 14 open Senate seats in the 1996 election, according to 
Rosner (1997), “helped produce a new Senate in which many of its most experienced and 
moderate voices on foreign policy have been replaced by members who are more extreme 
and far less knowledgeable on these issues.”35   
                                                            
34 The Senate of the 105th Congress (1997-98) had 55 Republicans and 45 Democrats.  Source:  
http://uselectionatlas.org.    
 
35 Of the 14 open Senate seats in the 1996 election, 8 were held by Democrats and 6 by Republicans.  As Dewar 
and Vobejda (1996) pointed out, “it was the large number of retirements by veteran Democrats from the South 
that shaped the dynamics of this year’s battle for control of the Senate.”  Democrats lost seats to Republicans in 
the states of Alabama, Arkansas, and Nebraska.  However, the retirement of Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) boded 
well for ratification because he was opposed to NATO enlargement.  As an entrepreneur on arms-control issues, 
he would have led the fight on the Senate floor against ratification.  Democrats retained control of his seat with 
the election of Max Cleland. 
 
125 
 
Another obstacle to ratifying enlargement was the partisanship over foreign policy 
after the Cold War (Rosner, 1995).  Rosner (1996, p. 15) wrote:  “The final hazard for the 
ratification of enlargement stems from Congress’ greater assertiveness, partisan fervor, and 
volatility on foreign affairs since the end of the Cold War.”  Democrats were less likely to 
desert the President on an important foreign-policy issue such as NATO enlargement.  The 
concern for the administration was support from GOP senators; and thus Rosner selected a 
“center-out” strategy aimed at securing Republican support (Asmus, 2002, p. 254; Goldgeier, 
1999, p. 124).  Rosner justified his choice in a memo to National Security Advisor Samuel 
“Sandy” Berger and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright:  “While most of the votes we 
need to pick up at this point are from Democrats on the left, the most serious prospect for 
defeat entails a broad defection by Republicans on the right” (Asmus, 2002, p. 254).36  There 
was concern that Rosner might emphasize an anti-Russia rationale in selling NATO 
enlargement to conservative Republican senators.  In reference to the dual track of pursuing 
enlargement in tandem with cooperation with Russia, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott told 
Rosner:  “I want you to approach this with two lobes of your brain, not just one” (Goldgeier, 
1999, p. 124).  Rosner pointed out in his memo that the ratification campaign should be 
pursued “in a way that does not harm, and hopefully advances, other US objectives, such as 
constructive relations with Russia” (Grayson, 1999, p. 113). 
 The challenge throughout the NATO enlargement debate was reconciling the 
different rationales for enlargement.  This was the key in maintaining consensus among the 
diverse groups that composed the pro-enlargement coalition.  Asmus (2002, p. 252) pointed 
                                                            
36 Excerpts of the memo “Initial Thoughts on NATO Enlargement Ratification Strategy,” dated 26 February 
1997, could be found in Grayson (1999, pp. 113-5). 
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out:  “The Clinton Administration had embraced enlargement as part of a broader overhaul of 
the Alliance to help unify Europe and create a new trans-Atlantic partnership oriented toward 
new threats.  . . .  In contrast, many Republicans were inclined to support enlargement as a 
geopolitical hedge against Moscow.  They were suspicious of, if not opposed to, negotiating 
the NATO-Russia Founding Act.”  There was fear that the outcome of the NATO-Russia 
agreement would provide Moscow with too much influence over NATO decision-making.  
Conservative Republicans were not ready to relinquish the role of NATO as a military 
alliance to hedge against Russian resurgence.  Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) (1997), Chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, expressed this viewpoint in an op-ed in the Wall 
Street Journal (European edition):  “A central strategic rationale for expanding NATO must 
be to hedge against the possible return of a nationalist or imperalist Russia.”  Although the 
Senate in July 1996 passed the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act by a margin of 81 to 16, 
the measure only expressed a sense of Congress and was thus non-binding. In the final 
analysis, congressional support was “broad but thin” (Goldgeier, 1999, p. 122; Isaacs, 1997).  
Partisanship between the Clinton White House and Republican-controlled Congress could 
diminish any prospect for cooperation between the branches.  Rosner (1997a, p. 10) 
observed:  “The end of the Cold War has made it less politically risky for Congress to oppose 
White House positions on national security, while divided control of the two ends of 
Pennsylvania Avenue gives many members added political reason to do so.” 
 The administration sought to solidify congressional support by building a sense of 
public momentum for ratifying NATO enlargement.  Obtaining endorsements from a diverse 
array of outside groups would demonstrate to senators a groundswell of public support for 
enlarging NATO and thus making it “easy for Senators to vote in favor of enlargement” 
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(Asmus, 2002, p. 257).  Bringing new groups into the pro-enlargement coalition showed that 
grassroots support for enlargement is nationwide, not just confined to the ethnic 
communities.  The goal is to “transform enlargement from an ethnic issue to an American 
one” (Goldgeier, 1999, p. 133), so NATO enlargement would not be perceived “solely a 
priority for Polish Americans and other constituencies” (Grayson, 1999, p. 114).  Rosner 
said:  “we certainly are using all the resources available to make the case—both to the 
Congress and the public—for why we think NATO enlargement is good for American 
national security” (U.S. Information Agency, 1997, p. 11). 
 Another group that arrived on the scene in 1997 was the U.S. Committee to Expand 
NATO.  In October 1996, Bruce P. Jackson, who at the time was National Finance Co-
Chairman of the Dole presidential campaign, approached the Clinton administration about 
forming a bipartisan group to promote the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe 
(Grayson, 1999, p. 131; Asmus, 2002, pp. 255-6).  Jackson’s association with the GOP 
foreign-policy establishment (he was a Defense official during the Reagan administration) 
helped the administration secure support from officials of past Republican administrations.  
As Asmus (2002, p. 257) observed, “the Committee members helped reach out to the target 
audience the Administration needed the most—conservative Republican Senators.”  Director 
of the Committee Cece Boyer said:  “Our focus is on the Senate . . . If a senator is wavering, 
we arrange for a meeting between that senator and a member of our committee” (Mesler, 
1997).  The role of Republican heavyweights working outside government was instrumental 
in generating bipartisanship in securing the ratification of enlargement.  Goldgeier (1999, p. 
138) observed:  “And most important from the standpoint of building a national campaign, 
the leading figures in the committee were neither ethnic Americans nor Democrats.” 
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While serving as president of the Committee, Jackson was also director of strategic 
planning for Lockheed Martin—a top U.S. defense contractor.  His association with both 
organizations would lead to charges that the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO was a front 
for the arms industry lobbying for increased sales to Central and Eastern Europe (Gerth & 
Weiner, 1997; Seelye, 1998; Goldgeier, 1999, pp. 135-6).  Poland, the Czech Republic, and 
Hungary would become lucrative markets for defense firms after they are admitted into 
NATO.  Charles Manor, a spokesperson for Lockheed Martin, said:  “When the day arrives 
and those countries are in a position to buy combat aircraft, we certainly intend on being a 
competitor” (Seelye, 1998).  Although defense contractors have intensified their efforts to 
promote new markets after the Cold War, there is nothing to suggest their lobbying activities 
were specifically linked to NATO expansion. 
 There were assertions that the ethnic coalition’s lobbying for NATO enlargement was 
financed by the arms industries.  Seelye (1998) wrote:  “Corporate sponsors are also 
supporting ethnic groups that have championed NATO membership for their native 
countries.”  Granville (1999, p. 167 [fn. 1]) pointed out that “some United States weapons 
manufacturers financed ethnic organizations in the United States that favor NATO 
expansion, such as the Polish-American Congress, the Hungarian-American Foundation, and 
the American Friends of the Czech Republic.”  There was the possibility for coordination 
between ethnic groups and defense contractors.  Myra Lenard, executive director of the 
Washington D.C. office of the Polish American Congress said:  “Boeing and the others are 
pushing their own line, but we work alongside them” (Longworth, 1998).  Both the U.S. 
Committee to Expand NATO and ethnic groups shared the goal of expanding NATO into 
Central and Eastern Europe.  Sophia Miskiewicz, legislative and public affairs director for 
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the Polish American Congress, said:  “We will be working with [the committee] more and 
more as ratification comes up” (Mesler, 1997). 
 The coordination of the two major outside groups in the administration’s ratification 
campaign was important in generating support for enlargement at both the elite and 
grassroots levels.  It helped minimize perception that domestic support for enlargement was 
driven by parochial interests.  The ethnic groups supported NATO enlargmeent to bring their 
ancestral homelands into U.S.-led security institutions.  The U.S. Committee to Expand 
NATO was perceived as an organization lobbying for increased arms sales to Central and 
Eastern Europe.  It was imperative to synchronize the actual or perceived goals of the 
different groups in the pro-enlargement coalition to the administration’s rationale, which was 
predicated on America’s long-term security interests in Europe.  The administration’s 
ratification team traveling across the country obtaining endorsements from various groups 
and local and state legislatures provided proof that support for NATO enlargement was found 
in various levels of American society.37  Rosner said:  “We are also talking with the public, 
going all over the country to forums on these kinds of issues, talking with groups who are 
interested in NATO enlargement—ranging from veterans’ community to the religious 
community to the business community to ethnic communities” (U.S. Information Agency, 
1997, p. 11).38 
                                                            
37 For a list of public endorsements the NATO Enlargement Ratification Office received, see Grayson (1999, 
pp. 128-9). 
 
38 The administration “going public” in search of support for NATO enlargement had mixed results.  For 
example, five people attended an event at Portland State University (Grayson, 1999, p. 117; Goldgeier, 1999, p. 
134).  But for the most part, the campaign was fairly successful.  Rosner traveled to San Francisco where he 
obtained the endorsement from the Conference of Mayors.  He also presented the administration’s case for 
enlargement at the American GI Forum, a Hispanic veterans organization, where Jess Quintero, the local 
commander, said:  “He [Rosner] said that adding all those new voices would make Europe more stable . . . that 
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 The administration’s effort in building public support received a major boost when 
groups joined forces and created the NATO Enlargement Ratification Working Group.  At 
the inaugural meeting on 30 September 1997, Casimir Lenard, executive director of the 
Washington D.C. office of the Polish American Congress, said:  “Although we come here 
from varied backgrounds, we are like-minded in our commitment to NATO enlargement.”  
Frank Koszorus of the Hungarian American Coalition said:  “the existence of the Working 
Group unequivocally demonstrates that a cross-section of Americans support NATO’s 
enlargement and recognize that a rejuvenated Alliance serves the security interests of the 
United States” (Hungarian American Coalition, 1997).39   
The administration sought support from particular groups to dampen the potential for 
opposition on various fronts.  Maintaining consensus among the key groups that made up the 
pro-enlargement coalition was key to generating the public momentum needed for 
ratification.  Rosner (1997) wrote:  “The real danger to the ratification of enlargement, 
therefore, would come if some energetic and influential group of elites were to spring into 
action against the issue, or if there were to be a falling out among the different elite factions 
that compose the pro-enlargement coalition.”  For example, gaining the support of labor 
unions helped downplay perception that NATO enlargement would be portrayed as a “guns 
vs. butter” issue.  The support of Jewish-American organizations was important due to 
Poland’s legacy of anti-Semitism (Goldgeier, 1999, p. 134).  The administration receiving 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
our children and grandchildren, our cousins and their children, would be less likely to fight another war” 
(Robbins, 1998; 1997). 
 
39 The Working Group included organizations which have publicly endorsed their support for NATO 
enlargement.  They are:  American GI Forum; American Jewish Committee; American Legion; AMVETS; 
Association of the United States Army, Central and East European Coalition; International Union of Bricklayers 
and Allied Craftworkers; Jewish War Veterans; New Atlantic Initiative; Polish Legion of American Veterans, 
USA; Reserve Officers Association of the United States; U.S. Committee to Expand NATO; U.S. Conference 
of Mayors; Veterans of Foreign Wars.  Information cited from Polish American Congress (1999). 
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endorsements from the AFL/CIO on January 1998 and the American Jewish Committee on 
June 1997 helped maintain public consensus for enlargement (Asmus, 2002, pp. 268, 280).  
Support from Polish-American groups was important since “state legislatures and trade 
organizations typically include Polish Americans” (Goldgeier, p. 138).  Considering the 
concentration of Polish Americans in certain congressional districts in the Midwestern and 
Northeastern U.S., for example, in the 30th congressional district of New York where one out 
of four residents is of Polish background, this would make the task of rounding up local- and 
state-level support in these communities much easier.   
The administration sought to reduce the potential for partisanship to derail ratification 
by generating a sense of public momentum for NATO enlargement.  It would be difficult if 
not impossible for senators to reject a foreign-policy initiative supported by all major 
organizations in American society.  Enlisting various groups in the pro-enlargement coalition 
and harmonize them under the administration’s rationale demonstrated to senators that public 
opinion was clearly in favor of enlargement.  The public-relations component reinforced the 
congressional component of the administration’s strategy.  Building a sense of public 
momentum for enlargement provided the foundation for the bipartisanship that would emerge 
during the Senate ratification vote. 
Stimulating Public Debate 
The strategy memo Rosner wrote to Albright and Berger stated that “a ‘good win’ . . . must 
include a sense of broad public support after a full public debate” (Grayson, 1999, p. 115).  
Part of the administration’s plan was to demonstrate to equivocal senators that there was 
widespread public support for enlargement.  It also helped counter the claim that the 
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administration rushed the ratification vote before the public had an opportunity to debate the 
issue.  The endorsements the administration received from various groups and local and state 
assemblies provided evidence that the enlargement issue had been fully debated.  NATO 
enlargement was an issue that did not spark much public interest across the U.S., except in 
the ethnic communities.  The lack of public awareness on the enlargement issue benefited the 
administration’s campaign.  Pro-enlargement groups would play a decisive role in shaping 
public opinion and mobilizing grassroots support for ratification.  Milbank (1998) observed 
that the administration “gave the senators cover for their ratification vote by creating the 
appearance of a groundswell of support for NATO expansion when, in reality, the general 
public did not care much one way or the other” (emphasis in original).  Generating a 
groundswell of public support was a necessary component of the administration’s strategy to 
secure ratification, even though the grassroots pressure appeared contrived, suggesting that 
the administration attempted to build “astroturf” support (Kollman, 1998, p. 158). 
Two polls conducted prior to the ratification vote indicated low public interest on 
NATO enlargement.  A January 1997 poll by the Pew Research Center found that among 
those surveyed, only 5% followed the issue “very closely.”  A poll conducted by the Program 
on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) in Feburary 1997 found that only 7% had strong 
awareness of the issue.40  Steven Kull, the principal investigator of the PIPA poll said:  “The 
public is not paying a great deal of attention” (Dobbs, 1997).  A Pew Research Center poll 
conducted on 3-6 April 1997 found that among the 6% who followed the issue closely, 61% 
favored expansion while 28% preferred keeping NATO the way it is (Dobbs, 1997).  In other 
words, those who were aware of the issue were more likely to support NATO enlargement.  
                                                            
40 The study, “Americans on Expanding NATO:  A Study of Public Attitudes,” is available online:  
http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/nato_pipa.htm. 
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An administration official said:  “Foreign policy issues like this tend to be decided less by 
general public opinion than by highly organized segments of opinion . . . All the pressure, in 
terms of organized pressure, is in favor of expansion” (Dobbs, 1997a).  Groups who have 
already demonstrated their willingness to outside lobby helped the administration make its 
case for the intensity of public support for NATO enlargement, in particular the political 
activism of the ethnic groups.  “We wanted them to make their views known in a way that 
signaled to the Senate there is a base of support,” said a senior administration official 
(Mitchell, 1998). 
Rosner (1996, p. 13) wrote:  “The low salience of the issue makes the politics of 
ratification vulnerable to the sway of ethnic interest groups:  the less the general public cares 
about an issue, the greater the influence of those who care a great deal.”  Furthermore, “mass 
opinion from a public that is little focused on foreign affairs has had less impact than the 
opinion of highly vocal elites or splinter groups” (Rosner, 1997).  Groups vociferous in their 
support for enlargement entered the scene early and have already shaped public opinion 
inclined toward ratification.  The proclamations and resolutions ethnic groups received from 
local and state assemblies provided evidence to senators of public support for NATO 
enlargement.  By far, the most active organization capable of mounting grassroots pressure 
on senators was the ethnic coalition.  Thus, organized pressure is clearly in favor of 
expansion.   
Opposition groups seemed “diffuse and disorganized” (Rosner, 1997).  Opposition 
was mainly confined to the academic and think-tank communities and op-eds by the New 
York Times’ Thomas Friedman (1997; 1998).  Groups that campaigned against enlargement 
included the Coalition Against NATO Expansion (CANE), an organization composed of far-
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left and right groups.  Ben Cohen of Ben and Jerry’s Ice Cream organized a campaign called 
Business Leaders for Sensible Policy (BLSP), a last-ditch effort to derail ratification by 
portraying NATO enlargement as a “guns vs. butter” issue (Asmus, 2002, p. 281; Grayson, 
1999, pp. 137-146; Schmitt, 1998).  Opposition groups arrived on the scene much too late to 
affect public opinion.  They focused mainly on the East Coast, especially in the Washington 
D.C.-New York-Boston corridor (Grayson, 1999, pp. 144-6).  The endorsements the 
administration’s ratification team received reflected nationwide support.  Asmus (2002, p. 
281) wrote:  “But the opposition was unable to make significant political inroads—either in 
the Senate or in the broader public.  They were not well organized politically, too disparate in 
their ideological composition, and unable to put together a broad-based coalition.  Above all, 
they could not enlist a critical mass of political leaders, neither on Capitol Hill, nor more 
generally from the political center—which the Administration had assiduously cultivated.” 
It was easy for the administration to generate a sense of public momentum if groups 
involved in the public debate all supported NATO enlargement.  All signs pointed toward 
ratification since pro-enlargement groups dominated the debate.  The administration 
orchestrated a debate among like-minded groups.  This served the objective of achieving a 
“good win” after a full public debate, even though it was fairly one-sided.  But who was there 
to debate the issue when the general public did not care about NATO enlargement one way 
or another?  With the exception of the ethnic communities, there was no other organized 
interest politically active on the issue, and they played a major role in shaping public opinion 
toward NATO enlargement.  By generating grassroots support for an issue that lacked public 
awareness, there is support that the administration’s campaign attempted to build “astroturf” 
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support.  It is possible that astroturf pressure is equally effective in persuading senators to 
ratify NATO enlargement. 
The Impact of Electoral Politics 
The electoral clout of the ethnic communities was a factor driving the domestic politics of 
NATO enlargement.  The issue’s appeal to voters of Central and Eastern European 
background intensified the contention between the Clinton administration and Republican-
controlled Congress in the lead-up to the 1996 U.S. presidential election.  Rosner (1997) 
attributed electoral politics as a factor favoring ratification.  He wrote:  “There are nearly 20 
million Americans of Central European descent in the US, and they are most heavily 
concentrated in 14 states accounting for 194 electoral votes—more than two thirds the 
amount needed for a majority in the presidential elections.  Many of these states, such as 
Michigan, Ohio, and New Jersey, are pivotal, ‘battleground’ states in American politics.”  
Grassroots activism by the ethnic groups demonstrated the intensity of their preferences for 
expanding NATO and helped maintain pressure on senators of those states as the ratification 
vote approached. 
 The only constituency active in the NATO enlargement debate with electoral clout 
was the coalition of ethnic groups.  There was no organization with the potential to mobilize 
grassroots pressure that opposed enlargement.  Ratifying NATO enlargement was the correct 
political decision—at least from an electoral standpoint.  As Kupchan (2000, p. 134) 
observed, “Voting for enlargement kept happy Americans of central European extraction, the 
defense industry, and conservative Russophobes.  In contrast, voting against enlargement 
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may have been the right thing to do, but it had no political pay-offs.”41  Isaacs (1998) wrote, 
“Those few who care strongly enough to pressure their senators tend to be ‘ethnic 
Americans’ who identify with one of the proposed members.”  NATO enlargement was 
clearly a “no-lose” issue; however, voting against it may carry electoral consequences.  The 
potential for electoral backlash loomed large if senators in the battleground states were to 
vote against enlargement.  For example, the New Jersey division of the Polish American 
Congress mobilized against Senator Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) after he supported delaying the 
ratification vote in March 1998.  The demonstrators warned him:  “We will remember in 
November” (Thomma, 1998; Goldgeier, 1999, p. 139).42 
 An asset for the administration’s ratification campaign was the coalition of ethnic 
groups capable of grassroots mobilization.  The outside lobbying by the ethnic coalition at 
this stage of the process helped the administration convert grassroots pressure into legislative 
influence.  By coordinating the activities of a wide array of public groups in support of 
enlargement, the administration demonstrated to senators public momentum for ratification.  
Milbank (1998) pointed out that “NATO enlargement may well have cleared the Senate 
without NERO’s [the acronym of the administration’s ratification office] sales job,” but the 
support from the ethnic groups added another layer of reinforcement:  electoral pressure.  
Take for example a story from the Minnesota Hungarians, a sister organization of the 
Hungarian American Coalition, in their campaign for NATO enlargement: 
                                                            
41 Note that Kupchan, a Europe expert in the Clinton NSC, emerged as an opponent of NATO enlargement after 
he left government. 
 
42 Torricelli was already on the Polish American Congress’ radar as early as 1995 when he (then a member of 
the House) change the target date of enlargement from January 10, 1999 to “in the near future” in the NATO 
Participation Act Amendments (Polish American Congress, 1999).  On 30 April 1998, he voted for ratification. 
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In 1996 a group of the Minnesota Hungarians (MH) joined forces with fellow Minnesotans of Czech 
and Polish origin to promote the idea of NATO expansion, specifically to advance the inclusion of 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.  We got our informal name, “The Cookie Coalition,” 
because a group member brought in cookies decorated with “vote for NATO” to a meeting with Sen. 
Wellstone.  We supported each other to reach our common goal, by writing letters to Senators, 
collecting signatures from our communities and giving TV interviews about the advantages of NATO 
enlargement.  One member of each group was asked to testify before a Minnesota Senate Committee 
and a House Committee about this issue.  We were proud that Minnesota and California were the only 
two states that expressed support for NATO expansion (Hungarian American Coalition).43 
Before the ratification vote, the Polish American Congress (1999) issued a call to all 
50 state divisions and chapters, as well as hundreds of other national Polish American 
organizations, for a letter-writing campaign to senators.  Accounts of “Central and East-
European ethnic groups roam[ing] the corridors of the Senate office buildings in search of 
votes” provided evidence of their political activism (Grayson, 1999, p. 147).  Garrett and 
Omestad (1998) reported:  “Nineteen U.S. ethnic groups, under the banner of the Central and 
East European Coalition, bombarded the Senate with letters and phone calls on behalf of 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.”  The CEEC maintained pressure on senators with 
“congressional scorecards that kept a running count of each U.S. Senator’s position on 
expansion.”  These activities were “part of a larger grass roots outreach campaign that 
intensified during the Senate debate on enlargement” (Koszorus, 2007).  In recognition of the 
public support for NATO enlargement, a “Dear Colleague” letter, dated 24 April 1998, from 
Senators Roth (R-DE), Lieberman (D-CT), and McCain (R-AZ) noted that “these 
endorsements are a powerful reflection of the broad consensus affirming that NATO 
                                                            
43 Sen. Paul Wellstone (D-MN) voted against ratification on 30 April 1998. 
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enlargement is in America’s national interest and deserves the full support of the Senate” 
(Asmus, 2002, p. 285). 
 On 30 April 1998, the U.S. Senate by a vote of 80 to 19 ratified the the admission of 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into NATO, the fifth NATO legislature to ratify 
the protocols of accession.44  Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) said:  “NATO enlargement 
will make Europe more stable and America more secure” (Schmitt, 1998a).  The 84-year old 
Jan Novak, national director of the Polish American Congress, said:  “I never thought that I 
would live to see the day when Poland is not only free—but safe” (Asmus, 2002, p. 288).  Of 
the 80 “yea” votes, 45 were from Republicans and 35 from Democrats.  In what Grayson 
(1999, p. 208) termed “Ethniclandia,” the ten battleground states in the Midwestern and 
Northeastern U.S., 18 of the 20 senators voted for ratification.45   
In recognition of this momentous occasion, Edward Moskal, President of the Polish 
American Congress (1999), said: 
This is a historic moment for Poland, Europe and the United States.  Together we are building a stable 
and secure future.  I wish to thank all Polish Americans and our friends who took an active part in the 
appeals and campaigns of letter writing and telephone calls organized by the Polish American 
Congress over the past seven years to bring Poland into NATO.  Together we made it happen!  
Together we did it! 
The efforts of the Polish-American community was recognized by the Polish government.  
Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek said: 
                                                            
44 The admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary required the unanimous ratification by all NATO 
legislatures. 
 
45 The two senators from “Ethniclandia” who voted “nay” were Arlen Specter (R-PA) and Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan (D-NY).  For a complete breakdown of the ratification vote, see 
http://govtrack.us/congress/votes/105-1998/s117. 
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We thank all of those who have supported us on our journey to NATO and helped in the ratification 
process.  We express our special thanks to all Americans of Polish heritage, particularly the Polish 
American Congress, whose support for Poland’s aspirations has played such a pivotal role (Polish 
American Congress, 1999). 
Summary 
This chapter focuses on the developments from March 1997 to April 1998.  Recognizing the 
importance of NATO enlargement as a foreign-policy goal for Clinton’s second term, an 
office was established to spearhead the administration’s ratification campaign.  Rosner, 
appointed special advisor for NATO enlargement, was aware of the political obstacles that 
could potentially derail ratification.  First and foremost was the composition of the Senate 
after the 1996 election, which became more Republican and conservative.  Rosner chose a 
ratification strategy predicated on securing Republican support.  The administration also 
incorporated a public dimension in its ratification campaign by rounding up support from 
diverse societal groups to build a sense of public momentum for ratifying enlargement.  
Along with the coalition of ethnic groups, the administration also received support from labor 
unions, veterans organizations, and the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO—notable for its 
ties to foreign-policy officials of past and future Republican administrations.  The goal of the 
administration was to develop a broad base of domestic support to achieve bipartisan 
consensus for the ratification of NATO enlargement. 
 The administration was able to utilize the resources of various groups to generate a 
sense of public momentum for ratification.  There is support for the proposition that 
administration officials mobilized like-minded groups to generate public support for 
initiatives that lack public awareness.  NATO enlargement was an issue that fits this 
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category.  The key asset for the administration’s ratification campaign was the coalition of 
ethnic groups who demonstrated their willingness to outside lobby.  The grassroots action 
helped shape public opinion on the NATO enlargement issue, and most importantly, forced 
policymakers to pay attention.  The endorsements from local and state legislatures groups 
received on behalf of the administration created the appearance that NATO enlargement had 
been publicly debated, when in reality, much of the “debate” was stimulated by the pro-
enlargement groups themselves.  On an issue that did not attract much attention in the public 
arena, they were decisive in generating a sense of public momentum the administration 
needed to achieve a “good win” in the Senate. 
Rosner pointed out that the electoral clout of the ethnic communities was a factor 
favoring enlargement.  The importance of this constituency as the potential swing vote in the 
1996 presidential election was a factor in triggering the executive-legislative contention over 
NATO enlargement.  Another objective of outside lobbying is that it serves as “rehearsal” for 
electoral mobilization.  Mass electoral pressure was directed at the Senate during the 
ratification stage.  The ability for the ethnic coalition, especially the Polish American 
Congress, to mobilize electoral pressure made it more likely that senators from the 
battleground states would be committed to voting “yea” as the ratification vote approached.  
By maintaining voting records of senators and bombarding them with letters and other forms 
of communcations, leaders of the ethnic coalition organized a campaign that assisted the 
administration’s drive to obtain as many votes as possible.  The outside lobbying in the lead-
up to the ratification vote signaled the intensity of support for NATO enlargement in the 
ethnic communities and generated electoral pressure for senators to put their votes in the 
“yea” column.  Building a sense of public momentum for enlargement created the perception 
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that it would be politically costly for senators to vote against the preferences of their 
constituents.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION:  INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES IN A PARTISAN ERA 
 
This thesis focuses on the impact of executive-legislative relations on the lobbying strategies 
of interest groups by using the Clinton administration’s decision to enlarge NATO as the case 
study.  Central to the examination is the coalition of ethnic groups representing Americans of 
Central and Eastern European ancestry lobbying for the admission of Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary into NATO.  Three variables are posited to guide the theory 
development in group strategies in foreign-policy lobbying:  party control of government; 
issue salience; and electoral pressure.  The concluding chapter is divided into three parts.  
Part One discusses the findings of the NATO enlargement case study and the significance of 
the findings to the proposed theoretical framework.  Part Two offers implications on the 
study of interest groups in U.S. foreign policymaking.  Part Three proposes some suggestions 
for further research based on this study that could advance our knowledge of organized 
interests in foreign policymaking in U.S. and non-U.S. political settings. 
Part I:  Findings 
Party Control 
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The “party control” variable posits the importance of the domestic structure on the lobbying 
strategies of interest groups.  Since U.S. political power is divided and shared between the 
executive and legislative branches, interest groups have two separate yet interdependent 
decision-making arenas to consider.  A focus on the U.S. policymaking structure must take 
into account the impact of party control on executive-legislative relations.  Animating this 
variable is the proposition that a change in party control of government would result in a shift 
in agenda-setting dynamics between the branches.  Under unified government, there is 
expectation for Congress to delegate to the executive branch in setting the agenda.  Since the 
president’s co-partisans are in control of the levers of power in Congress, a compatibility of 
policy preferences is more likely to occur.    However, when there is divided party control of 
government, there are partisan and institutional incentives to highlight policy differences 
between Congress and the administration.  There is greater expectation for congressional 
assertiveness under divided government.  An interest group’s decision to target a particular 
decision-making arena is shaped by the branch of government that assumes the lead in setting 
the agenda.  Thus, it is proposed that interest groups are more likely to target the executive 
branch during unified government, and interest groups are more likely to target Congress 
during divided government.  What does the evidence in the NATO enlargement case say 
about the impact of party control on the lobbying decisions of interest groups? 
 The executive branch was a primary decision-making arena and a target of the ethnic 
coalition.  After learning about the Clinton administration’s decision to emphasize the 
Partnership for Peace at the 1994 NATO Summit, the most significant coordinated action 
was a massive letter-writing campaign to make known the ethnic communities’ displeasure 
over the administration’s decision to prioritize cooperation with Russia over the aspirations 
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of Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics to join NATO.  With over 100,000 
pieces of communications directed at various administration officials, this was a significant 
statement by the ethnic groups to force Clinton administration officials to pay attention.  This 
provided clear evidence that the ethnic coalition targeted the executive branch during unified 
government.  With the absence of Congress challenging the administration when Democrats 
controlled both branches of government, leaders of the ethnic coalition made the strategic 
decision to target the Clinton administration.  There is support for the hypothesis that interest 
groups are likely to target the executive branch during unified government. 
 An auxiliary, or “follow-on,” hypothesis concerns the choice of lobbying strategies.  
Since outside lobbying is a strategy of mass persuasion, it is aimed at a large number of 
lawmakers, thus a strategy suited for Congress.  The hypothesis advanced here is that interest 
groups are more likely to outside lobby Congress.  The NATO enlargement case provides an 
unexpected development.  The most significant outside lobbying conducted by the ethnic 
coalition was directed at the presidential administration, not Congress.  Attention given to the 
enlargement initiatives was significant in building congressional support, but these efforts did 
not match the magnitude of the letter-writing campaign directed at the Clinton White House 
in December 1993.  Administration officials may have responded to the barrage of 
communications by organizing a meeting with ethnic-group leaders the evening before the 
presidential speech in January 1994.   
Outside lobbying is not a strategy geared toward a particular branch of government 
and its susceptibility to public pressure.  The decision to outside lobby may be related to the 
importance group leaders attach to a particular decision-making arena at a particular stage of 
policy development.  Before divided government occurred in January 1995, the decision to 
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enlarge NATO was largely confined within the administration.  This was the stage before the 
decision-making was exposed to congressional pressure.  Ethnic leaders wanted to make their 
point in the most overt way possible by targeting the Clinton administration with well-
coordinated grassroots action.  Due to the challenge of mobilizing collective action, ethnic 
leaders were motivated to outside lobby the White House by the fact that the executive 
branch was deemed the most important to foreign-policy formulation.  And thus, group 
decision to outside lobby has relatively little to do with the institutional designs of the 
decision-making arenas, but is largely dependent on which arena assumes the role in setting 
the agenda.  This study shows that the executive branch is not immune to strategies of mass 
persuasion.  
 Divided government resulted in a shift in the ethnic coalition’s strategy.  The 
Republicans assuming control of Congress marked the beginning of congressional 
assertiveness on the NATO enlargement issue.  The Contract with America, the GOP’s 
legislative agenda, provided the platform for the ethnic coalition to pressure the 
administration.  There was a “before and after” effect as a result of the change in party 
control of Congress.  The ethnic coalition lobbying for the enlargement initiatives under 
unified government was unsuccessful owing to the lack of congressional interest and support.  
Administration opposition precluded further congressional action when Clinton’s co-
partisans controlled Congress.  But under divided government, administration opposition in 
fact encouraged House Republicans backed by the ethnic coalition to promote legislation 
aimed at defining the “who” and “when” of enlargement.  The legislative alerts issued by the 
Polish American Congress for the National Security Revitalization Act, the bill that 
developed from the Contract, provided evidence of the ethnic coalition lobbying for 
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Republican-led initiatives.  It also displayed the willingness of the ethnic leaders to engage in 
partisan politics.  Divided government creates an executive-legislative context ripe for 
conflict expansion (Schattschneider, 1960).  Contention between the branches does create a 
political environment conducive for societal actors to enter the policy process.  Republicans 
in need of outside support for their congressional initiatives created opportunities for the 
ethnic coalition to access the legislative branch.  Congress became the base of support for the 
ethnic coalition’s strategy to pressure the administration, and this strategy was aided in part 
by a change in party control of Congress.  Thus, the evidence in the case study does validate 
the hypothesis that interest groups are likely to lobby Congress under divided government. 
 Although this study did not examine every aspect of the “party control” variable due 
to a limited number of observations, its use did generate insights into how shift in party 
control of Congress and its relations with the Presidency influence the strategic choices of 
interest groups.  Of particular interest is the impact of divided government, which has 
become a fixture in the contemporary American political landscape.  The examination of 
split-party control is not exhaustive as there are other possible configurations of divided 
government.  One possible configuration, which occurred during the NATO enlargement 
case, is the change in party control of both chambers of Congress after the 1994 midterm 
election.  A configuration that did not occur, but merits further research, is the impact of a 
split Congress, where party control is divided between the House and Senate.  Executive-
legislative relations under this configuration could be complex since there is interplay of both 
unified and divided governments.  There could be same-party control between the 
administration and Senate, but divided control between the administration and House, or 
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vice-versa.  A distinction could be made between simple and compound divided government 
(Bowling & Ferguson, 2001). 
 The potential for a divided Congress complicates group lobbying decisions.  Not only 
do interest groups have to deal with inter-branch competition, but there is also the possibility 
of intra-branch competition.  In the NATO enlargement case, congressional assertiveness 
stemmed from the House due to the fact that the Contract with America was a pledge taken 
by House Republicans, but the Senate became the decision-making arena during the 
ratification stage due to its constitutionally-mandated responsibility to ratify treaties.  
Although a divided Congress did not come into play, the possibility of a Democratic-
controlled Senate may have resulted in the administration selecting a different ratification 
strategy, which in turn could influence how pro-enlargement groups lobby for congressional 
support.  Most of the lawmaking responsibilities are shared between the House and Senate.  
When party control of the legislative branch is split itself, this imposes a hurdle on the policy 
process.  It is possible that a divided Congress is more conducive to policy gridlock (Binder, 
1999).  Guiding legislation along the legislative process is an important measure of group 
lobbying influence.  Understanding how interest groups navigate through different 
configurations of divided government creates new wrinkles to the research on the impact of 
executive-legislative relations on group lobbying strategies. 
 Another issue worthy of further research is whether divided government is the result 
of a presidential or midterm election.  Coleman and Parker (2009, p. 395) asked:  “Does it 
make any difference if the divided government starting point is a presidential rather than 
midterm election?”  Shift in party control of Congress in the middle of a presidential term has 
occurred on several occasions.  Recent examples include the change from a Republican- to 
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Democratic-controlled House after the 2006 election and from a Democratic- to Republican-
controlled House after the 2010 election.  Both elections signified the shift from unified to 
divided government in the middle of a presidential term.  Pertaining to the NATO 
enlargement case is the shift from a Democratic- to Republican-controlled Congress (House 
and Senate) after the 1994 midterm election.  The results of the 1996 election continued the 
pattern of divided party control of the executive and legislative branches.  The focus has been 
on divided government as a result of a midterm election.  Perhaps a more dramatic 
development would be change in party control of the White House.  Considering the 
executive branch is central to foreign-policy formulation, a change in presidential 
administration could significantly shape the political landscape.  How interest groups adjust 
their lobbying strategies when a new presidential administration arrives in Washington is a 
topic of interest.   
Party control not only entails the change from unified to divided government, but also 
the change from divided to unified government.  Investigating variance on the “party control” 
variable must involve both directions of the causal relationship.  This study focuses on the 
former, using the NATO enlargement case to examine the change from unified to divided 
control on the lobbying strategies of interest groups.  Assuming the circumstances are similar 
to the case used in this study, change of party control as a result of a midterm election during 
the first term of a presidential administration, are the lobbying strategies likely to be the 
mirror opposite to the findings of this study if there is change from divided to unified party 
control of government?  Or is it possible that a change of party control in the other direction 
would result in a different pattern of lobbying strategies?  And if so, what explains this 
peculiarity?  An examination of the party control of American political institutions on 
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interest-group strategies is developing into a fairly robust research agenda that could reveal 
surprising findings.  The issues raised here all provide avenues for further research. 
Issue Salience 
 The second variable posited in this study relates to issue salience.  The key questions 
driving the investigation are when and why interest groups outside lobby.  The “party 
control” variable discussed earlier addressed the “when” by pointing out that the level of 
contention in the political environment is a determinant in group decisions to outside lobby.  
The detection of political opposition is likely to motivate groups to pursue outside strategies.  
Seeking to answer “why” is the major reason for selecting issue salience as a variable in the 
theoretical framework.  Kollman (1998, p. 76) stated:  “outside lobbying forces policymakers 
to pay attention.”  More precisely, outside lobbying convinces policymakers that an issue is 
salient to the attentive public.  Groups need to demonstrate mass support for an issue to 
enhance the electoral significance of grassroots mobilization.  As Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 
(2004, p. 184) observed, “policies that are salient push electoral leaders to respond to public 
concerns or face electoral consequences.”  Grassroots action is an effective way for groups to 
signal the salience of an issue to policymakers.  Since this study is focused on the role of 
grassroots groups, the ability to bring mass pressure onto policymakers is a major source of 
political influence.  This begins by demonstrating the intensity of their policy preferences to 
policymakers through outside lobbying. 
 The letter-writing campaign directed at the Clinton administration in December 1993 
provided evidence of the ethnic coalition raising awareness of the NATO enlargement issue 
by outside lobbying.   Based on the volume of communications sent to the White House, the 
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letter-writing campaign was successful in demonstrating the intensity of support within the 
ethnic communities for the admission of the Central and Eastern European states into NATO.  
The objective of outside lobbying is fairly straightforward:  mobilizing grassroots support 
forces policymakers to pay attention.  White House officials responded to the letter-writing 
campaign by organizing a meeting with leaders of the ethnic coalition in Milwaukee in 
January 1994.  Even in the absence of congressional pressure in late-1993, outside lobbying 
made administration officials realized the importance of NATO enlargement in the ethnic 
communities.  Coordinated grassroots action helped the ethnic coalition established access to 
the White House.  The Milwaukee meeting signified the first in a series of exchanges 
between administration officials and ethnic leaders through the course of the NATO 
enlargement debate.  Outside lobbying does not often occur due to the difficulty of 
organizing collective action (Olson, 1965).  But when it is successful, its effects could be 
wide-ranging.   
 The decision by group leaders to outside lobby did not occur in a vacuum.  A factor 
that aided the effectiveness of outside lobbying was contention in the policymaking 
environment.  Divided government creates partisan and institutional incentives to highlight 
policy differences between the branches.  The ethnic coalition using Congress to pressure the 
administration contributed to tensions between the executive and legislative branches over 
the NATO enlargement issue.  Outside lobbying probably would have been effective in 
demonstrating the intensity of policy preferences in the ethnic communities regardless of the 
party configuration of government.  But divided government intensified the executive-
legislative contention, which increased the effectiveness of conflict-expansion strategies such 
as outside lobbying.  Not only did the outside lobbying by the ethnic groups brought out 
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differences in the policy positions of the Clinton administration and the Republican-
controlled Congress, but the demonstration of mass pressure increased the electoral stakes 
associated with the NATO enlargement issue.  It is fair to assume that group leaders need to 
take into account the level of political contention in the policymaking when planning their 
lobbying strategies.  This is especially important for leaders of groups dependent on 
grassroots mobilization as a source of political influence. 
 The discussion so far focuses on the pressure aspect of outside strategies.  This is the 
expectation normally associated with the role of interest groups in U.S. politics.  However, it 
is also important to examine how grassroots mobilization could become an asset for 
policymakers.  This issue surfaced during the ratification stage when the administration 
needed to generate a sense of public momentum to ratify NATO enlargement by an 
overwhelming margin.  The administration through its ratification campaign sought to 
convert public support into legislative influence.  But whether presidential appeals could 
generate congressional support “depends upon the extent to which salience is a political 
asset” (Canes-Wrone, 2001, p. 324).   
With the exception of the ethnic communities, public awareness of the NATO 
enlargement issue was low.  The administration mobilized pro-enlargement groups to 
generate a groundswell of public support for ratification.  The goal was to make senators of 
all 50 states aware of the importance of NATO enlargement, and not just senators 
representing states with high concentrations of voters of Central and Eastern European ethnic 
backgrounds.  The lack of opposition at the grassroots level provided latitude for pro-
enlargement groups to shape public debate inclined toward ratification.  If anti-enlargement 
groups were able to mobilize at the grassroots level, that would have undermined the 
152 
 
administration’s goal of achieving a “good win” for ratification.  There would have been 
competition for public opinion if awareness of the issue was higher.  But NATO enlargement 
was an issue that did not stimulate much general public interest.  The factor that benefited the 
pro-enlargement coalition was the absence of opposition at the grassroots level.  The low 
salience of the issue meant that outside groups were decisive in shaping public debate and 
played a major role in drumming up public support.  Thus, the NATO enlargement case does 
provide support for the hypothesis that policymakers are likely to rely on groups to mobilize 
grassroots support for issues lacking public awareness.  
 Issue salience is a variable that captures both the pressure and supply aspects of group 
relations with policymakers.  Interest groups seek to raise awareness of issues of concern by 
mobilizing their members for grassroots action.  But raising awareness of an issue also makes 
policymakers pay attention.  It is well established at this point that outside lobbying is a 
pressure strategy.  However, less attention is devoted to ways outside lobbying could be a 
tool for policymakers.  Policymakers need public opinion on their side to push their 
initiatives through Congress.  The ability for interest groups to mobilize grassroots support is 
an asset for policymakers seeking to convert issue salience into legislative influence.  
Relations between policymakers and interest groups are not uni-dimensional.  There is, of 
course, the potential for like-minded groups to offer services to policymakers.  It is thus 
useful to think of group relations with policymakers as a continuum, with the pressure side 
on one end and supply side on the other.  The role of societal interests in U.S. foreign 
policymaking needs to focus more on the “inside-out” aspect of lobbying, where groups 
become part of a continuing reciprocal relationship with executive officials.  Since 
presidential appeals for public support often fall “on deaf ears” (Edwards, 2003), the need for 
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presidents to appeal to supportive segments of society, in particular, like-minded groups 
becomes greater (Cohen, 2010).  U.S. foreign policymaking is not immune to the influence of 
public opinion, and especially on decisions requiring congressional involvement, there is thus 
greater expectation for presidential-group interaction. 
Electoral Pressure 
 The third variable posits the importance of electoral pressure.  A source of political 
influence for grassroots groups is electoral mobilization.  The ability to mobilize at the 
grassroots level is intimated in statements identifying the coalition of ethnic groups lobbying 
for NATO enlargement as an organization “representing more than 20 million Americans 
with roots in Central and East Europe” (CEEC position paper, 1996).  Electoral politics 
motivated the Republicans to include NATO enlargement in the Contract with America due 
largely to the issue’s appeal to the ethnic voters in the “battleground states.”  The importance 
of these states in the 1996 presidential election played a part in Clinton’s decision to 
announce 1999 when the “first group of countries” would join NATO before a predominately 
Polish-American audience.  These two examples provide support for the influence of 
electoral politics in the U.S. decision to enlarge NATO.  Groups representing a large number 
of members have greater potential to mobilize electoral pressure.  Another factor is the 
organization of the membership bases of grassroots groups.  Paul and Paul (2009, pp. 102-
112) distinguishes between ethnic groups with members dispersed across the country and 
concentrated in selected states. The organization of membership bases may have a minimal 
impact on groups influencing congressional decision-making.  But since this study focuses 
particularly on ethnic groups’ interactions with the executive branch, the organization of 
members would play a greater role in determining the ability for grassroots groups to 
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influence presidential decision-making through electoral pressure.  And thus, electoral 
pressure is more likely to be a source of influence for groups in states where members 
constitute key voting blocs. 
 The organization of grassroots groups matters less in lobbying Congress because it is 
a branch of government more responsive to public pressure.  Regardless of whether their 
membership bases are dispersed or concentrated, groups should have enough members at the 
grassroots level to persuade members of Congress to take up their causes.  Since 
congressional elections occur every two years, members of Congress are sensitive to 
constituent concerns due to the imperative of re-election (Mayhew, 1974).  However, foreign 
policymaking does need to take into account the importance of the executive branch.  Groups 
do need to consider the executive branch a target when lobbying foreign-policy decisions.  
The White House is more insulated from public pressure compared to Congress, but it is not 
impenetrable.  The opportunity to influence presidential decision-making with electoral 
pressure is far and few, perhaps the fourth year of the first term when a president is seeking 
re-election.  The need to win votes from a key voting bloc in key swing states may motivate 
presidents to be responsive to group pressure.  The importance of the battleground states with 
significant number of voters of Central and Eastern European ethnic backgrounds was a 
reason that the NATO enlargement issue received attention in the 1996 presidential 
campaign.  
 The high concentration of voters passionate about NATO enlargement in states that 
could decide the outcome of the 1996 presidential election made electoral pressure a credible 
strategy of influence.  Deploying electoral pressure is based on creating the perception that 
grassroots pressure could influence electoral outcomes.  Electoral pressure and issue salience 
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are closely connected.  The outside lobbying by the ethnic communities demonstrated the 
intensity of their support for expanding NATO and made known to policymakers the 
electoral consequences associated with the issue.  Another point about outside lobbying is 
that it simulates electoral mobilization.  It helps reinforce perceptions of elected officials that 
if voters are active in demonstrating their preferences on an issue, then how they vote would 
most likely be based on that issue.  This motivates elected officials to be sensitive to group 
pressure, especially if members are willing to engage in grassroots action.  The Clinton and 
Dole campaigns in 1996 believed in the importance of the NATO enlargement issue in the 
key swing states, and ethnic leaders reinforced this perception by making known to both 
campaigns the importance ethnic voters attached to this issue. 
 Is the policy advocacy of ethnic groups enhanced if members constitute major voting 
blocs in key swing states?  For example, the number of Cuban Americans in Florida and New 
Jersey or the percentage of Polish Americans in certain congressional districts of the 
Midwestern and Northeastern U.S. underscores the observation that although ethnic groups 
constitute a small percentage of the overall U.S. population, they could still exert significant 
political influence.  Having members concentrated in states that could decide the outcome of 
a presidential race helps a group demonstrate its electoral clout, but that is only half the story.  
The other half rests on the political activism of its members.  Key to policy advocacy for 
grassroots groups is the willingness of their membees to pursue political action.  Electoral 
pressure as a lobbying strategy has to be considered in tandem with a group’s ability to 
mobilize for political action.  Electoral pressure would not have been as effective if voters of 
Central and Eastern European ethnic backgrounds were not motivated to lobby for NATO 
expansion.  Ethnic leaders mobilized them in a letter-writing campaign and thereby provided 
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the NATO enlargement issue with electoral significance.  The presence of ethnic voters in 
key swing states in itself was not going to trigger the electoral pressure necessary to 
influence presidential decision-making.  The intensity of support or opposition on an issue 
has to be demonstrated through political action.  Outside lobbying requires coordination, and 
above all, leadership.  The ability to coordinate grassroots action and be implemented 
effectively signifies a group has overcome the dilemma of collective action.  It is possible 
that groups with concentrated membership bases are more effective in mobilizing grassroots 
pressure than groups with dispersed bases.  But the key to determining the validity of this 
proposition depends on the willingness of group members to engage in political action. 
 Groups with members concentrated in key swing states may have organizational 
advantages over groups with dispersed membership bases, but that by itself is not likely to 
convert electoral pressure into a strategy of political influence.  It needs to be “activated” by 
a well-organized outside lobbying campaign.  Salience of an issue is the factor determining 
the ability for groups to convert grassroots mobilization into electoral pressure.  Group 
mobilization is an important factor in shaping the influence of grassroots groups since their 
source of influence depends on politically-active members.  While the hypothesis posited to 
test the “electoral pressure” variable proves inconclusive, an amended hypothesis could be 
offered here.  Thus, the ability for grassroots groups to provide an issue with electoral 
significance depends on the level of salience members attach to that issue.  Although this 
study is focused on the impact of the policymaking environment on the strategies of interest 
groups, how groups overcome the dilemma of collective action and allocate their resources 
are important in determining their ability to exert political influence.  If electoral pressure is 
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an effective strategy for grassroots groups, then more research is needed to examine the 
internal-external nexus of outside lobbying. 
Part II:  Implications 
The examination of the coalition of ethnic groups lobbying for the expansion of NATO 
underscores the influence of societal interests in U.S. foreign policymaking.  Ethnic groups 
constitute a major part in the constellation of interest groups seeking to influence foreign-
policy decisions.  This study could be applied toward a broader area of study on groups 
reliant on grassroots mobilization as a source of political influence.  Berry (1999) observed 
that the rise of citizen groups may point to the emergence of a “new liberalism.”  The rise in 
the political activism of ethnic groups in the post-Cold War era suggests that a similar pattern 
may be developing in foreign policymaking (Smith T. , 2000).  Interest-group behavior has 
responded in kind to the overall changes of the policymaking environment.  As the foreign-
policy process becomes more pluralist and exposed to societal pressure, groups involved 
have greater latitude to use grassroots mobilization as a strategy of influence.  The outside 
lobbying by the ethnic coalition in the NATO enlargement case demonstrated that such 
provocative strategies force policymakers to pay attention.  The effectiveness of outside 
lobbying also suggests the possibility of enhanced democratic participation in foreign 
policymaking.  This study helps dispel the notion that U.S. foreign policymaking is confined 
to small circles of advisors in settings well insulated from public pressure.  Even on a 
significant issue such as NATO expansion, public influence, in particular, the role of 
organized interests could have an impact on U.S. decision-making.  The study on the 
domestic sources of U.S. foreign policy must take into account the role of societal groups and 
the strategies they use to access the political process. 
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 Group activism contributes partly to the development of a pluralist foreign-policy 
system.  But the exposure of the foreign-policy process to public pressure is also the result of 
increased partisanship in executive-legislative relations.  Congressional assertiveness has 
provided opportunities for groups to enter the policy process.  The role of Congress as a 
decision-making arena also creates opportunities for congressional entrepreneurs to seek 
interest-group support for their initiatives.  The institutional context plays an important role 
in shaping the behavior of interest groups.  This study seeks to contribute to the discussion by 
examining how groups exploit partisan divisions in the policymaking environment to 
enhance their lobbying influence.  One of the findings established in this study is that when 
executive-legislative relations are contentious, interest groups are more likely to use conflict-
expansion strategies such as outside lobbying.  When the potential for a “contested agenda” 
between the branches are at its greatest, this sets up the political environment in which 
conflict-expansion strategies thrive.  An aim of this study is the consideration of the ways 
groups develop access to the executive branch.  Of course, groups could seek direct access by 
forging ties with White House officials.  The direct access path assumes there is a 
compatibility of interests; however, that is not always the case.  This study suggests the 
possibility of groups developing indirect access by using Congress as a platform to pressure 
the administration.  A shift to divided government creates incentives for congressional 
entrepreneurs to push initiatives that highlight policy differences between the branches.  
Lobbying for these initiatives provide opportunities for groups to enter the policy process.  
Building congressional support thus makes it more likely that the administration would 
respond to public pressure.  Group do need to consider how partisanship influences their 
choice of lobbying strategies.  And thus, attention needs to be paid to the impact of the 
159 
 
institutional context on group strategies in foreign-policy lobbying.  Pluralism alone does not 
adequately explain why interest groups have been more successful in lobbying foreign-policy 
decisions in the post-Cold War era.  The explanation has to be combined with the rise in 
partisanship and divided party control of Congress and the Presidency. 
 Thomas Dine, executive director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC), developed a lobbying strategy in the 1980s based on three objectives:  “Spread the 
power base.  Go to the grass roots.  Get involved in the political process” (Smith H. , 1988, p. 
226).  Even one of the most influential lobbies in foreign policy in Washington D.C. adjusted 
its strategy in response to the changing political context.  The increase in the number of 
actors involved in foreign policymaking inside government is a reason for the increased use 
of strategies of mass persuasion.  This study clearly demonstrates that foreign policymaking 
is not immune to grassroots lobbying (Clough, 1994).  But an issue to consider is whether 
outside lobbying reflects a genuine expression of mass political participation or what may be 
considered attempts in “astroturf building.” 
 There is optimism that the rise in grassroots lobbying reflects the emergence of a 
“bottom-up” approach in the flow of ideas in the foreign policymaking process.  The rise in 
group activism and use of outside lobbying does point to increased pluralism in the foreign 
policymaking process, but not to the extent where ideas flow from bottom to top.  What may 
appear to be grassroots mobilization could actually be attempts in astroturf building.  There 
are suggestions that the administration sought to generate a groundswell of public support for 
NATO enlargement to increase the margin of ratification amid general public apathy 
regarding the issue.  Attempts in generating popular support for an issue of low salience 
suggests that the Clinton administration may have colluded with pro-enlargement groups to 
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manufacture astroturf (Kollman, 1998, p. 158).  If there is no effective opposition at the 
grassroots level, who was there to question whether the public support the administration 
developed was genuine or contrived?  Democratic theorists may be disappointed to find out 
that outside lobbying may be subject to deception, thus falling short of representing true 
grassroots action.  But from a more pragmatic, policymaking perspective, the simple question 
is:  does it matter as long as outside lobbying can put pressure on policymakers?  The 
administration’s objective during the ratification stage was fairly straightforward:  pressure 
senators to ratify enlargement.  As Hedrick Smith (1988, p. 251) observed:  “They [members 
of Congress] dare not ignore any major pressure group, even if the pressure looks contrived.  
For mass mail usually shows organizational force, and that threatens to touch the politician’s 
lifeline of survival and reelection.”  Thus, achieving policy outcomes may be more important 
than the substance of the strategy. 
 The final point made regarding the limits of pluralism in U.S. foreign policymaking 
rests within the arena of interest-group politics.  Mancur Olson (1965) observed that the key 
to political action for groups is to overcome the dilemma of collective action.  Groups that 
could mobilize for politial action are clearly the ones representing the constellation of interest 
groups in the foreign-policy arena.  The NATO enlargement case shows the role of the Polish 
American Congress spearheading the lobbying campaign by mobilizing grassroots support 
from its local and state divisions and chapters.  This is especially apparent for grassroots 
groups reliant on their members as a source of political influence.  Group leaders need to 
convince their members to pursue political action, and the grassroots pressure would force 
policymakers to pay attention to their causes.  This study shows that political mobilization is 
a prerequisite for group influence in the policy process.  Having groups with significant 
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presence in electorally-influential areas is a factor, but if they are not able to mobilize for 
grassroots action, then they are not likely to convert that into political influence.  Outside 
lobbying is not devoid of organization and leadership.  In fact, they are critical to the success 
of any grassroots campaigns.  Outside lobbying connects the internal organizational aspect of 
group influence with the policymaking arena.  More importantly, it demonstrates to 
policymakers the potential for groups to mobilize for grassroots action.  The key to 
explaining the lack of diversity in ethnic activism in U.S. foreign policy is the fact that some 
groups have not been able to overcome the dilemma of collective action.  The inability for 
some groups to mobilize for political action is a key factor limiting the diversity of ethnic-
group influence in the politics of U.S. foreign policy.  Simply put, some groups do not have 
the organizational skills to force policymakers to pay attention. 
 Related to the issue of collective action is the lack of general public awareness for 
foreign-policy issues.  Groups that are able to mobilize for political action have members 
who are passionate about the issues of concern.  The NATO enlargement case shows that the 
ethnic communities of Central and Eastern European origins are passionate regarding issues 
concerning U.S. relations with their ancestral homelands.  The same could be said about the 
roles of Cuban Americans, Armenian Americans, and Jewish Americans, other influential 
ethnic groups involved in U.S. foreign policymaking today (Paul & Paul, 2009, pp. 136-51).  
This study shows that grassroots groups could exert influence over the policy process if they 
could mobilize for political action.  This study did not find that the strategies groups used to 
lobby foreign-policy decisions are different from those used in domestic-policy lobbying.  
Outside lobbying, regardless of the policy dimension, shared the same objective in forcing 
policymakers to pay attention.  However, what is apparent in group politics in foreign-policy 
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lobbying is the lack of competition.  The mobilization of bias is clearly in favor of groups 
willing to pursue political action (Schattschneider, 1960).  It is possible that intermestic 
issues, such as international trade, are more likely to see a healthy debate between groups 
arguing the pros and cons of an issue.  But it is less apparent where the domestic 
consequences rest on international security issues, such as NATO enlargement, except for the 
assurance in the ethnic communities that their ancestral homelands are integrated in U.S.-led 
security institutions.  Groups involved on issues not regarded by the general public as salient 
are more likely to shape public debate.  The limits to diversity and pluralism in U.S. 
policymaking is attributed to the fact that not all groups are created equal.  Groups that have 
better organizational capabilities and financial resources are more effective in mobilizing for 
political action.  But the general public apathy on most foreign-policy issues means that 
groups able to mobilize on these issues are likely to dominate public discourse, and thus 
more likely to win as well. 
Part III:  Directions for Further Research 
The Transnational Impact 
Although this study focuses on U.S.-based groups in the domestic politics of NATO 
enlargement, the role of foreign governments also deserves attention.  By far the most 
important figure was Poland’s ambassador to the U.S. Jerzy Kozminski (Goldgeier, 1999, pp. 
138-9).  The Polish embassy orchestrated a lobbying campaign for NATO membership that, 
in many ways, paralleled the administration’s effort.  The Polish embassy in Washington 
D.C. mobilized its consulates in Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York to build U.S. public 
support for NATO enlargement.  Grayson (1999, p. 181) wrote about the efforts of the Polish 
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diplomatic corps at the grassroots level:  “The consul-generals helped build build support 
among local business, trade unions, civic associations, and fraternal organizations.  Polish 
diplomats actually took the lead in obtaining endorsements from nineteen state legislatures.  
Later, they joined Rosner in soliciting support from governors, mayors, and city councils, an 
activity the embassy had begun before NERO’s [the administration’s ratification office] 
formation.”  The Polish embassy’s efforts to build grassroots support was also assisted by the 
local divisions and chapters of the Polish American Congress (Goldgeier, 1999, pp. 138-9).  
The Czech and Hungarian embassies in Washington pursued similar efforts, but the 
campaign by the Polish embassy carried the most weight owing to the large number of Polish 
Americans. 
 Robert Putnam (1988), in his seminal essay on two-level games, noted the potential 
for foreign governments to collude with domestic groups to affect the terms of ratification for 
international agreements.  Knopf (1998, p. 70) also raised a similar point:  “it is important to 
consider the possible impact of interaction between U.S. activism and advocacy efforts by 
governmental and societal actors abroad.”  The politics of NATO enlargement presents an 
opportunity to examine the possibility of candidate states seeking to influence the decision-
making of NATO members, especially the U.S.  A strategy foreign governments use is 
domestic political penetration, and according to Walt (2005, p. 198), this strategy is effective 
when “a foreign government can rely upon a sympathetic group of supporters within the 
target country.”  Unlike hiring professional lobbyists, who are often portrayed as “hired 
guns,” foreign governments working with domestic groups confer a level of legitimacy to 
their lobbying activities.  The Polish government bolstered its legitmacy by working with the 
Polish American Congress and the administration’s ratification team.  The ability to connect 
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with both domestic groups and the U.S. government in Poland’s campaign for NATO 
membership points to a new path of research in the lobbying behavior of foreign 
governments.  While there are numerous stories of foreign governments spending million of 
dollars seeking to improve their images in the U.S., an avenue of research is the examination 
of how foreign governments seek to legitimize their lobbying activities through cooperation 
with domestic groups. 
Keeping NATO’s Door Opened 
The role of the ethnic coalition in lobbying for NATO expansion did not end when Poland, 
the Czech Republic, and Hungary were officially admitted into NATO in April 1999, the 50th 
anniversary of the Alliance’s founding.  Clinton’s vision of an unified, democratic Europe 
could only be realized if NATO expansion did not estabish new lines of division.  Goldgeier 
(1999, p. 172) wrote:  “The paradox of enlargement, however, is that the first round only 
makes sense if NATO delivers on the Clinton administration’s open-door promise in the 
future.”  The presence of the ethnic coalition after the completion of the first round 
demonstrated continued public support for NATO enlargement.  What was significant about 
the role of ethnic groups was that they lobbied together on behalf of a common endeavor.  
The 18 organizations that comprise the Central and East Europe Coalition all support NATO 
memberships for their ancestral homelands.  During the first round of enlargement, Baltic-
American associations were just as enthusiastic about bringing Poland, the Czech Republic, 
and Hungary into NATO as the Polish American Congress and Hungarian American 
Coalition.  The two organizations returned the favor by lobbying for a second round of 
enlargement, which included the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) plus Romania, 
Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Slovenia.  Even before Senate ratification of the first round was 
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completed, the CEEC lobbied the Clinton administration to keep NATO’s door opened.  In a 
letter to Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the CEEC stated:  “The time has come, we 
feel, to make it clear that the second round of enlargement will follow” (Hungarian American 
Coalition, 1998).  The signing of the U.S.-Baltic Charter in January 1998 was important in 
expressing U.S. support for the aspirations of the Baltic states to join NATO (Asmus, 2002, 
pp. 155-63).  However, the decision regarding the next round of enlargement would be made 
by the George W. Bush administration. 
 The second round presents an opportunity for another case study on the role of 
interest groups in NATO enlargement.  This is an interesting case since not much is known 
about the activities of the ethnic coalition and other pro-enlargement groups during the 
debate on the second round.  The research design of this study could be applied and would 
complement the use of structured, focused comparison.  While the case study on the first 
round considered the shift from unified to divided government as a result of a change in party 
control of Congress, the second round presents a case to analyze the shift from divided to 
unified government as a result of change in party control of the presidential administration.  
The change from a Democratic to Republican administration was a significant political 
development.  Owing to the importance of the executive branch in foreign-policy initiation, 
its impact on the agenda-setting dynamics may be more important than change in party 
control of Congress.  An issue to consider here is how did change in party control of the 
executive branch affect the ethnic coalition’s access to the White House vis-à-vis Congress. 
 If congressional interest in the second round is less than the first, generating public 
momentum would be even more important.  The Bush administration did not establish an 
office tasked with NATO enlargement ratification similar to what the Clinton administration 
166 
 
did during the first round.  The lobbying by the ethnic coalition in the lead-up to the 
ratification vote during the first round was coordinated by the administration.  An issue to 
examine is the ethnic coalition cooperating with other pro-enlargement groups to build 
grassroots support for the second round in the absence of administration links built 
specifically for ratifying enlargement.  A case study based on the events of the second round 
of NATO enlargement would be a logical extension of this study.  The lack of secondary 
sources on the second round would necessitate interviews with members of Congress, 
administration officials, ethnic leaders, etc.  This would further the understanding on the role 
of interest groups in the U.S. politics of NATO enlargement and provide an original 
contribution to the topic. 
Comparative Politics of NATO Enlargement 
NATO is an institution that operates according to constitutional principles.  Article 11 of the 
Washington Treaty called for the ratification of amendments be subjected to the 
“constitutional processes” of all NATO members.  Rosner (1996) observed that while other 
NATO members required simple majorities in party-disciplined legislatures for ratification, 
the U.S. imposed the highest political hurdle, requiring a two-thirds majority from the 
“notoriously independent Senate.”  Differences in the terms of ratification among NATO 
members offers an opportunity to propose a research agenda examining the comparative 
politics of NATO enlargement.  This line of research puts into focus the impact of domestic 
structure on state-society relations.  As Risse-Kappen (1991, p. 484) observed, “Domestic 
structures determine how political systems respond to societal demands.”  The institutional 
setup of political systems impact how societal groups exert influence over the policy process.  
For example, the U.S., with political power divided and shared between the executive and 
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legislative branches, creates opportunities for interest groups to seek access to two separate 
yet interdependent decision-making arenas.  The lobbying behavior of interest groups in 
parliamentary systems could be different due to the executive being responsible to the 
legislature.  Thus, “A state’s structure may affect the balance of power between domestic 
groups, their opportunities for striking coalitions, and their ability to construct issue-
linkages” (Rauchhaus, 2000, p. 180).  While attention is focused on the role of ethnic groups 
in the U.S. lobbying for NATO enlargement, this genre of research could be extended to 
examine the role of societal groups in non-U.S. settings.  It would further our understanding 
on variation in domestic structures on group lobbying behavior. 
Final Thoughts 
The aim of this study is to examine the impact of partisanship in policymaking on the 
behavior of interest groups.  The findings suggest that the executive-legislative context 
indeed shapes the strategies groups use to access the respective decision-making arenas.  In 
fact, increased contention in executive-legislative relations may actually provide interest 
groups more latitude in exerting influence over the policy process.  Foreign policymaking is 
not immune to the partisan politics normally associated with domestic policymaking.  
Partisanship and divided government are likely to remain an integral part in relations 
between Congress and the White House in the 21st century.  Cooperation and contention 
between both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue are likely to shape the parameters of interest-
group access.  If there is greater cooperation between the executive and legislative branches, 
interest groups would have less opportunity to exploit partisan divisions.  However, if 
executive-legislative contention intensifies, this may be a positive sign for interest groups.  
There are indications that the partisanship that defined foreign policymaking in the 1990s 
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would remain in the 21st century.  With less agreement about the role of the U.S. in world 
affairs, an executive-legislative “tug-of-war” over foreign policymaking is likely to continue.  
Thus, pessimism for cooperation between the branches means optimism for interest-group 
activity.  Interest groups have been a vibrant part of American political life and would remain 
so in the 21st century.  Their active involvement is contributing to the growing pluralism in 
U.S. foreign policymaking in a partisan era.
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